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Risk tradeoff analysis is in the process of transformingthe practiceof regulation.Its core
idea is simple and intuitively appealing:Regulations undertaken to minimize or eliminate certain
health risks often have the perverse effect of promoting otherrisks A seriousanalysis of the impact
of a regulationshould pay attention not only to its primary effects in reducing the so-called target
risk, but also to the secondary effects of the regulationin bringingabout "ancillaryrisk&" In this
way, risk tradeoffanalysispromisesa more rationaltechniquefor the evaluationof regulation.
Risk tradeoffanalysi, however,focuses exclusively on the negative secondary effects of risk
regulation,but systematically ignores the phenomenon of "ancillarybenefits;"the reductionsin risk
that take place in addition to-and as a direct or indirect result of-reductions in the target risk.
The resulting conclusionsare thereforeconsistently biasedagainstregulation.This methodological
bias is; in turn, reinforced by an institutionalbias that emerges when risk tradeoff analysis is applied in the administrativestate.Agency inattentionto ancillary effects gives rise to iterativeprocesses of administrativeoversight andjudicialreview thatprivilege the opponents of regulation.
This Article sheds light on these biases and proposes a solution. ancillary benefit analysia
This technique would directthe attention of administrativedecisionmakersto the positive byproducts of regulation designed to promote health, safety, and the environment.At a time when risk
tradeoffanalysis enjoys ever-growing support in the courts and the academy, this Article proposes
an approachthrough which to counteractits one-sidednes&

INTRODUCTION

"Risk-risk analysis,"1 also referred to as "risk tradeoff analysis"2
and "health-health analysis,, 3 is transforming the practice of regulat Law Clerk to Judge Pierre N. Leval of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; Postdoctoral Fellow, Center on Environmental and Land Use Law, New York University School of Law, Fall 2001. A.B. 1996, Harvard University; B.A. 1998, Oxford University;
J.D. 2001, Yale Law School.
tt Dean and Lawrence King Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. The
Filomen D'Agostino and Max E. Greenberg Research Fund at the New York University School
of Law provided financial assistance. We are grateful for the comments of Noah Feldman, Louis
Kaplow, Lewis Kornhauser, Howell Jackson, Richard Stewart, W. Kip Viscusi, Jonathan Wiener,
and the participants in the Law and Economics Workshop at Harvard Law School and in the
Advanced Environmental Law Seminar at New York University School of Law. Itai Greenberg
and Kelsey Jack were excellent research assistants.
I
The concept of "risk-risk" was first explained in Lester B. Lave, The Strategy of Social
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tion. In a path-breaking concurrence in Whitman v American Trucking

Associations, Inc, last term's most-watched administrative law case,
Justice Stephen Breyer explicitly embraced the methodology, to
which we shall refer generally as risk tradeoff analysis. A number of
prominent federal judges, principally Judge Stephen Williams of the
D.C. Circuit (who, like Justice Breyer, is a distinguished scholar in the

field), and administrative law scholars, such as Professors Cass Sun8 and W. Kip Viscusi,9 have also advocated the broad application
stein
Regulation:Decision Frameworksfor Policy 15 (Brookings 1981).
2 The most comprehensive work to date on risk tradeoffs is John D. Graham and Jonathan
Baert Wiener, eds, Risk versus Risk. Tradeoffs in ProtectingHealth and the Environment (Harvard 1995). Graham and Wiener coined the term "risk tradeoff analysis" See John D. Graham
and Jonathan Baert Wiener, ConfrontingRisk Tradeoffs, in Graham and Wiener, eds, Risk versus
Risk 1, 4.
3 The secondary literature on health-health tradeoffs, which significantly overlaps with the
secondary literature on health-wealth interactions, is extensive. For an important investigation of
the implications of health-health tradeoffs for law, see, for example, Cass R. Sunstein, HealthHealth Tradeoffs, 63 U Chi L Rev 1533 (1996) (proposing a framework for how regulatory agencies should approach health-health tradeoffs). See also Ralph L. Keeney, Mortality Risks Induced
by Economic Expenditures, 10 Risk Anal 147 (1990) (presenting a framework for investigating
indirect health risks due to expenditures); Aaron Wildavsky, Searching for Safety (Social Philosophy and Policy Center 1988) (arguing that health, safety, and risk should be viewed as inevitably mixed); Aaron Wildavsky, Richer Is Safer, 60 Pub Int 23 (1980) (observing connections between greater wealth and increased health).
4
531 US 457,490 (2001) (Breyer concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
5 In addition to his judicial writing, Justice Breyer has contributed an important monograph in the area of risk regulation. See Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation (Harvard 1993) (calling for greater rationality and coordination in federal health-and-safety regulation).
6 The precise meaning of these concepts is contested. For the purposes of this Article, we
will employ the concept of risk tradeoff analysis to encompass a broad range of phenomena. This
approach is consistent with our observations that these methodological approaches bear an important "family resemblance" to one another, and differ primarily in the relative directness of
the ancillary effects of the regulation. See text accompanying notes 32-37.
7
Judge Williams has employed risk tradeoff analysis both in his opinions, see text accompanying notes 60-66,71-73, and 96-97, and in his scholarly articles, see, for example, Stephen F.
Williams, The Era of "Risk-Risk" and the Problem of Keeping the APA Up to Date, 63 U Chi L
Rev 1375 (1996) (discussing approaches to risk-risk and health-health analysis); Stephen E Williams, Second Best: The Soft Underbelly of DeterrenceTheory in Tort,106 Harv L Rev 932 (1993)
(applying risk-risk analysis to tort law).
8 See, for example, Cass R. Sunstein, Free Markets and Social Justice 298-317 (Oxford
1997) (proposing a framework for health-health tradeoffs); Sunstein, 63 U Chi L Rev at 1561-69
(cited in note 3) (exploring the application of risk tradeoff analysis in the courts and throughout
the administrative state); Cass R. Sunstein, Legislative Foreword:Congress, ConstitutionalMoments; and the Cost-Benefit State, 48 Stan L Rev 247, 307 (1996) (examining the 104th Congress
and the Contract with America as signals of the evolution of a cost-benefit state).
9 See, for example, W. Kip Viscusi, Regulating the Regulators,63 U Chi L Rev 1423,143755 (1996) (exploring various techniques for assessing risk-risk analysis, among other regulatory
techniques); W. Kip Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs: Publicand PrivateResponsibilitiesfor Risk 149-292
(Oxford 1992) (addressing fundamental principles of risk regulation). For a general discussion of
the relationship between risk regulation and health expenditures and its impact on standard
cost-benefit and risk reduction tests, see W. Kip Viscusi, Mortality Effects of Regulatory Costs and
Policy Evaluation Criteria,25 RAND J Econ 94 (1994).
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of risk tradeoff analysis. Congress has on numerous occasions considered the possibility of requiring agencies to undertake some type of
risk tradeoff analysis before promulgating regulations.' And John D.
Graham, perhaps the name most closely identified with the emergence of risk tradeoff analysis,11 was recently tapped by President Bush
to head the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs ("OIRA")
in the Office of Management and Budget ("OMB"), the institution responsible for overseeing the regulatory efforts of administrative agencies.1
The guiding idea behind risk tradeoff analysis is simple and intuitively appealing: Regulations undertaken to minimize or eliminate

certain health risks often have the perverse effect of promoting other
risks." A serious analysis of a regulation should therefore pay attention not only to the regulation's primary effects in reducing the socalled target risk,' but also to the secondary effects of the regulation

in calling forth "countervailing" or "ancillary" risks.'5 In this way, risk
tradeoff analysis• promises
a more rational technique for the evalua16
tion of regulation.
10 See, for example, HR 1022, § 105(4), 104th Cong, 1st Sess (Feb 23, 1995), which on
March 3,1995 became part of HR 9, § 415(4), 104th Cong, 1st Sess (Jan 4, 1995) ("Each significant risk assessment or risk characterization document shall include a statement of any significant substitution risks to human health, where information on such risks has been provided to
the agency."); S 343, § 636(2), 104th Cong, 1st Sess (Feb 2,1995) ("When a covered agency provides a risk assessment or risk characterization for a proposed or final regulatory action, such assessment or characterization shall include a statement of any significant substitution risks, when
information on such risks has been made available to the agency."); S 981, § 624(h), 105th Cong,
2d Sess (June 27,1997) ("When scientifically appropriate information on significant substitution
risks to health, safety, or the environment is reasonably available to the agency, the agency shall
describe such risks in the risk assessment."); S 746, § 621(11), 106th Cong, 1st Sess (Mar 25,1999)
(defining the term "substitution risk"); HR 3311, § 621 (7)(C)(ii), 106th Cong, 1st Sess (Nov 10,
1999) (requiring that any health, safety, or environmental regulation be accompanied by a risk
assessment of, inter alia, "an evaluation of any substitution risk relating to the proposed rule").
11 See generally Graham and Wiener, eds, Risk versus Risk (cited in note 2) (presenting the
most sustained account of risk tradeoffs to date).
12 Graham was confirmed by the Senate on July 19,2001, by a vote of 61-37. See Washington in Brief,Wash Post A4 (July 20,2001).
13 See text accompanying notes 42-49 and 67-78 for some examples.
14 Graham and 'Wiener define "target risk" as "the risk that is the primary focus of riskreduction efforts" Graham and Wiener, ConfrontingRisk Tradeoffs at 23 (cited in note 2). Sunstein speaks of the "regulated risk." Sunstein, 63 U Chi L Rev at 1539 (cited in note 3).
1
Graham and Wiener define a "countervailing risk" (which we use interchangeably with
"ancillary risk") as "the chance of an adverse outcome that results from an activity whose ostensible purpose is to reduce the target risk." Graham and Wiener, ConfrontingRisk Tradeoffs at 23
(cited in note 2).
16 Risk tradeoffs are essentially a case of a broader phenomenon of actions that bring
about unanticipated or undesirable side effects. In a meaningful sense, the economic analysis of
externalities represents an attempt to come to terms with such a phenomenon. See, for example,
Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral,85 Harv L Rev 1089,1111-12 (1972) (noting some legal implications
of externalities). See also Edward Tenner, Why Things Bite Back- Technology and the Revenge of
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In practice, however, risk tradeoff analysis does not deliver on
that promise. At the core of risk tradeoff analysis lies an important
methodological flaw: inattention to ancillary benefits. Risk tradeoff
analysis focuses on and attempts to quantify only the negative-that is
to say, the risk-promoting-secondary effects of risk regulation.
Through the very definition of its own methodological enterprise, risk
tradeoff analysis systematically ignores the phenomenon of "ancillary
benefits," reductions in risk that take place in addition to-and as a direct or indirect result of-reductions in the target risk. The resulting
legal and scholarly conclusions about the desirability of regulation
therefore are consistently distorted.
Although they have not yet figured in academic debates about
regulation or in regulatory practice, ancillary benefits have been observed across a broad range of contexts. A representative list reveals
the widespread nature of the phenomenon. 7 For example, a more
stringent standard for carbon monoxide emissions in automobile exhaust not only achieved its target of reducing air pollution, but also
had the ancillary benefit of significantly reducing loss of life attributable to carbon monoxide-related accidents and suicides.' Policies targeting greenhouse gas reductions can be expected to have the ancillary benefit of reducing conventional air pollutants.'9 Policies favoring
wastewater management through constructed wetlands have ancillary
benefits for public use and preservation of habitats.20
Medical interventions-most notably drug therapies-have been
observed to have significant ancillary benefits.2 ' To take only a few
examples, aspirin, first introduced as an analgesic and anti-pyretic,
is now widely used to reduce the risk of heart attack, "2 and may help
prevent against certain cancers.N Minoxidil, approved by the FDA as
Unintended Consequences (Knopf 1996) (observing that technological innovation entails unwanted consequences).
17 We discuss these and other examples of ancillary benefits more fully in Part III.C In
Part III.B we argue that there is no convincing argument why ancillary benefits should be less
prevalent than ancillary harms.
18 See M. Shele, UnanticipatedBenefits of Automotive Emission Controk Reduction in

Fatalitiesby Motor Vehicle Exhaust Gas, 1461147 Sci Total Envir 93, 93-94 (1994).
19 See generally Dallas Burtraw, et al, Ancillary Benefits of Reduced Air Pollution in the
United Statesfrom Moderate GreenhouseGas MitigationPolicies in the Electricity Sector, Discussion Paper No 01-61 (Resources for the Future 2001), available online at <http://www.rfforg/
disc..papers/PDF -fies/0161.pdf> (visited April 20,2002).
20 See, Robert L. Knight, Wildlife Habitatand Public Use Benefits of Treatment Wetlands,

35 Water Sci & Tech 35,36-39 (1995).
21 We discuss these and other instances of the ancillary benefits of drug therapies in Part
III.C1.
22 See, for example, Prevention:Aspirin Underusedto PreventHeartAttacks Strokes, Heart

Disease Weekly 8, 9 (Feb 3,2002) ("[A]spirin is a life-saving treatment that will provide major
benefits to many thousands of people at high risk of heart attack or stroke.").
23
See, for example, Pasi Jiinne and Robert J. Mayer, Chemoprevention of ColorectalCan-
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an antihypertensive, is now more frequently prescribed to treat hair
loss.24 As this partial survey suggests, ancillary benefits are a real-if
heretofore understudied-phenomenon.
The methodological bias born of inattention to ancillary benefits
is in turn perpetuated and reinforced by institutional biases that

emerge when risk tradeoff analysis is applied in the rulemaking process. "Tunnel vision" within agencies prevents them from considering

ancillary effects altogether-both positive and negative." However,
the processes that OIRA and the courts use to review agency action

privilege consideration of ancillary harms over ancillary benefits.
OIRA generally is perceived to have pursued an antiregulatory
agenda2 6 ever since Executive Order 12291 empowered it to review
regulation for compliance with cost-benefit principles.n It is not surprising, therefore, that OMB oversight privileges the ancillary harms
of regulation over ancillary benefits.n In the courts, bias emerges from
the complex interplay between various doctrines and incentive struc-

tures associated with judicial review of regulation. The cumulative effect of the biases that emerge from the review of agency action by
OIRA and the courts is to place an unjustified obstacle in the way of
socially beneficial regulations."
We propose a remedy for these methodological and institutional
biases: ancillary benefit analysis.n This technique corrects the methcer, 342 New Eng J Med 1960, 1961 (2000) (noting that "it is likely that aspirin ... act[s] as [a]
chemopreventive agent[j at early stages of carcinogenesis").
24
See, for example, Vera H. Price, Treatment of Hair Loss, 341 New Eng J Med 964, 966
(1999).
25 See Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle at 11 (cited in note 5) (proposing that standard
economic analysis, which fails to take externalities into account, leads to undesirable results
when choosing between regulatory alternatives). See also Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation
of EnvironmentalRegulation?,29 Cap U L Rev 21,153 (2001) (drawing attention to the problem
of fragmentation in environmental regulation).
26 See, for example, Robert V. Percival, et al, EnvironmentalRegulation: Law,Science, and
Policy 694 (Little, Brown 1996) ("What does seem evident is that regulatory review was used exclusively to promote less stringent regulation rather than to increase the net benefits of regulation?'); Erik D. Olson, The Quiet Shift of Power: Office of Management & Budget Supervision of
EnvironmentalProtectionAgency Rulemaking under Executive Order 12,291,4Va J Natural Resources L 1, 43 (1984) (citing former OIRA Deputy Administrator Jim Tozzi for the idea that
OMB begins with a "rebuttable presumption against regulation").
27 Exec Order 12291,3 CFR § 127 (1981). This executive order, which has been called the
"'constitution' of OMB review," E. Donald Elliott, TQM-ing OMB: Or Why Regulatory Review
under Executive Order12,291 Works Poorlyand What PresidentClinton Should Do aboutIt, 57 L
& Contemp Probs 167,169 (Spring 1994), required a Regulatory Impact Analysis of all rules with
an annual economic impact of $100 million or more. We discuss the OMB review process more
fully in Part IV.B.
28 See text accompanying notes 318-20.
29 See text accompanying note 62.
30 We propose ancillary benefit analysis as an antidote to the one-sidedness of risk tradeoff
analysis. It is not intended as an alternative (but rather as a potential aid) to cost-benefit analysis,
although, together with risk tradeoff analysis, it may occasionally function as such, as where cost-
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odological bias in risk tradeoff analysis by directing attention to the
positive ancillary effects generated by environmental and health-andsafety regulation. Moreover, administrative agencies that invoke ancillary benefit analysis at the time of their initial decision can avoid the
institutional biases otherwise introduced by OIRA and the courts. In
turn, Congress, in considering future regulatory reform legislation,
should require agencies to consider ancillary benefits alongside ancillary risks.
At a time when risk tradeoff analysis enjoys ever-growing support in the courts and the academy, we raise serious questions about
its one-sidedness. By complementing-rather than displacing-risk
tradeoff analysis, ancillary benefit analysis will help promote greater
rationality in the administrative state.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I presents a typology of risk
tradeoffs, focusing on the kinds of tradeoffs that have been observed
by academic commentators. It draws on a number of opinions by
Judge Williams to illustrate how such tradeoffs have become cognizable in the judicial review of administrative action.
Part II underscores the striking ascendancy of risk tradeoff analysis both in the academy and in the regulatory state. It begins by outlining various academic proposals for its widespread implementation.
Then it turns to an analysis of the current role of risk tradeoff analysis
in Congress, the agencies, and OMB. In order to highlight the growing
prominence of risk tradeoff analysis in the courts, Part II engages in a
'
close reading of Justice Breyer's concurrence in American Trucking.
Part III focuses on the inattention to ancillary benefits in the administrative state and among academic proponents of risk tradeoff
analysis. It first offers a historical account of this methodological bias.
Then it critically evaluates a defense, put forward by John D. Graham
and Jonathan Baert Wiener on public choice grounds, of the inattention to ancillary benefits. Drawing on the typology of risk tradeoffs
identified in Part I, it next provides examples of different types of ancillary benefits that have been observed. Finally, it raises serious
methodological questions about health-health tradeoffs and lulling effects, two types of risk tradeoffs.
Part IV addresses the institutional biases in the application of risk
tradeoff analysis that reinforce the methodological bias. As already
indicated, these biases arise from the tunnel vision of administrative
agencies coupled with the manner in which OMB performs a centralized review of regulations and the doctrines governing judicial review
of administrative action.
benefit analysis is prohibited by statute.
31 531 US at 490.

The Biases of Risk TradeoffAnalysis

2002]

1769

In Part V, we discuss how to address the antiregulatory effects of
current administrative practice. We argue that the character of OMB
review is unlikely to change and that courts cannot solve the problem
as a result of the well-established doctrines governing judicial review.
To the extent that Congress enacts comprehensive regulatory reform
legislation in the future, it should treat risk tradeoffs and ancillary
benefits in a parallel manner, not privileging the former over the latter. At present, however, the best answer lies with the agencies. We
develop a case study to show how agencies might consider ancillary
benefits in the rulemaking process.
The Conclusion places our call for ancillary benefit analysis
within a broader conceptual framework. We underscore that a commitment to rationality requires parity in the treatment of risk tradeoffs and ancillary benefits.
I. A TAXONOMY OF RISK TRADEOFFS
We define four categories of risk tradeoffs: direct risk tradeoffs,
substitution effects, lulling effects, and health-health tradeoffs.2 We
provide prominent examples of each category from the academic literature and from Judge Williams's judicial opinions.
Our typology analyzes the various kinds of risk tradeoffs according to the relationship between the regulatory intervention and the
ancillary risk. Does the ancillary risk come about directly as a result of
the regulation, or is its emergence mediated by an intervening chain of
events?" In direct risk tradeoffs, the causal link is typically robust. By
contrast, where risk tradeoffs are generated through substitution effects, lulling effects, or health-health tradeoffs, the connection between
the regulatory intervention and the ancillary effect is somewhat more
tenuous.
Distinguishing among various types of tradeoffs on the basis of
the nexus between the regulation and the tradeoff to which it gives
rise is useful for three reasons.- First, it draws attention to an impor32 Sunstein provides a suggestive list of various types of tradeoffs but does not produce a
typology. See Sunstein, 63 U Chi L Rev at 1541-42 (cited in note 3).
33 Commentators have referred to "direct" and "indirect" risk-risk phenomena, although
not precisely in the sense that we do. Lester Lave, for instance, distinguishes between direct and
indirect effects not in terms of their causal link to a regulatory intervention, but in terms of the
population affected. See Lave, Strategy of Social Regulation at 15-17 (cited in note 1).
34 Graham and Wiener provide a different typology, which focuses on two dimensions: the
nature of the ancillary risk as compared with the target risk, and the population affected by the
ancillary risk as compared with the target risk. They produce the following two-by-two matrix:

SAME POPULATION
DIFFERENT POPULATION

I SAME TYPE
Risk Offset

DIFFERENTTYPE

Risk Transfer

Risk Transformation

Risk Substitution
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tant methodological question about risk tradeoff analysis: How immediate a relationship must the ancillary effect bear to the regulatory intervention in order to be taken into account by risk tradeoff analysis? ' Second, our taxonomy reveals the strong family resemblance shared
by the various types of tradeoffs. In the face of some attempts to distinguish rigidly between direct and substitution risk tradeoffs on the
one hand, and health-health tradeoffs on the other,3 we show their
important analytic continuities. Finally, in spite of its growing importance, risk tradeoff analysis has been riddled by terminological confusion.- Our typology suggests a coherent approach to analyzing related
phenomena.
Graham and Wiener, Confronting Risk Tradeoffs at 19-22 (cited in note 2). They helpfully draw
attention to two important dimensions of risk tradeoffs. First, by observing that the ancillary risk
might differ in kind from the target risk (whether through what they call "substitution" or "transformation"), they help explain why government agencies, which suffer from tunnel vision and
bureaucratic fragmentation, often fail to take ancillary effects into account. See id at 22-25. See
also the discussion of fragmentation of decisionmaking into specialized "bounded oversight
roles" in Jonathan Baert Wiener and John D. Graham, Resolving Risk Tradeoffs, in Graham and
Wiener, eds, Risk versus Risk 226,235-41 (cited in note 2), and the discussion of tunnel vision in
Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle at 11-19 (cited in note 5). We discuss the problem of bureaucratic fragmentation in the text accompanying notes 295-316. Second, this typology throws light
on the redistributive aspects of regulatory intervention by observing that the populations affected by the target and ancillary risks might be different. We critically examine "risk transfers"
and "risk transformations" in the text accompanying notes 196-201.
35 "An important question about a possible methodology for estimating indirect risks is,
where should one stop modeling?" Ralph L. Keeney and Detlof von W'mterfeldt, Why Indirect
Health Risks of Regulation Should Be Examined, 16 Interfaces 13, 25 (Nov/Dec 1986). Wiener
thoughtfully considers what he refers to as the "optimal stopping problem." Jonathan Baert Wiener, Managingthe latrogenicRisks of Risk Management,9 Risk 39,73-74 (1998).
36 Graham and Wiener, for instance, question the inclusion of health-health effects under
the rubric of risk tradeoffs, since the health risks associated with the high cost of regulation "are
not uniquely related to policies aimed at risk reduction" Graham and Wiener, Confronting Risk
Tradeoffs at 20 (cited in note 2). They reason that all government spending, and not just spending
on health-and-safety regulation, may reduce overall economic performance, and with it overall
health. Similarly, Wiener compares direct risk tradeoffs to iatrogenesic disease and injury, while
analogizing health-health tradeoffs to triage, where resources committed to one enterprise or
cause are not available for another. See Wiener, 9 Risk at 51-53 (1998) (cited in note 35).
However, a form of the same critical argument can be applied to direct risk tradeoffs as well.
Imagine the entire universe of decisions that bring about ancillary health risks. Some of those
decisions will take the form of health-and-safety regulations, but many of them will not. Just as
there is nothing unique in the manner in which health-and-safety regulations lead to economic
losses, there is also nothing distinctive about the way in which health-and-safety regulations (as
opposed to other types of government interventions) produce ancillary harms. As a result, we
view health-health analysis-the study of ancillary risks to health mediated by economic transformations-as an instance of risk tradeoffs.
37 For example, different authors mean different things by "health-health tradeoffs" Sunstein uses the term "health-health tradeoff" synonymously with risk-risk tradeoff, to refer to
situations where "the diminution of one health risk simultaneously increasesanotherhealth risk."
Sunstein, 63 U Chi L Rev at 1535 (cited in note 3). Randall Lutter and John Morrall use the term
to convey a risk tradeoff mediated by a decline in overall wealth. See Randall Lutter and John F.
Morrall III, Health-HealthAnalysis: A New Way to Evaluate Health and Safety Regulation, 8 J
Risk & Uncertainty 43,44-48 (1994).
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A. Direct Risk Tradeoffs
What we refer to as direct risk tradeoffs embrace a range of phenomena in which the very act of regulating the target risk itself brings
about ancillary risks. Perhaps the paradigmatic examples of such direct tradeoffs are the negative side effects associated with medical interventions.n Known as iatrogenic disease or injury, this phenomenon
is widespread and serious. A recent study found that 3.7 percent of
hospitalizations brought on care-induced effects, of which 14 percent
were fatal." Overall, iatrogenic disease or injury is responsible for
more than 7.5 percent of the total deaths in the country every year.40
As one commentator has noted: "[T]he medical care component of
society's risk regulation
regime is a source of quite significant
41
countervailing risks.'
The pattern of well-intentioned actions or decisions bringing
about negative side effects is also familiar in health, safety, and environmental regulations.0 For example, the health risks posed by white
asbestos (prevalent in schools and other public buildings) are minimal,
while its removal "stirs up and sends into the air white asbestos fibers
that would otherwise remain in place, thus threatening removal workers"-with the result that "removal is likely more dangerous than doing nothing."4' Requiring that children's pajamas be treated with Tris
(2,3-dibromopropyl phosphate) protected the children from fire but
enhanced their risk of developing certain cancers." And policies to reduce the amount of chlorine in water because of its carcinogenic
properties at the same time may increase exposure to the microbial
diseases that had formerly been killed by the chlorine.4'
38 See Wiener, 9 Risk at 39 & n 1 (cited in note 35) (presenting a number of studies on
iatrogenesis).
39 Id at 46, citing Paul C. Weiler, et al, A Measure of Malpractice:Medical Injury, Malpractice Litigation, and PatientCompensation43-44 (Harvard 1993) (presenting the results of a study

by the Harvard Medical Practice Study Group).
40 Id at 47.
41 Id at 48.
42 See id at 40 (arguing that iatrogenesis and risk tradeoffs in the regulatory context are

conceptually similar). See also id at 41 n 14, citing Daniel Patrick Moynihan, latrogenicGovernment: Social Policy and Drug Research, 62 Am Scholar 351 (1993) (discussing the negative side
effects of drug regulation). In the context of this discussion we convey by "regulatory interven-

tions" not just rules promulgated by administrative agencies, but also collective decisions to promote health and safety more broadly.
43 Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circleat 12 (cited in note 5)(discussing asbestos regulation
as an example of agency tunnel vision). For a helpful catalog of risk tradeoffs, see Graham and

Wiener, ConfrontingRisk Tradeoffs at 12-17 (cited in note 2).
44 See Chris Whipple, Redistributing Risk, 9 Reg 37,38 (May/June 1985) (describing how

this regulation was the source of new risk).
45 See Graham and Wiener, ConfrontingRisk Tradeoffs at 15 (cited in note 2), citing Christopher Anderson, CholeraEpidemic Traced to Risk Miscalculation,354 Nature 255 (1991) (providing an example of a risk miscalculation).
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A direct risk tradeoff can take a toll in health, safety, or environmental integrity in multiple ways. The intervention may itself pose a
health risk, as in the asbestos example above or when the implementation of safety equipment takes a toll in lives and health.'6 Alternatively,
the intervention may reduce the benefits formerly provided by a nowregulated substance or procedure. Such is the case in the chlorine example above or, for instance, when the removal of asbestos takes a toll
in reduced fire safety. The same is true of a regulation that aims to
eliminate altogether a chemical that is "harmful to health at high
doses [but] turns out to produce beneficial effects at low doses."' This
phenomenon is known as "hormesis" and is usually reflected in a Ushaped dose response curve.* Sodium nitrite, for instance, is at once a
carcinogen and an important protection against botulism. When regulating sodium nitrite, the health benefits in terms of cancer reductions
must be compared with the increasing risks of botulism. 9 Regardless
of precisely how direct tradeoffs take effect, they (among the various
types of tradeoffs we identify) feature the most straightforward connection between the regulation and the ancillary risks to which it gives
rise.

Not only have direct risk tradeoffs been examined in the scholarly literature, but they have also received attention in the federal
courts. In American Trucking Associations, Inc v EPA,nO the D.C. Cir-

cuit recognized a legal challenge to an environmental regulation based
on the agency's failure to consider a direct risk tradeoff. In the portion
of the case that was later reviewed by the Supreme Court, the D.C.
Circuit held that the discretion enjoyed by the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") Administrator in revising National Ambient Air
Quality Standards ("NAAQS") for ozone and particulate matter was
so broad as to spell an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority to the agency." The appellate court also rejected an argument
that the NAAQS be made subject to cost-benefit analysis, upholding

46 See Keeney and von Winterfeldt, 16(6) Interfaces at 14 (cited in note 35) (noting that
one of the pathways causing indirect risks is "through the risks associated with constructing and
operating pollution abatement equipment").

47 Cass R. Sunstein, The Arithmetic of Arsenic *28 & nn 130-31, Working Paper No 01-10
(AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies 2001), available online at
<http://www.aei.brookings.orglpublicationslworkinglworking-01-IO.pdf> (visited Feb 16,2002).
48 See id.
49 See Lave, Strategy of Social Regulation at 15 (cited in note 1) (discussing the beneficial
and adverse health effects of sodium nitrite).
50 175 F3d 1027 (DC Cir 1999), revd in part as Whitman vAmerican TruckingAssociations;
Inc, 531 US 457 (2001). The same D.C. Circuit panel recently held on remand that the EPA's
NAAQS for particulate matter and ozone were not arbitrary and capricious. See American
TruckingAssociations Inc v EPA, 283 F3d 355,358 (DC Cir 2002).
51 See American Trucking, 175 F3d at 1034.
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its decision in Lead Industries Association v EPA2 prohibiting costbenefit analysis in this area.53
Before the D.C. Circuit, petitioners also argued that the EPA

failed to undertake a thorough analysis of the health effects of the
new NAAQS, as the statute required. They based their claim on the

EPA's failure to consider adequately the potentially salutary effects of
tropospheric ozone in shielding people from ultraviolet rays, thereby

reducing the risks of cataracts and skin cancers.7 In the view of petitioners, the EPA was required to consider not only the deleterious effects of ozone on respiration, but also the ancillary harm of ozone

regulationfor skin and eyes. Section 109 of the Clean Air Act requires
that the EPA base its NAAQS on published "criteria"5 that, according
to Section 108, must reflect "the latest scientific knowledge useful in

indicating the kind and extent of all identifiable effects on public
health or welfare."" According to petitioners, this language embraced
both the negative and the positive effects of a regulated pollutant.
The EPA claimed that it was barred from considering these ancillary effects by the statute itself.5 Section 108 of the Clean Air Act requires the EPA to consider "all identifiable effects" of "pollutant[s].'7
The EPA understood the requirement to refer only to the consideration of the effects of substances insofar as they were pollutants, and

not, in other words, insofar as they produced health benefits.5 9
Accepting the petitioners' direct risk tradeoff argument, Judge
Williams refused to accord deference under Chevron USA Inc v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inco to the agency's interpretation,
reasoning first that the statute was unambiguous in requiring agency
52 647 F2d 1130 (DC Cir 1980).
53 See American Trucking, 175 F3d at 1040.
54 See id at 1051-53. See generally Randall Lutter and Christopher Wolz, UV-B Screening
by TroposphericOzone: Implicationsfor the NationalAmbientAirQuality Standard,31 Envir Sci
& Tech 142A (1997) (arguing that the EPA should consider the health benefits of tropospheric
ozone in setting NAAQS). See also Gary E. Marchant, Turning Two Blind Eyes: The EPA's Failure to ConsiderCosts and Health Disbenefitsin Revising the Ozone Standard,11 Tulane Envir LJ
261,272-80 (1998) (arguing that the EPA should consider both harmful and protective health effects of this type of ozone).
55 Pub L No 101-549,104 Stat 2399, codified at 42 USC § 7409(b)(1)-(2) (1994).
56 42 USC § 7408(a)(2) (emphasis added).
S7 See American Trucking, 175 F3d at 1051-52.
58 42 USC § 7408(a)(2) (emphasis added).
59 See American Trucking, 175 F3d at 1051. See EPA, Responses to Significant Comments
on the 1996 ProposedRule on the NationalAmbientAirQuality Standardsfor Ozone 128 (1997)
(stating that the EPA strongly disagrees that such benefits should be considered), cited in Marchant, 11 Tulane Envir L J at 272 n 74 (cited in note 54). The EPA also pressed various other
statutory claims, arguing, for example, that the beneficial aspects of ozone vere properly covered
by Title VI of the Clean Air Act, 42 USC §§ 7671-71q (1994), and not Sections 108 and 109,42
USC §§ 7408-09. See American Trucking, 175 F3d at 1052.
60 467 US 837,843-45 (1984) (holding that courts should to defer to an agency's reasonable
interpretation of an ambiguous statute).
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attention to the direct risk tradeoff, and second, that the EPA's interpretation was facially unreasonable.6' "[I]t seems bizarre," wrote Judge
Williams, "that a statute intended to improve human health would, as
EPA claimed at argument, lock the agency into looking at only one
half of a substance's health effects in determining the maximum level
for that substance. ' 'u The court ordered the matter remanded to the
EPA for further consideration of the risk tradeofC' Previously, the
D.C. Circuit has also been receptive to arguments grounded in direct
risk tradeoffs."' Nevertheless, the clarity of Judge Williams's analysis,
See American Trucking, 175 F3d at 1052.
Id. A critic of our presentation of Judge Williams's opinion-or of our account of direct
risk tradeoffs more generally-might argue that the reduction in the benefits of ozone is not an
ancillary effect of the regulation but a primary effect. In other words, precisely because the link
between the regulatory intervention and the effect is so close, one might question whether this is,
in fact, an ancillary effect at all. We argue that, as an analytic matter, the primary effect of the
regulation ought to be construed narrowly as its direct effect on the target risk. Since the observed escalation in risk here involved not the target risk but another risk altogether, we think it
appropriate to treat the possibility of skin cancer as an instance of an ancillary effect-and to
treat Judge Williams's analysis, therefore, as drawing on a risk tradeoff
63 Id at 1053. In the wake of the D.C. Circuit's opinion in American Trucking, the EPA was
compelled to study the risk tradeoffs of its proposed revised standards for ambient ozone. See id
at 1052-53. Just before the change in administrations, EPA Administrator Browner signed a proposed response to the remand. See EPA, NationalAmbient Air Quality Standardsfor Ozone:
Proposed Response to Remand, available online at <http:lwww.epa.govlttnloarpgltl/
fr_notices/uvbnotic.pdf> (visited Apr 20,2002). That response was made subject to review by the
Card Memorandum of January 20,2001, which prohibited agencies from undertaking regulation
without the approval of an agency head appointed by incoming President Bush. See Andrew H.
Card, Jr., Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff, Memorandum for the Heads and Acting
Heads of Executive Departmentsand Agencies: Regulatory Review Plan (Jan 20,2001), available
online at <http:llwww.whitehouse.govlnewslreleases/20010123-4.html> (visited Apr 20,2002). On
November 14, 2001, Administrator Whitman released the current EPA's proposed response,
which is similar to the one proposed by the Clinton Administration. See EPA, NationalAmbient
Air Quality Standardsfor Ozone: Proposed Response to Remand; Proposed Rule, 66 Fed Reg
57268 (2001). It indicates that the EPA has studied the effects of tropospheric ozone on melanomas and cataracts and has decided that the potential harms are negligible when compared to
the health benefits of the new ozone standards. See id at 57278-86. See also EPA, Fact Sheet,
Proposed Response to Remand: NationalAmbient Air Quality Standardsfor Ozone: Beneficial
Aspects
of
Ground-Level-Ozone
(Oct
31,
2001),
available
online
at
<http:l/www.epa.govlttn/oarpgltl/fact sheets/naaqsos.pdf> (visited Apr 20, 2002) (reaffirming
the eight-hour standard after carefully considering the available technical and scientific literature). Randall Lutter and Howard Gruenspecht-the former is the author of two studies on
which the industry group challengers relied in the D.C. Circuit litigation-have argued that the
EPA did not give sufficient weight to the scientific evidence in considering the risk tradeoff on
remand. See Randall Lutter and Howard Gruenspecht, Assessing Benefits of Ground Level
Ozone: What Role for Science in Setting NationalAir Quality Standards,15 Tulane Envir L J 85,
94-95 (2001) ("In the twenty months after the Court's decision, the EPA made no effort to update its risk assessments [or] develop new information."). See also Randall Lutter, Clean Air and
Dirty Science, Policy Matters No 02-12 (AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies
2002), available online at <http:lwww.aei.brookings.orglpublicationslpolicy/policyO2_l2.asp>
(visited Apr 19,2002). Ultimately, the D.C. Circuit might be asked to review the quality of the
EPA's risk tradeoff analysis. It is worth underscoring that the EPA was required to undertake a
risk tradeoff analysis in this case, and probably will have to do the same in future cases.
64 See, for example, National Resources Defense Council,Inc v EPA, 655 F2d 318 (DC Cir
61
62
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the absence of a dissent on this issue by Judge David Tatel,8 and the
fact that the EPA did not seek review of this aspect of the decision by
the Supreme Court as it did with respect to the finding of an impermissible delegation," suggest that arguments grounded in direct risk
tradeoffs may play a prominent role in the judicial review of administrative action.
B. Substitution Effects
Sometimes a regulation will bring about a risk tradeoff when it
effects a shift from one product or process to another, which in turn
gives rise to risks of its own.7 For instance, banning artificial sweeteners called cyclamates because of their carcinogenic properties led consumers to turn to saccharin, which itself was shown to cause cancer.68
Regulations aimed at making nuclear power generation safer might,
by imposing large costs, encourage reliance on other risky methods of
energy production. 8
Even though the causal relationship between the regulatory
intervention and the ancillary effect is more mediated in the context
of substitution effects, the courts have struck down regulations on the
basis of failure to consider these types of tradeoffs just as they have in

1981). In that case, the EPA itself advanced a pure risk tradeoff argument in order to justify its
decision to permit nitrogen oxides (NO.) waivers to various manufacturers under Section
202(b)(6)(B) of the Clean Air Act, Pub L No 89-272,79 Stat 992 (1965), codified at 42 USC §
7521(b)(6)(B), redesignated as 42 USC § 7521(b)(3)(B), repealed Pub L No 101-549, 104 Stat
2529 (1990). See NaturalResources Defense Council,655 F2d at 342. Granting the waivers would
have increased overall NO. levels but at the same time would have led to a reduction in ambient
particulate matter, another criteria pollutant regulated under Section 109 of the Clean Air Act.
See 42 USC § 7409(b) (1994). Judge Abner Mikva upheld the EPA decision to grant the waivers
against a challenge by the environmental group, reasoning that "[iut was perfectly proper for the
EPA to bear in mind this trade-off [between refusing the waivers and thereby increasing particulate matter] in evaluating the public health impact of NO. waivers." NaturalResources Defense
Council,655 F2d at 342. Earlier case law also supports pure risk tradeoff analysis. Judge Harold
Leventhal reasoned, for instance, that the criteria set out in Section 111 of the Clean Air Act
"require the Administrator to take into account counter-productive environmental effects of a
proposed standard, as well as economic costs to the industry." Portland Cement Association v
Ruckelshaus, 486 F2d 375,385 (DC Cir 1973).
65 Judge Tatel dissented vigorously from the court's holding that Section 109 of the Clean
Air Act represents an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the EPA. See American
Trucking, 175 F3d at 1057-62 (Tatel dissenting).
66 See American Trucking, 531 US at 495.
67 See Whipple, 9 Reg at 37 (cited in note 44) ("We ban some substances or technologies or
practices on grounds of risk, only to see less desirable and, in many cases, more hazardous alternatives chosen.").
68 See Graham and Wiener, ConfrontingRisk Tradeoffs at 14 (cited in note 2) (describing
the risks involved in regulation); Whipple, 9 Reg at 38 (cited in note 44) (same).
69 See Stephen Breyer, Vermont Yankee and the Courts' Role in the Nuclear Energy Controversy, 91 Harv L Rev 1833,1835-36 (1978) (reviewing the potential harmful effects of nuclear
power regulation).
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the context of direct risk tradeoffs.70 In Competitive EnterpriseInstitute
71 Judge Williams
v National Highway Traffic Safety Administration,

agreed with Competitive Enterprise Institute ("CEI") that the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA") had failed
to consider adequately the potential implications that a more stringent
corporate average fuel economy ("CAFE") standard might have for
highway safety. Judge Williams found persuasive CEI's contention
that by implementing the more stringent standard, NHTSA effectively
caused the price of larger, safer cars to increase, which in turn meant
that more consumers would be forced either to drive their older, less
safe cars, or else to buy smaller, less safe cars than they would have
absent the regulation.7 "By making it harder for consumers to buy
large cars, the 27.5 miles per gallon (mpg) standard will increase traffic
fatalities ift as a general matter, small cars are less safe than big ones.
They are, as NHTSA itself acknowledges.7'
Here, the ancillary harm was mediated by a consumer reaction to
changed market conditions. The regulation affected the production of
automobiles as well as consumer demand in such a way as to bring
about new risks.7 Writing in dissent, Judge Mikva, without rejecting
the risk tradeoff argument in principle, nevertheless took the view that
the agency had considered the tradeoff sufficiently.7 "The majority's
predictions about effects on the behavior of both manufacturers and
consumers and the likely safety consequences of these anticipated effects ... represent musings that the agency considered and reasonably

rejected. 76
70 See text accompanying notes 60-63.
71 956 F2d 321 (DC Cir 1992).
72 See Robert W. Crandall, Policy Watch: CorporateAverage Fuel Economy Standards,6 J
Econ Persp 171, 178 (1992) (explaining how stringent CAFE standards can lead to decreased
automobile safety); Robert W. Crandall and John D. Graham, The Effect of Fuel Economy Standards on Automobile Safety, 32 J L & Econ 97, 101-15 (1989) (finding that NHTSA's CAFE
standard kills thousands of people per year). Judge Williams's opinion cites the study by Crandall
and Graham. See Competitive EnterpriseInstitute,956 F2d at 327.
73 Competitive EnterpriseInstitute, 956 F2d at 326.
74 In another case, Judge Buckley (joined by Judges Williams and Robinson) accepted a
risk tradeoff argument, grounded in substitution effect, invoked by the U.S. Consumer Product
Safety Commission. See Consumer Federation of America v U.S. Consumer Product Safety
Commission, 883 F2d 1073, 1078-79 (DC Cir 1989). The Consumer Federation of America
("CFA") disputed "the Commission's position that a ban on methylene chloride is undesirable
because manufacturers might respond to a ban by substituting other more harmful chemicals for
methylene chloride." Id t 1079. The court rejected the CFA's argument that "the Commission
should deal with this potentiality by regulating the substitutes that manufacturers use rather than
leaving methylene chloride on the market." Id.
75 See Competitive EnterpriseInstitute,956 F2d at 327-30 (Mikva dissenting).
76 Id at 329. One observer has emphasized that the debate between Judges Williams and
Mikva was about the extent to which the agency had considered the risk tradeoff argument, and
not its facial plausibility. See Jay D. Wexler, Risk in the Balance, 30 Conn L Rev 225,253 (1997)
("[T]he key debate ... was not over the issue of whether the agency had to consider such risks,
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Another case addressing substitution effects is CorrosionProof

Fittings v EPA.' In that case, an industry group challenged an EPA
rule promulgated under the Toxic Substances Control Act ("TSCA")
that aimed to reduce exposure to asbestos. The Fifth Circuit struck

down the rule partly because the EPA failed to take into account the
fact that the likely substitutes for asbestos would themselves be carcinogenic: "Eager to douse the dangers of asbestos, the agency inadvertently actually may increase the risk of injury Americans face. The
EPA's explicit failure to consider the toxicity of likely substitutes thus

deprives its order of a reasonable basis."
C. Lulling Effects
The chain of events mediating between the regulatory interven-

tion and the ancillary harm need not take the form of a substitution
effect. Under the banner of "lulling effects," Viscusi discusses what is
essentially a cognitive-psychological transformation wrought by
health-and-safety regulation. The introduction of a safety measure, he

argues, can have the effect of "produc[ing] misperceptions that lead
consumers to reduce their safety precautions because they overestimate the product's safety."79 Thus, a regulation requiring that drugs be
dispensed in child-safe packages gives rise to a mediated risk tradeoff
when the rule has the effect of lulling parents into thinking that they

no longer need to take precautions about storing medications outside
the reach of their young children.a In a similar vein, there has been a
but over the extent to which they have to consider and justify their conclusions regarding the
risks."). Indeed, Judge Mikva endorsed an argument based on pure risk tradeoff analysis in National Resources Defense Council, nc,v EPA, 655 F2d 318,341-42 (DC Cir 1981).
77 947 F2d 1201 (5th Cir 1991).
78 Id at 1221. The approach to risk tradeoffs embodied in these two cases should be contrasted with the treatment of this issue in the previous decade. For example, Environmental Defense Fund,Inc v EPA, 510 F2d 1292 (DC Cir 1975), presented numerous challenges to the EPA's
decision to suspend the registration and ban the manufacture of the pesticides aldrin and dieldrin.See id at 1295-96. Shell Chemical Company challenged the ban, arguing among other things
that "[b]ecause heptachlor [the likely substitute] presents an identical cancer risk ... the Administrator's suspension of aldrinldieldrin does not 'prevent' an imminent hazard as required by the
statute." Id at 1303. Judge Leventhal rejected that rationale, reasoning, "There is no law that says
that all evils must be attacked at the same time and at the same rate" Id.
79 Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs at 225 (cited in note 9). Lulling effects bear a strong conceptual
resemblance to the phenomenon of moral hazard, whereby insurance increases the likelihood
that certain undesirable events will transpire by creating perverse incentives among the insured
to behave more carelessly than they would absent the insurance. See, for example, Tom Baker,
On the Genealogy of MoralHazard,75 Tex L Rev 237,238-39 (1996).
s0 See Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs at 234-42 (cited in note 9) (arguing that the implementation
of safety caps on aspirin bottles lulled people into a false sense of safety, thereby undermining
the utility of the regulation); W. Kip Viscusi, Regulating Consumer Product Safety 73-80 (ABI
1984) (critiquing consumer product safety regulation of child-resistant bottle caps). See also
Whipple, 9 Reg at 41, 44 (cited in note 44), citing Gilbert Fowler White, Human Adjustment to
Floods:A GeographicalApproach to the Flood Problem in the United States *206, Research Pa-
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recent increase in unsafe sex among men at risk for HIV,possibly as a
result of a lulling effect induced by overestimating greater success in
the medical community at managing the disease.8
D. Health-Health Tradeoffs
Although certain authors regard health-health tradeoffs" as a distinct analytic phenomenon, they are best thought of as instances of
risk tradeoffs in which the chains of events mediating between regula-

tory intervention and ancillary harm take a distinctive form-namely
a reduction in overall social wealth, which is thought to lead to a reduction in overall social health. Proponents of this methodology begin
with the premise that wealthier people and societies are also health-

ier.8 They argue that because environmental and health-and-safety
regulations impose large economic costs on society, they have negative

health consequences.6 This negative effect must be weighed against
the benefits of reducing target risks.8 "[R]egulatory expenditures represent opportunity costs to society that divert resources from other
uses. These funds could have provided for greater healthcare, food,
housing,
and other goods and services that promote individual longev86
ity.
Ralph L. Keeney, a prominent proponent of health-health tradeoff analysis, has argued that each $7.25 million of costs of regulation
per No 29 (University of Chicago Department of Geography 1942) (arguing that the building of
dams encouraged people to move to flood plains, which resulted in greater overall loss of life
than had been experienced before the dams were built).
81 See American Health Consultants, CDC Stats Show Unsafe Sex PracticesAre Increasing,
AIDS Alert (Apr 1,1999), available online at <http://www.ahcpub.comlahc_oninelaa.html> (visited Oct 2,2002).
82 We follow Lutter and Morrall in using the term "health-health tradeoffs" to denote reductions in health that flow from government-mandated expenditures on health regulation. See
Lutter and Morrall, 8 J Risk & Uncertainty at 44 (cited in note 37) ("Health-health analysis
seeks to quantify the expected declines in health and safety that may be ascribed to the costs of
complying with a regulation"). See generally Fred Kuchler, et al, Health Transfers:An Application of Health-HealthAnalysis to Assess Food Safety Regulations, 10 Risk 315 (1999).
83
See Wildavsky, Searchingfor Safety at 59-66 (cited in note 3); Wildavsky, 60 Pub Int at
25-28 (cited in note 3).
84 See Frank B. Cross, When Environmental Regulations Kill: The Role of Health-Health
Analysis, 22 Ecol L Q 729,731 (1995) (finding the theory "fundamentally sound"); Keeney, 10
Risk Anal at 147 (cited in note 3) ("[S]ome expensive regulations and programs intended to save
lives may actually lead to increased fatalities.").
85 See, for example, Lutter and Morrall, 8 J Risk & Uncertainty at 44 (cited in note 37)
(noting how health-health analysis compares the expected decline in health and safety attributable to compliance costs with the direct benefits of regulation). Keeney's study, arguably the
most influential in the area, "develops a model to estimate the number of excess deaths when the
relationship between income and mortality risk is assumed to be an induced relationship."
Keeney, 10 Risk Anal at 147 (cited in note 3) (emphasis added). He does not present a theoretic
account for the existence of a causal nexus. See id.
86 Viscusi, 63 U Chi L Rev at 1452 (cited in note 9).
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may induce one statistical fatality.7 This estimate has become somewhat standard in the literature: Judge Williams makes reference to it
in an important opinions' and Justice Breyer refers to it as a conserva-

tive estimate in his book on risk regulation.9 Keeney's figure, however,
is in 1980 dollars. Converting to 1999 dollars, the $7.25 million is

equivalent to $14.7 million.o In a more recent study, three leading exponents of health-health tradeoffs argue that regulatory expenditures
that rely on a valuation of a statistical human life over $15 million per
human life saved will have net counterproductive effects.9'
Health-health analysis has attracted considerable interest not
only in academic circles, but on the federal bench as well. Distinguished judges such as Frank Easterbrook,7 Richard Posner,9 Stephen
Williams,9 and most recently, Justice Breyer" have all explicitly embraced this version of risk tradeoff analysis in their judicial opinions.
In particular, Judge Williams has evinced an interest in health-health
tradeoffs on a number of occasions. In his concurring opinion in International Union, UAW v OSHA ("LockoutTagout"), Judge Williams

87 See Keeney, 10 Risk Anal at 155 (cited in note 3), relying on the data of E.M. Kitagawa
and P.M. Hauser, Differential Mortality in the United States of America: A Study of Socioeconomic Epidemiology (Harvard 1973).
88 See InternationalUnion, UAW v OSHA ("Lockout/Tagout"), 938 F2d 1310, 1326 (DC
Cir 1991) (Williams concurring).
89 See Breyer, Breakingthe Vicious Circle at 23 & n 119 (cited in note 5).
90 The conversion to 1999 dollars is performed employing a consumer price index from
1980 to 1999 of 2.022. See NASA, ConsumerPriceIndex Inflation Calculator,available online at
<http://www.jsc.nasa.govibu2/inflateCPI.html> (visited Apr 20,2002).
91 See Randall Lutter, John Morrall, and W. Kip Viscusi, The Cost-Per-Life-Saved Cutoff
for Safety-Enhancing Regulations, 37 Econ Inq 599, 605 (1999) (arguing that a $15 million decrease in income is associated with the loss of an additional statistical life).
92 See InternationalUnion, UAW v Johnson Controls, nc,886 F2d 871, 918 (7th Cir 1989)
(en banc) (Easterbrook dissenting) (arguing that removing women from jobs in which they run
the risk of lead exposure might create more overall risk for their children because "[t]he net effect of lower income and less medical care could be a reduction in infants' prospects"), revd, 499
US 187 (1991).
93 See American Dental Association v Martin, 984 F2d 823, 826 (7th Cir 1993) (Posner)
(reasoning that OSHA-by not taking into account lives sacrificed because of increased health
care costs passed on to consumers-exaggerated the number of lives saved by mandatory workplace precautions against AIDS).
94 See New York State OphthalmologicalSociety v Bowen, 854 F2d 1379,1395 n 1 (DC Cir
1988) (Williams concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[E]xtravagant expenditures on
health may in some instances affect health adversely, by foreclosing expenditures on itemshigher quality food, shelter, recreation, etc., that would have contributed more to the individual's
health than the direct expenditure thereon."); Building and Construction Trades Department v
Brock, 838 F2d 1258,1267 (DC Cir 1988) (Williams) ("[L]eaning towards safety may sometimes
have the perverse effect of increasingrather than decreasing risk.").
95 See American Trucking, 531 US at 490-96 (Breyer concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment). We discuss Justice Breyer's concurrence in the text accompanying notes 153-61.
96 938 F2d 1310 (DC Cir 1991). From the fact that Judge Williams wrote the majority opinion in this case as well, it appears that the other members of the panel were not interested in endorsing the risk tradeoff analysis.
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rejected the union's contention that less stringent regulation was necessarily adverse to worker safety:
More regulation means some combination of reduced value of
firms, higher product prices, fewer jobs in the regulated industry,
and lower cash wages. All the latter three stretch workers' budgets tighter (as does the first to the extent that the firms' stock is
held in workers' pension trusts). And larger incomes enable people to lead safer lives."
II. THE RISE OF THE RISK TRADEOFF SUBSTATE
Risk tradeoff analysis has become a pervasive feature of the contemporary regulatory state. We appear to have entered what Judge
Williams has called the "Era of 'Risk-Risk.'" Indeed, we might say
that risk tradeoff analysis now supplies the foundation of its own substate, as part of the larger "Cost-Benefit State" to which Sunstein has
drawn attention.9 This Part aims to highlight the prominence of the
methodology in current regulatory practice and noteworthy calls for
its wider application.
In Part II.A, we survey various academic proposals for the wider
application of risk tradeoff analysis. Then, in Part II.B, we turn our attention to the regulatory process. We first discuss various congressional initiatives to broaden the use of risk tradeoff analysis in
administrative rulemaking. Then we explore the role of risk tradeoff
analysis in OMB's review of regulation and to a lesser extent in the
decisions of administrative agencies. Finally, focusing on Justice
Breyer's concurring opinion in American Trucking, we show how risk
tradeoff analysis has come to play a prominent role in the courts.
A. Academic Proponents
Recent years have witnessed intense academic interest in the
broader application of risk tradeoff analysis in the regulatory process.
We focus on a number of different visions of how to implement risk
tradeoff analysis in the regulatory state. Graham and Wiener offer the
most developed account of the potential role of risk tradeoff analysis
in the legislative, executive, and judicial branches.l ° Sunstein likewise
has expressed the view that risk tradeoff analysis ought to be incorporated into every branch of government.""
Id at 1326, citing Keeney, 10 Risk Anal at 158 (cited in note 3).
98 Williams, 63 U Chi L Rev at 1375 (cited in note 7).
99 See Sunstein, 48 Stan L Rev at 249 (cited in note 8).
100 See Wiener and Graham, Resolving Risk Tradeoffs at 242-71 (cited in note 34).
101Viscusi is another strong proponent of risk tradeoff analysis, particularly health-health
analysis, though he has a less developed vision for institutional reform than Graham and Wiener
97
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Graham and Wiener recognize that their call for greater reliance
on risk tradeoff analysis requires substantive changes in the structures
of decisionmaking at various stages in the regulatory process.' 02On the
legislative front, Graham and Wiener would implement a number of
important changes. First, they call for Congress to require by statute
that risk tradeoff analysis of all future legislative initiatives be undertaken. '° Technical assistance in assembling reports on risk tradeoffs
might be supplied by expert staff members. Second, they call for the
creation of a "Joint House-Senate Committee on Risk" to oversee legislative risk regulation initiatives and guard against the possibility of
risk tradeoffs. Third, they would urge Congress to rewrite certain statutes in a way that does not preclude cost-benefit analysis, in order to
ensure that risk tradeoff analysis can be employed. 'OFinally, they advocate amending health, safety, and environmental laws so that those
laws require agencies to "reduce overall risk," rather than relying on
the vaguer language currently in place, such as the statutory emphasis
10 5
on "protect[ing] the public health."
With respect to the executive branch, Graham and Wiener favor
an executive order, modeled on Executive Orders 12291 and 12866, ' 0'
explicitly requiring agency staff to undertake risk tradeoff analysis of
proposed regulations. ' Graham and Wiener acknowledge that the
process of generating a risk tradeoff analysis and having it reviewed
by OIRA might become an "iterative process" if, for example, OIRA
scrutiny were to reveal ancillary harms that the agency had failed to

or Sunstein. See Viscusi, 63 U Chi L Rev at 1455-60 (cited in note 9) (criticizing prior attempts at

reform without putting forward a program of his own).
102 "[B]ecause so many risk tradeoffs in decisionmaking are driven by structures that induce narrow and bounded decisions, proposing a new method of analysis will have only limited

impact unless it is complemented by institutional reforms that enable and impel decisionmakers
to pursue a more comprehensive analysis of risk." wiener and Graham, Resolving Risk Tradeoffs
at 243 (cited in note 34).
103 See id at 250. They leave open the possibility that such an investigation might be undertaken when a bill is reported out of committee, subcommittee, or brought up for action on the
floor. See id. See also John D. Graham, Legislative Approaches to Achieving More Protection
againstRisk at Less Cost, 1997 U Chi Legal F 13,47 (calling for Congress to require consideration of risk tradeoffs in all regulatory determinations, and to impose a "more good than harm"

requirement in new regulatory programs).
104

See Wiener and Graham, Resolving Risk Tradeoffs at 250-51 (cited in note 34). Even

where cost-benefit analysis is prohibited by statute, OIRA can review a regulation for compliance with risk tradeoff analysis. See text accompanying notes 138-41,183-88.
105 Wiener and Graham, Resolving Risk Tradeoffs at 251 (cited in note 34).

106 3 CFR § 638 (1993). President Clinton issued Executive Order 12866 to replace Executive Order 12291. Id at § 11.The Clinton executive order shares with the Reagan executive order

a commitment to the cost-benefit analysis of regulation. For a general discussion of this similarity,see Richard H. Pildes and Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U Chi L Rev
1(1995).
107 See Wiener and Graham, Resolving Risk Tradeoffs at 254-55 (cited in note 34).
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consider.'0 Thus, they would like OIRA to develop the know-how to
scrutinize risk assessments!'

-

Graham and Wiener also make a number of bolder suggestions,
including the creation of a "primary care" agency, possibly in the
White House, which could then treat a regulatory problem holistically,
analyzing potential risk tradeoffs that more narrowly conceived agencies would miss. The primary care agency would refer individual aspects of a global problem to "specialist" agencies as needed. 0 Alternatively, Graham and Wiener imagine that within a given complex
agency, oversight of risk across various program offices might be consolidated in a position entitled "Undersecretary for Risk Management. 11 They also call 2for the centralization of the scientific analysis
of risk in a single body.1
Finally, Graham and Wiener argue that courts, when taking a
"hard look" at agency decisionmaking, should consider whether the
agency adequately considered risk tradeoffs. 1 3 When there is strong
reason to suspect that the ancillary harms outweigh the good accomplished by regulation, they would have courts strike down the regulation as arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure
Act ("APA"). 114 The authors emphasize, however, that judges are not
ideally situated to undertake substantive inquiries into risk tradeoffs
and should be thought of as a last line of defense if the oversight procedures within the executive branch fail."'
108 Id

at 255.

109 See id.

110 Id at 257. Graham and Wiener's account of risk tradeoffs draws heavily on this medical
metaphor. See, for example, id at 270 (referring to the need to implement in the regulatory arena
the "whole patient" approach of modem medicine and gestalt psychology).
111 Id at 258.
112 See id.
113 See id at 262. The genesis of the "hard look" doctrine has been traced to an influential
essay by Judge Leventhal of the D.C. Circuit. See Harold Leventhal, Environmental Decision-

making and the Role of the Courts, 122 U Pa L Rev 509,514 (1974) ("The court does not make
the ultimate decision, but it insists that the official or agency take a 'hard look' at all relevant fac-

tors").
114 See Wiener and Graham, Resolving Risk Tradeoffs at 262-63 (cited in note 34), referring
to the APA, 5 USC § 706(2)(A) (1994). See also Edward W, Warren and Gary E. Marchant,
"More Good Than Harm" A FirstPrinciplefor EnvironmentalAgencies and Reviewing Courts,

20 Ecol L Q 379,381-82 (1993) (defining as beneficial regulations that "produced a net benefit
to society, taking account of risk-risk tradeoffs and the various regulatory options open to the
promulgating agency"); W. Kip Viscusi, Risk-Risk Analysis, 8 J Risk & Uncertainty 5,15 (1994)

("If in fact these regulations do more harm than good, then they should not be pursued"); Antonin Scalia, Reagulation- The First Year, 6 Reg 19, 19-20 (Jan/Feb 1982) (maintaining that a
rule that probably "does more harm than good" should be struck down as arbitrary and capri-

cious).
115 See Wiener and Graham, Resolving Risk Tradeoffs at 262-63 (cited in note 34). The au.

thors advance a number of other suggestions. They would interpret statutory calls for agency
"reasonable[ness]" to imply the need for consideration of risk tradeoffs. Id at 263-64. To that
end, they would require risk tradeoff analysis even when a statute has been interpreted to pre-
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Sunstein refers to risk tradeoffs as "a pervasive problem in risk
regulation, one that helps account for regulatory failure, that is an intriguing part of cost-benefit assessment, and that is only now receiving
public attention." Like Graham and Wiener, to whom he acknowledges a general debt,117 he makes a number of concrete policy suggestions.
With respect to Congress, Sunstein recommends establishing a
new committee with the mandate to study the risk portfolios of various pieces of proposed legislation, and to initiate revisions where new
laws would increase risk."8 Sunstein would empower the committee to
introduce what he refers to as "corrective legislation" in cases in which
such proposals would increase risk."9 He also advocates an amendment to the APA requiring that "[a]gencies shall ensure, to the extent
feasible, that regulations do not create countervailing risks that are
greater than those of regulated risks. '' 2 Since Sunstein, unlike Graham
and Wiener, embraces health-health tradeoffs, 2 ' his proposed reform
of the APA would presumably apply to them as well as to direct risk
tradeoffs.
Sunstein's principal suggestion for the executive branch is similar
to Graham and Wiener's. He would have OIRA supervise agency decisionmaking on risk regulation issues to ensure that risk tradeoffs are
taken into account." Together with Robert Hahn, Sunstein has also
recently proposed a new executive order that would explicitly require
agencies to "explore and explain whether any regulation will create
significant new risks of any kind, and if so," to quantify them.'
With respect to the courts, Sunstein has two specific proposals.
First, when a statute does not explicitly require or forbid risk tradeoff
analysis and when the agency carried out such an analysis, Sunstein
would require courts to defer to that agency decision. Specifically, he
endorses a new interpretive principle to the effect that "agencies are
permitted to minimize net risks to life and health, a principle that

lude cost-benefit analysis. See id at 264-65. They would also broaden the rules of standing to allow the victims of ancillary harms to bring suit against the offending agency. See id at 265.
116 Sunstein, 63 U Chi L Rev at 1535 (cited in note 3).

117 Id at 1535 n 17.
118 See id at 1567.
119 Id.

120 Sunstein, 48 Stan L Rev at 296 (cited in note 3) (citations omitted).
121 See Sunstein, 63 U Chi L Rev at 1543-49 (cited in note 3) (discussing how health and
wealth are correlated).

122 See id at 1568-69.
123 Robert W. Hahn and Cass R. Sunstein, A New Executive Orderfor Improving Federal

Regulation?: Deeper and Wider Cost-Benefit Analysis *49, Working Paper No 02-4, (AEI-

Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies 2002), available online at <http'/
www.aei.brookings.org> (visited Apr 19, 2002).
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Congress can overcome only with a clear statement to the contrary.' 24
Second, and more generally, he would require courts to take a "hard
look" at agency decisions that failed to undertake risk tradeoff analysis. He does not, however, argue- as do other commentators, including
Graham and Wiener-that courts should strike down as "arbitrary and
capricious" regulations that do not meet a substantive "more good
than harm" test.
B. Risk Tradeoffs in Current Regulatory Practice
Regardless of the fate of the commentators' policy proposals, risk
tradeoff analysis is already an important feature of the administrative
state. In the remainder of this Part, we highlight the importance of this
methodology by surveying developments in the Congress, OMB, the
agencies, and the courts.
1. Congress.
Efforts to pass legislation requiring federal agencies to consider
the efficacy and cost-effectiveness of regulations began with the 103d
Congress in 1992.'2 But it was with the Contract with America in 1994
that Congress first revealed an appetite for comprehensive regulatory
improvement legislation."6 The 104th, 105th, and 106th Congresses all
considered legislation that would have required administrative agencies to subject proposed regulations to risk assessment and costbenefit analysis.2 ' Although regulatory reform seems temporarily to
124 Sunstein, 63 U Chi L Rev at 1562 (cited in note 3) (emphasis omitted).This canon would
become unnecessary if Sunstein's suggested amendment to the APA were enacted.
125 These early legislative initiatives focused exclusively on the EPA. See Environmental
Technologies Act of 1994, HR 3870,103d Cong, 2d Sess (Feb 22,1993) (proposing the promotion
of research and development of environmental technologies); Risk Assessment Improvement
Act of 1994, HR 4306,103d Cong 2d Sess (Apr 28,1993) (proposing a comprehensive risk assesment program within the EPA). The Risk Assessment Improvement Act never came up for a
vote, but portions of it, including those dealing with risk tradeoffs, were appended to the Environmental Technologies Act, HR 3870,103d Cong 2d Sess (Feb 22,1993).
126 The legislative centerpiece of the platform was the Risk Assessment and Cost-Benefit
Act of 1995, HR 1022, 104th Cong, 1st Sess (Feb 23, 1995), led by Thomas Bliley (R-Va), which
passed the House 286 to 141. Fred Anderson, et a, Regulatory Improvement Legislation:Risk Assessment, Cost-Benefit Analysis andJudicialReview, 11 Duke Envir L & Pol F 89,98 (2000).The
proposed legislation would have superseded the "decisional criteria" in all existing health-andsafety regulations. Id.
127 A number of regulatory reform bills were proposed during these years. For a discussion,
see Anderson, et al, 11 Duke Envir L & Pol F at 96-101 (cited in note 126) (presenting in
chronological order and analyzing legislative initiatives to effect regulatory reform). The most
significant pieces of proposed legislation included the Comprehensive Regulatory Act of 1995, S
343, 104th Cong, 1st Sess (Feb 2, 1995); the Risk Assessment and Cost-Benefit Act of 1995, HR
1022, 104th Cong, 1st Sess (Feb 23, 1995); the Regulatory Improvement Act of 1998,
S 981, 105th Cong, 2d Sess (June 27, 1997); the Regulatory Improvement Act of 1999, S 746,
106th Cong, 1st Sess (Mar 25, 1999); and the Regulatory Improvement Act of 2000, HR 3311,
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have dropped from the congressional agenda,n there is no reason to
believe that concern about these issues has gone away, only that the
political conditions for the passage of broad-gauged regulatory reform
bills are not necessarily present. '

In addition to general statutory language calling for risk assessment of regulatory proposals, each of these bills also featured specific
provisions requiring agencies to consider risk tradeoffs, or in the
words of the bills, "substitution risks," which might be brought about
by major regulatory interventions." The nature of the requirement to
consider "substitution risks" differs very little from one bill to another."' There is one important difference, however, in the manner in
which the various bills define "substitution risk." All except one follow

the example of the first comprehensive regulatory reform bill, which
defines "substitution risk" as "a potential risk to human health, safety,
or the environment from a regulatory alternative designed to decrease
other risks. ' 1 The one outlying bill is the Regulatory Improvement
Act of 1999, which defines substitution risk as "a reasonably identifiable significant increased risk to health, safety, or the environment expected to result from a regulatory option; and [that does] not include
risks attributable to the effect of an option on the income of individu106th Cong, 1st Sess (Nov 10,1999).
128 A keyword search in the Lexis-Nexis Congressional Universe turned up seventeen different bills from the 104th Congress that mentioned "substitution risks," and only one from the
107th Congress (conducted Feb 16,2002).
129 See Sunstein, 48 Stan L Rev at 249-51 (cited in note 8) (referring to the ambitious regulatory reform bills of the 104th Congress as part of a "Stalled Constitutional Moment"). See also
Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation:A Public Choice Analysis, 115
Harv L Rev 553, 635 (2001) (citing the political dynamics of the 1990s as a reason for the lack of
federal environmental regulation).
130 Interest in substitution risks has not been limited to these broad-gauged regulatory reform initiatives. The requirement to consider substitution risks has also appeared in various bills
that focus on the assessment of risk at so-called defense nuclear facilities. See, for example, HR
1649, § 513(b)(3)(D), 106th Cong, 1st Sess (Apr 29, 1999) (mandating that site-specific risk assessments of nuclear facilities provide "a statement of any significant substitution risks to human
health").
131See HR 3311, §§ 621 (7)(C)(ii), 622(a)(1)(A), 106th Cong, 1st Sess (Nov 10, 1999) (requiring that any health, safety, or environmental regulation be accompanied by a risk assessment
of; inter alia, "an evaluation of any substitution risk relating to the proposed rule");
S 746, § 621(11), 106th Cong, 1st Sess (Mar 25,1999) (defining substitution risks as a "reasonably
identifiable significant risk to health, safety, or the environment expected to result from a regulatory option"); S 981, § 624(h), 105th Cong, 2d Sess (June 27,1997) (cited in note 10) ("When scientifically appropriate information on significant substitution risks to health, safety, or the environment is reasonably available to the agency, the agency shall describe such risks in the risk assessment."); HR 1022, § 105(4), 104th Cong, 1st Sess (Feb 23, 1995) ("Each significant risk assessment or risk characterization document shall include a statement of any significant substitution risks to human health, where information on such risks has been provided to the agency.");
S 343, § 636(2), 104th Cong, 1st Sess (Feb 2,1995) (requiring that an agency risk assessment "include a statement of any significant substitution risks, when info on such risks has been made
available to the agency").
132 HR 9, § 420(4), 104th Cong, 1st Sess (Jan 4,1995).
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als."1' 33 This definition explicitly excludes so-called health-health tradeoffs.

34

While none of these comprehensive legislative initiatives has become law, some bills containing language about risk tradeoffs have.
One example is the "clean fuels" provisions in the Clean Air Act, enacted in 1990, which require the EPA to report on "any negative
health or environmental consequences to the community of efforts to
reduce such risks."' 3' Similarly, the 1996 Amendments to the Safe
Drinking Water Act mandate the analysis of "[a]ny increased health
risk that may occur as the result of compliance, including risks associated with co-occurring contaminates. ' L These statutory initiatives may
be indicative of a growing interest on Capitol Hill in the risk tradeoff
phenomenon.
2. OMB and the administrative agencies.
In conducting cost-benefit analyses of regulation pursuant to Executive Orders 12291 and 12866, OMB has, at least at times, relied on
risk tradeoff analysis -especially health-health tradeoff analysis."' The
best known example is the "return letter" that James B. MacRae, Acting Administrator of OIRA, sent to Nancy Risque-Rohrbach, Assistant Secretary for Policy in the Department of Labor, on March 10,
1992.m In that letter, OMB, citing recent studies on health-health
tradeoffs, 319 as well as the then newly minted opinion by Judge Williams in Lockout/Tagout, suspended its review of an OSHA proposed
rule pending OSHAs consideration of the health-health implications
of setting permissible exposure levels ("PELs") for more than six
hundred workplace air contaminants.' ° As MacRae reasoned in the
letter: "If government regulations force firms out of business or into

133 S 746, § 621(11)(A)-(B), 106th Cong, 1st Sess (Mar 25,1999).

134 Itmay be that this bill reflects the influence of Graham and Wiener, who oppose the inclusion of health-health tradeoffs under the rubric of risk tradeoff analysis. See note 36.

135 42 USC § 7412(f)(1)(C) (1994). See also Sunstein, 63 U Chi L Rev at 1568 (cited in note
3) (referring to the provisions as a "modest forerunner" of more dramatic changes).
136 42 USC § 300g-1(b)(3)(C)(i)(VI) (1994). See also DavidW. Schnare, EnvironmentalRationality and Judicial Review: When Benefits Justify Costs under the Safe Drinking Water Act
Amendments of 1996, 5 Hastings W-Nw J Envir L & Pol 65, 90-91 (1998) (discussing amendments).

137 See Lutter and Morrall, 8 J Risk & Uncertainty at 45-46 (cited in note 37) (discussing an
example of OMB's application of health-health analysis).
138 The letter was read in its entirety into the Congressional Record. See Regulatory Review
Process,138 Cong Rec S 3806-03,3808-09 (Mar 18,1992).

139 See, for example, Keeney, 10 Risk Anal at 147 (cited in note 3) (arguing that regulators
take health-health effects into consideration).

140 See OMB Interference in OSHA's Efforts to ProtectWorker Health and Safety, 138 Cong

Rec S 3858-01 (Mar 18,1992) (discussing OSHA's suspension).
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overseas production, employment of American workers will be
re'
141
duced, making workers less healthy by reducing their incomes."
The letter sparked a great deal of congressional interest. '4 An
outraged Senator Kennedy deplored OMB's use of "Alice in Wonderland economics."' Senator Glenn, then Chairman of the Government
Affairs Committee, called for an investigation into health-health
tradeoffs by the General Accounting Office ("GAO").1" The GAO investigation found that OIRA had improperly relied on health-health
analysis as a means of circumventing the statutory ban on carrying out
cost-benefit analysis, that the agency did not use the methodology correctly (from a technical standpoint), and that generally speaking the
methodology was, in the words of Senator Glenn, "a pipe dream."'45
In the face of intense congressional scrutiny, OMB backed down
from its position on that occasion.'4 But there is no indication that
OMB has disavowed health-health analysis,'" and with John Graham
as OIRA Administrator, OMB may rely more heavily on risk tradeoffs going forward than it does already. Given Justice Breyer's blessing
of health-health analysis in his concurring opinion in American Trucking,'4 it will be more difficult for4 a senator to refer to its application as
"deregulation policy run amok."'
Despite the growing interest in risk tradeoff analysis in the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, the agencies themselves have
not pursued the methodology with noticeable vigor.ln Graham and
Regulatory Review Process,138 Cong Rec at S 3809 (cited in note 138).
The incident was widely reported in the media at the time. See, for example, Adam Clyner, Budget Office Retreats on Work Health,NY Times A8 (Mar 30,1992) (reporting the MacRae
incident); Bob Davis and Albert R. Karr, Bush to Require Regulators to Weigh Costs and Impact
on Health, Mortality,Wall St J A3 (Mar 20, 1992) (same); Frank Swoboda, OMB's Logic: Less
ProtectionSaves Lives, Wash Post A15 (Mar 17, 1992) (same); Robert D. Hershey, Jr., Cutting
Cost4 Budget Office Blocks Workplace Health Proposal,NY Times A13 (Mar 16,1992) (same).
143 OMB Interference,138 Cong Rec at S 3858-01 (cited in note 140).
144 See OMB Risk/Risk Analysis 138 Cong Rec S 10957-01 (July 30,1992).
141
142

145

Id.

146

See id (Sen Glenn) ("Within a few days of the hearing, OMB backed down and allowed

the OSHA rulemaking to go forward.").
147 In a recent speech, John F Morrall III, who as an OIRA staff economist was responsible
(together with Randall Lutter) for the health-health analysis behind the OSHA return letter,
and who now serves in a senior staff position at OIRA, acknowledged that the media criticism of
the return letter was disappointing, but that the story of health-health analysis "had a happy ending" because of the methodology's subsequent rise to prominence in regulatory debate. See John
F. Morrall III, Chiet Human Resources and Housing Branch, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget, Ebbs and Flows in the Quality of Regulatory
Analysis *7 (Dec 17, 2001) (speech at conference on executive regulatory review), available
online at <http://wc.wust.edu/regreviewvideo.html> (visited Apr 19,2002).
148 See text accompanying notes 157-61.
149 OMB Interference,138 Cong Rec at S 3858-01 (Sen Kennedy) (cited in note 140).
150 Industry groups have called on agencies to implement risk tradeoff analysis. See, for example, Michael J.Whinihan, Senior Economist, General Motors Public Policy Center, Statement
at the Public Advisory Committee Meeting before the Environmental Economics Advisory
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Wiener indicate that the number of such analyses carried out in the
agencies is "probably quite small."'5' They do, however, point to some
isolated examples. For instance, the EPA released a study showing that
under certain circumstances, using electric vehicles as a means of reducing air pollution might actually bring about more air pollution, depending upon how and where the electricity was generated.L
3. Courts: Justice Breyer's concurrence in American Trucking.
The Supreme Court in American Trucking' unanimously rejected
the nondelegation challenge to the EPA's regulations that had carried
the day in the D.C. Circuit and reaffirmed that the Clean Air Act prohibits the consideration of costs in setting NAAQS."' Writing sepa-

rately, Justice Breyer agreed with the result in the case but explained
that he favored a general presumption that Congress requires the consideration of costs in regulatory statutes."' Justice Breyer argued that
the legislative history and structure of the Clean Air Act made clear,
however, that "§ 109's language reflects a congressional decision not
to delegate to the agency the legal authority to consider economic
costs of compliance."'' '
In particular, Justice Breyer indicated that to foreclose completely the consideration of costs would be to "require the EPA to
eliminate every health risk, however slight, at any economic cost,

Committee of the EPA Science Advisory Board (Nov 30,2001) (advocating risk tradeoff analysis
and relying on a $7 million per statistical life valuation as the benchmark for EPA health-health
tradeoff analysis) (on file with authors).
151 Wiener and Graham, Resolving Risk Tradeoffs at 252 (cited in note 34).
152 Id, citing Oscar Suris, Electric Cars Pollute Air, EPA Study Says, Wall St J BI (Apr 5,
1994). See Office of Transportation and Air Quality, EPA, Electric Vehicles, Fact Sheet No OMS10 (1994), available online at <http:llwww.epa.govlotaq/10-elec.htm> (visited Apr 21, 2002)
(drawing attention to the "pollution tradeoff').
153 531 US at 472-76. Professor Revesz served as counsel of record for amici Environmental
Defense, et al, before the Supreme Court in American Trucking. See Brief of Amici Curiae Environmental Defense, et al, on behalf of Petitioners, Browner v American Trucking Associations,
Inc, No 99-1257 (filed July 21, 2000), available on LEXIS at 1999 US Briefs 1257 and Brief of
Amici Curiae Environmental Defense, et al, on behalf of cross-respondents, American Trucking
Associations; Inc v Browner, No 99-1246 (filed September 11, 2000), available on LEXIS at 1999
US Briefs 1426. His briefs, however, did not deal with the risk tradeoff issues that are the subject
of this Article.
154 See 531 US at 464-71,481-87. The Court declined the industry group's invitation to infer
a requirement to take costs into account from the statute's requirement to set NAAQS at a level
"requisite to protect the public health" with "an adequate margin of safety." See id, quoting 42
USC § 7409(b)(1) (emphasis added).The Court reasoned that absent clear statutory language to
the contrary, it would be far-fetched to assume that "Congress would give to the EPA through
these modest words the power to determine whether implementation costs should moderate national air quality standards." 531 US at 468.
155 531 US at 490 (Breyer concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
156

Id.
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however great, to the point of 'hurtling' industry over 'the brink of
ruin,' or even forcing 'deindustrialization."' He stated:
The statute also permits the Administrator to take account of
comparative health risks. That is to say, she may consider whether
a proposed rule promotes safety overall. A rule likely to cause
more harm to health than it prevents is not a rule that is "requisite to protect the public health." For example, as the Court of
Appeals held and the parties do not contest, the Administrator
has the authority to determine to what extent possible health
risks stemming from reductions in tropospheric ozone (which, it
is claimed, helps prevent cataracts and skin cancer) should be
taken into account in setting the ambient air quality standard for
ozone.158

Thus, Justice Breyer invoked Judge Williams's analysis based on direct
risk tradeoffs to illustrate why, even without permitting the consideration of costs, the statute does not inevitably require maximally stringent regulation. He then drew on risk tradeoff analysis to provide a
limiting principle-a technique to discipline agency decisionmakers
different from cost-benefit analysis. If a regulation were to entail an
intolerably profound risk tradeoff, it could be rejected.
A few paragraphs later, Justice Breyer again invoked risk tradeoff analysis, this time in the language of health-health tradeoffs: "Nor
need regulation lead to deindustrialization. Preindustrial society was
not a very healthy society; hence a standard demanding the return of
the Stone Age would not prove 'requisite to protect the public
health..'' Since excessively expensive regulation not only violates
canons of cost-benefit analysis but also reduces overall health, he argued, it violates the statutory requirement to promote public health.
Justice Breyer's concurrence marks the arrival of risk tradeoff
analysis in general, and health-health tradeoff analysis in particular, in
the Supreme Court. It can be expected to pave the way for future
challenges based on risk tradeoffs. The opinion is also noteworthy for
at least two other reasons. First, Justice Breyer drew attention to the
manner in which risk tradeoff analysis, and in particular health-health
tradeoff analysis, can serve as a proxy for cost-benefit analysis when it
is prohibited by statute. Commentators have observed that risk tradeoff analysis emerged in part because of statutory limitations on the
application of cost-benefit analysis.6But because health-health analysis can, to some extent, serve as a functional substitute for cost-benefit
157 Id at 494.
158 Id at 495.
159 Id at 496.

160 See text accompanying notes 183-86.
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analysis, one might argue that it should be prohibited whenever costbenefit analysis is prohibited. 6' Justice Breyer, while recognizing the
utility of health-health tradeoffs functionally to accomplish what costbenefit analysis would have done had its use been permitted, took the
position that the methodologies are sufficiently different that the ban
on one does not apply to the other.
The Keeney estimate on which many health-health analyses rely
($14.7 million in 1999 dollars), '6 differs significantly from the valuation of an individual life on which the EPA relies for purposes of costbenefit analyses ($6.0 million in 1999 dollars). "3 Thus, practically
speaking, regulations that would be prohibited as violations of costbenefit principles might well be upheld under health-health analysis.
But if lower values are used in health-health analysis, as industry
groups urge," the two methodologies are essentially equivalent.
Second, Justice Breyer implicitly equated health-health tradeoffs
with other risk tradeoffs. He relied on Judge Williams's direct risk
tradeoff analysis to ground his own claim about health-health tradeoffs. To Justice Breyer, both a regulation that entails a significant direct risk tradeoff and one whose exorbitant cost brings about health
risks appear to be instances of a "[rule] likely to cause more harm to
health than it prevents" and so "not a rule that is 'requisite to protect
the public health.""65 Thus, he implicitly rejected the approach of some
leading commentators, who deny the conceptual similarity among the
various types of tradeoffs.6
III. RISK TRADEOFF ANALYSIS AND INATrENTION TO
ANCILLARY BENEFITS

As we have seen, regulatory interventions have complex and unforeseen consequences that extend beyond the particular risks at
161 The General Accounting Office, responding to a request by Senator John Glenn, investigated the relationship between health-health tradeoff analysis and cost-benefit analysis and concluded, in the words of the Senator, that health-health analysis, "no matter what it is called, involved balancing benefits ... against compliance costs." OMB Risk, 138 Cong Rec at S 10957-01
(cited in note 144). See also text accompanying notes 42-49.
162 See text accompanying notes 87-91.
163 The EPA established that figure at $5.8 million in 1997 dollars, which is equivalent to
$6.0 million in 1999 dollars. See EPA, Guidelinesfor PreparingEconomic Analyses 90 (2000),
available online at <http://yosemitel.epa.gov/ee/epaeed.nsflpages/guidelines#download> (visited Apr 25,2002). Professor Revesz serves on the Environmental Economics Advisory Committee ("EEAC") of the EPA's Science Advisory Board. The EEAC reviewed the EPA Guidelines.
164 See note 150.
165 American Trucking, 531 US at 495.
166 See, for example, Graham and Wiener, Confronting Risk Tradeoffs at 20 (cited in note 2)
(distinguishing their approach from health-health analysis). See also note 36. But see Lutter and
Morrall, 8 J Risk & Uncertainty at 46 (cited in note 37) (contending that health-health analysis is
a form of risk-risk analysis).
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which they are directed. Sometimes these side effects will be negative.
Identifying and quantifying these negative side effects, or ancillary
risks, is the central objective of risk tradeoff analysis. ' 6 Other times,
they will be positive-that is, there will be what we refer to as ancillary benefits. ' s Part III.A establishes that leading academic and judicial applications of risk tradeoff analysis almost without exception ignore ancillary benefits. ' 69It also presents a historical explanation as to
why the methodology developed the way it did. The inattention to an
important category of consequences of a regulatory intervention
makes risk tradeoff analysis an incomplete methodology for the
evaluation of regulatory policy.
The inattention to ancillary benefits that is characteristic of risk
tradeoff analysis might be justified, at least in part, if ancillary benefits
were, as an empirical matter, less prevalent than risk tradeoffs. Graham and Wiener advance such a claim, drawing on public choice theory. ' , In Part III.B, we refute this claim and show that as a logical matter, regulatory interventions are no less likely to produce ancillary
benefits than risk tradeoffs.
In Part III.C, we extend the typology of risk tradeoffs set out in
Part I to ancillary benefits, with an eye to illustrating their prevalence.
We provide examples of direct ancillary benefits, as well as ancillary
benefits brought about by substitution effects and health-health effects. We also suggest that there may be positive counterparts to
health-health tradeoffs and lulling effects, and raise some analytical
concerns with the relevant academic literatures.
A. Inattention to Ancillary Benefits
Advocates of risk tradeoff analysis, while aspiring to a more "holistic" approach to regulation, consistently ignore the possibility that
regulatory interventions will produce ancillary benefits and not
merely ancillary harms."' This systematic inattention to ancillary bene167 See Graham and Wiener, Confronting Risk Tradeoffs at 19 (cited in note 2) ("In [risk
tradeoff analysis], the challenge is to consider and assess explicitly the impacts of interventions

on important countervailing risks as well as on the target risk.").
168 Keeney and von Wmterfeldt have written that "an analysis and evaluation of regulatory
options should identify and trade off all the effects of the alternatives, including the direct health

benefits and costs, indirecthealth benefits and risks, as well as higher order costs, risks, and benefits:" 16 Interfaces at 25 (cited in note 35) (emphasis added).
169 The term "ancillary benefits" appears to have been coined by Burtraw and Toman. See

Dallas Burtraw and Michael Toman, The Benefits of Reduced Air Pollutants in the U.S. from
Greenhouse Gas Mitigation Policies,Discussion Paper No 98-01-REV at ii, 1 (Resources for the
Future 1997), available online at <http:lwww.rftorg/CFDOCSIdis.-papers/PDF_files/
9801rev.pdf> (visited Apr 21, 2002).
170 See Wiener and Graham, Resolving Risk Tradeoffs at 232-33 (cited in note 34).
171 See, for example, Wiener, 9 Risk at 82 (cited in note 35) (identifying a holistic approach

with one that "[tlake[s] countervailing risks seriously").
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fits among students and practitioners of regulation leads to distortions
in the evaluation of the risk portfolio of regulation. In this Part, we
draw attention to the phenomenon of inattention to ancillary benefits
and offer an explanation of how risk tradeoff analysis developed to
exhibit this bias.
Inattention to ancillary benefits is a hallmark of the leading academic and judicial writing on risk tradeoff analysis. For example, Viscusi endorses the application of risk tradeoff analysis to the regulatory
process, arguing that "regulatory agencies should be concerned with
this broader effect of regulatory policy since their mandate is to improve the health and welfare of citizens generally..... By "broader effect," Viscusi refers only to ancillary harms brought about by the regulation, not ancillary benefits."' Sunstein also fails to address the possibility that regulation might have ancillary benefits. As he states it,
"The problem occurs when the diminution of one health risk simultaneously increasesanotherhealth risk.'7.
Like the academic commentators, Judge Williams makes no reference to ancillary benefits in his opinions discussing risk tradeoffs. In
American Trucking, for instance, he writes: "Legally, then, EPA must
consider positive identifiable effects of a pollutant's presence in the
ambient air in formulating air quality criteria under § 108 [of the
Clean Air Act] and NAAQS under § 109..". Judge Williams says nothing about the legal requirement to consider ancillary benefits, which
presumably is no less compelling. Although Justice Breyer in his
American Trucking concurrence maintains that under Section 109 of
the Clean Air Act, the EPA Administrator "may consider whether a
proposed rule promotes safety overall,' 76 he goes on to refer approvingly to Judge Williams's risk tradeoff analysis in the D.C. Circuit, and
to put forward a health-health tradeoff argument of his own. He does
not suggest that regulations might bring about ancillary benefits as
well as harms.

Moreover, legislative initiatives to reform the regulatory process
advocate risk tradeoff analysis, but are silent on ancillary benefits."7
Viscusi, 63 U Chi L Rev at 1455 (cited in note 9) (emphasis added).
See id. In another body of his scholarly output, Viscusi has discussed the ancillary
environmental benefits that accrue from various CO2 pricing schemes. See Roy Boyd, Kerry
Krutilla, and W. Kip Viscusi, Energy Taxation as a Policy Instrument to Reduce CO2 Emissions:A
Net Benefit Analysis, 29 J Envir Econ & Mgmt 1, 8-10 (1995);W. Kip Viscusi, et al, Environmentally Responsible Energy Pricing,15 Energy J 23,31-41 (Iss 2 1994). Nevertheless, he does not
consider those types of ancillary benefits in his discussions of risk tradeoffs.
174 Sunstein, 63 U Chi L Rev at 1535 (cited in note 3). In Sunstein's presentation of the
problem-and the methodology-ancillary benefits are absent.
172

173

175

175 F3d at 1052.
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531 US at 495 (Breyer concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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See Part II.B.1.
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Similarly, while OIRA has called attention to ancillary harms, '7 it has
not evinced any interest in ancillary benefits.
Since regulatory interventions bring about a range of ancillary effects, positive as well as negative, we regard the systematic inattention
to ancillary benefits as a serious methodological bias. Risk tradeoffs
and ancillary benefits are simply mirror images of each other. There is
no justification for privileging the former and ignoring the latter.
What accounts for this unwarranted asymmetry? At one level, the
answer is simple: Risk tradeoff analysis fails to take notice of ancillary
benefits because it fails to look for them in the first place. Since risk
tradeoff analysis searches only for countervailing risks, it finds only
countervailing risks. But this explanation merely invites a second
question: Why does the methodology not look more broadly at all the
effects of a regulatory intervention?
We suggest a path-dependent account. Risk tradeoff analysis began as a tool of deregulation. Once it became established, it gained
support across the political spectrum. This result is not surprising,
given that the limitations of risk tradeoff analysis have not been
widely discussed in either the academic community or the policy
community.
The emergence and ascendancy of risk tradeoff analysis is closely
linked to the rise of cost-benefit analysis during two antiregulatory
"moments" in recent American political history: President Reagan's
election in 1980, and the 1994 legislative elections that, for the first
time in years, produced Republican majorities in both houses."9 The
Reagan Administration ushered in the rise of cost-benefit analysis as
an overarching metric to provide coherence and rationality to the administrative state.'" The Contract with America meanwhile ushered in
what Sunstein has referred to as the "Cost-Benefit State."'8' Comprehensive regulatory reform initially proposed in 1994 would have required the implementation of cost-benefit analysis and risk tradeoff
See text accompanying notes 137-41.
The contention that intervention in the economy and society is liable to bring about unforeseen risks is, in its broadest articulation, a hallmark of the kind of the conservative political
theory associated with Edmund Burke. See, for example, Albert 0. Hirschman, The Rhetoric of
Reaction:Perversity,Futility,Jeopardy 12-13 (1991) (illustrating by reference to Burke a type of
reactionary rhetoric marked by a tendency to identify the perverse results of reforms); Anthony
T. Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 Yale L J 1029, 1056 (1990) (presenting the Burkean
view that even the most pressing social reforms ought to be undertaken "in a spirit of 'infinite
caution"'); Michael Oakeshott, Rationalismin Politics,in Michael Joseph Oakeshott, Rationalism
in Politics:And Other Essays 1, 31 (Basic Books 1962) ("[T]he Rationalist is a dangerous and expensive character to have in control of affairs, and he does most damage ... when he appears to
be successful.").
180See, for example, Exec Order 12291,3 CFR § 127 (1981) (making new regulations subject to cost-benefit analysis except where prohibited by statute). See also note 26.
181 Sunstein, 48 Stan L Rev at 249 (cited in note 8).
178
179
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analysis across all health-and-safety regulation. As discussed above,
even though the general bills did not pass, the administrative state has
been moving in that direction in smaller steps.1n
In light of the rise to prominence of cost-benefit analysis, risk
tradeoff analysis has two important antiregulatory purposes. First, it
functions as a proxy for cost-benefit analysis when the latter is prohibited by law.ln In an important case decided just before Reagan became
president, the D.C. Circuit held that Section 109 of the Clean Air Act
the NAAQS.14
expressly forbids the EPA from considering the costs of
Against the backdrop of that and similar rulings, Viscusi and Richard
Zeckhauser argue that risk tradeoff analysis is especially necessary
when governing law prevents decisionmakers from employing costbenefit analysis.*' In particular, health-health tradeoff analysis became
important as a means of circumventing statutory prohibitions on costbenefit analysis."6 Like cost-benefit analysis, health-health analysis requires a comprehensive understanding of the costs of regulation in
order to analyze whether it promotes health on balance-just the type
of inquiry the statute would otherwise prohibit.
When statutes do not preclude the application of cost-benefit
analysis, risk tradeoff analysis reduces the benefits that would otherwise be imputed to regulation (or adds to its costs). This use of risk
tradeoff analysis is perhaps best seen in the comprehensive statutory
initiatives associated with the Contract with America, in which risk
tradeoff analysis came to play an increasingly prominent role not as a
partial proxy for cost-benefit analysis, but as a significant tool in its
own right.
In summary, risk tradeoff analysis was developed and took shape
at two crucial moments of heightened antiregulatory sentiment. This
conservative pedigree of risk tradeoff analysis is responsible for its incompleteness. Indeed, Viscusi has directly addressed the question of
whether risk tradeoff analysis is tethered to any particular ideological
commitment about the regulatory state:
A final objection that might be raised against these various riskrisk approaches is political. Some critics have suggested that the
See text accompanying notes 135-36.
See text accompanying notes 162-64.
184 Lead IndustriesAssociation, Inc v EPA, 647 F2d 1130,1148 (DC Cir 1980).The Supreme
Court recently reaffirmed that case in American Trucking, 531 US at 464-71.
185 W. Kip Viscusi and Richard J. Zeckhauser, The Fatalityand Injury Costs of Expenditures,
8 J Risk & Uncertainty 19,21 (1994).
186 See text accompanying notes 162-64 (discussing divergence of the two methodologies).
See also Paul R. Portney and Robert N. Stavins, Regulatory Review of EnvironmentalPolicy: The
PotentialRole of Health-HealthAnalysis, 8 J Risk & Uncertainty 111,118 (1994) (observing that
health-health analysis emerged in part because of "statutory constraints limiting the use of cost
information in setting standards").
182
183
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reason such approaches have been embraced is that policymakers are simply seeking a political mechanism to limit environmental regulations. Imposing limits is not [necessarily] undesirable, however. The task of regulatory oversight is to ensure that
the risk regulations being issued are in society's best interest.in
Because of path dependency, once risk tradeoff analysis became
established-prodded in large part by Professors Graham and Viscusi-it retained its methodological bias against the consideration of
ancillary benefits that was an outgrowth of its antiregulatory pedigree.
That bias persists today, even as risk tradeoff analysis is invoked by
academics and judges across a broad range of the ideological
spectrum, including Professor Sunstein and Justice Breyer, and is
explicitly regarded by some of its staunchest supporters as a means of
achieving more efficient, though not necessarily less, regulation.n
B.

Challenging the Claim That Ancillary Benefits Are
Less Prevalent

Graham and Wiener are the only champions of risk tradeoff
analysis who consider the possibility that regulatory interventions will
produce ancillary benefits as well as harms. "There can also be 'coincident risk reductions,"' they write, "unintended bonuses of efforts to
reduce a target risk."' But they go on to argue, drawing on public
choice theory, that "coincident risk reductions [what we refer to as
"ancillary benefits"] are less likely to be prevalent than are countervailing risks.' ''
There are three interrelated steps to Graham and Wiener's argument that ancillary benefits will be relatively rare. First, they put forward a general argument about why public choice pathologies give
rise to risk tradeoffs. Next, they argue that systematic forces do not
similarly bring about ancillary benefits. Finally, they claim that decisionmakers can be expected to excise such benefits should they nevertheless arise. We address and criticize their arguments at each of these
three stages.
1. Public choice and tradeoffs.
Graham and Wiener draw on public choice theory to explain that
regulatory interventions produce risk tradeoffs as a result of omitted

187 Viscusi, 8 J Risk & Uncertainty at 15 (cited in note 114).
188 See, for example, Wiener, 9 Risk at 81 (cited in note 35) (arguing that risk tradeoff

analysis is a tool for more effective regulation, rather than a tool for deregulation).
189 Graham and Wiener, ConfrontingRisk Tradeoffs at 37 (cited in note 2).
190 Wiener and Graham, Resolving Risk Tradeoffs at 232 (cited in note 34).
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voice."' Consistent with standard public choice accounts,n they maintain that regulatory decisions will often have a concentrated impact on
certain groups. These groups will have a strong incentive to make their
voices heard in the regulatory process. By contrast, the incentives for
ordinary citizens will be smaller, commensurate with the relatively less
concentrated impact the regulation will have on them. Because of
these disparate incentives, the interest groups will play a prominent
role in the regulatory process, while the majority of citizens will not.
Consequently, when a highly affected interest group approaches a
regulatory decisionmaker with a proposal that has the consequence of
transferring risk from that group to a broader population, the "decisionmaker is unlikely to take account of countervailing losses imposed
on constituencies who are not participating in the dialogue [of regulatory policymaking]. '',I

In theory, the decisionmaker could invest time and effort to discover a means to remove the target risk from the interest group without passing it (or another risk) on to the unsuspecting population. But
because the broader population does not participate in the regulatory
process, the decisionmaker is willing to ignore the risk tradeoff of her
decision.'9 Thus, public choice pathologies give rise to risk tradeoffs
when policymakers redistribute risk away from well-organized groups
and onto poorly organized populations.
We begin by calling attention to limitations in this account. Graham and Wiener do not provide a general argument for why ancillary
benefits will be less prevalent than ancillary harms. Rather their account depends upon the risk tradeoffs' possessing a certain pedigree
(omitted voice) and a certain defining characteristic (redistributing
risk away from one group and onto another). Omitted voice, however,
as Graham and Wiener acknowledge, is only one source of risk tradeoffs among many. The authors discuss a number of other reasons for
risk tradeoffs, ranging from the cognitive limitations of decisionmakers to problems of bureaucratic organization. " Thus, Graham and
191 See id at 230-33. Consistent with their general view that health-health tradeoffs should

not be considered under the banner of risk tradeoff analysis, Graham and wiener's public choice
argument does not apply to health-health tradeoffs.
192 For a general discussion, see Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regula-

tion, 19 J L & Econ 211 (1976) (developing the idea that regulatory agencies do not exclusively
serve a single economic interest); George J. Stigler, The Theory of EconomicRegulation, 2 Bell J

Econ & Mgmt 3, 3 (1971) ("The potential uses of public resources and powers to improve the
economic status of groups (such as industries and occupations) are analyzed to provide a scheme
of the demand for regulation.").
193 Wiener and Graham, Resolving Risk Tradeoffs at 230 (cited in note 34).
194

See id.

195 The authors refer to "heuristics," "bounded oversight roles," and "behavioral responses"
as other causes of risk tradeoffs. See Wiener and Graham, Resolving Risk Tradeoffs at 233-42
(cited in note 34).

2002]

The Biases of Risk TradeoffAnalysis

1797

Wiener at best can explain the supposed dearth of ancillary benefits
with respect to those risk tradeoffs that come about because of public
choice pathologies.
Similarly, Graham and Wiener's argument can at most explain
why ancillary benefits are less likely to be prevalent when the tradeoff
takes the form of a risk redistribution.'" Risk redistributions come
about when a regulatory intervention brings about an ancillary harm
that affects a population distinct from the population affected by the
original risk. There are two kinds of such redistributions. When the
risk itself is identical to the original risk, Graham and Wiener speak of
a "risk transfer."'' Thus, adopting a policy to recycle lead batteries may
merely redistribute the risk of lead poisoning to the population of
workers and citizens living near a lead smelter.n The authors use the
term "risk transformation" to describe what happens when both the
nature of the risk and the affected population are changed."' For instance, tightening fuel economy standards brings about a risk transformation when, in the name of reducing risks of toxicity, it redistributes a different risk (less safe cars) to a different population (drivers,
passengers, and pedestrians)?'
All of the risk tradeoffs that come about because of omitted
voice problems will be risk redistributions of one kind or the other,
because interest groups would be unlikely to seek to remove one risk
to which they are exposed only to replace it with another such risk.
But-and this is the nub-risk redistributions represent only two of
the four categories of risk tradeoffs that Graham and Wiener identify."' Thus, Graham and Wiener can at best explain why, within a small
subset of risk tradeoffs, ancillary benefits are less likely to be prevalent than ancillary harms.
In addition to these significant limitations, the argument is flawed
in a number of important ways. Graham and Wiener's omitted voice
rationale for the existence of risk tradeoffs depends upon a certain
conception of how regulation operates. Crucial to their story is the
image of an interest group inclined to redistribute risks away from it196 See note 34.
197 Graham and Wiener, ConfrontingRisk Tradeoffs at 22-25 (cited in note 2).

198 See Katherine 'Walker and Jonathan Baert Wiener, Recycling Lead,in Graham and Wiener, eds, Risk versus Risk 149,152 (cited in note 2) ("Secondary lead smelting, a key component
of the recycling process, releases lead to ambient and workplace air, resulting in community and
worker exposures to lead.").
199 Graham and Wiener, ConfrontingRisk Tradeoffs at 22-25 (cited in note 2) ("[W]hen the
countervailing risk is different in both outcome and affected population, we describe the situation as a risk transformation.").
200 As an empirical matter, that population may overlap significantly with the population of
"breathers" affected by automobile emissions. Analytically, however, the two populations are
distinct.

201 See Graham and Wiener, ConfrontingRisk Tradeoffs at 22-25 (cited in note 2).
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self and onto unsuspecting "forgotten groups." There are two implicit
assumptions in this image that are open to question. First, Graham
and Wiener assume that a single interest group will capture the regulatory process and successfully impose its views on the captured
agency.2 In practice, regulatory decisions are typically contested, with
groups representing opposing views (paradigmatically public interest
groups on the one hand and industry groups on the other) jockeying
for superiority with the relevant decisionmaker. In other words, the
problem of the omitted voice is not as acute as the authors suggest.
A second, related problem in their account is the authors' failure
to specify precisely which groups can be expected actively to seek
regulation that redistributes risk away from them and onto others.
Graham and Wiener suggest that the group might be "an industry or
the raison d'etre of an advocacy group ''m but do not clarify, for instance, why an industry group would be seeking regulation in the first
place,20or why an advocacy group would be indifferent to, or supportive of, the imposition of health risks onto other populations. With respect to this latter point, Graham and Wiener assume that an advocacy group will have a singular mission: to advance a particular, limited agenda on behalf of a discrete population. But an advocacy group
is just as likely to represent not a particular interest, but rather a range
of interests, and for that matter, a range of populations. True, the
American Lung Association might be less interested in skin cancers
than respiratory disorders, and so might champion a regulation that
transforms risk of respiratory disease into risk of melanoma, but the
National Resources Defense Council ("NRDC"), for instance, is likely
to care about a risk transfer away from conventional pollutants and
toward global warming. That organization advocates reducing both

202

Graham and Wiener raise the possibility that multiple groups might mobilize to have

their voices heard, but reason that legislators will still "tend to hear only part of the story" because they will be most responsive to the voices of their constituents. Wiener and Graham, Re-

solving Risk Tradeoffs at 230 (cited in note 34).
203 See, for example, Toke S.Aidt, PoliticalInternalization of Economic Externalities and
Environmental Policy, 69 J Pub Econ 1, 1 (1998) (explaining that competition between lobby

groups is an important source of internalization of economic externalities); Gary S.Becker, A
Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for PoliticalInfluence, 98 Q J Econ 371, 372

(1983) (discussing competition among interest groups and the resulting equilibrium). Graham
and Wiener recognize the phenomenon. Thus, in describing the potential risk tradeoffs of requiring senior citizens to be recertified for driver licenses, the authors note that the countervailing
risks "may have been avoided because of the potent political voice of older people in this coun-

try.' Wiener and Graham, Resolving Risk Tradeoffs at 231 (cited in note 34).7The core of their argument, however, overlooks this possibility. See id at 230-33.
204 Wiener and Graham, Resolving Risk Tradeoffs at 230 (cited in note 34).
205

One example of an industry group that pursues regulation is the manufacturers of pollu-

tion control equipment. See Revesz, 115 Harv L Rev at 574 (cited in note 129).
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conventional pollutants and greenhouse gases, and is interested in the
well-being of the respective populations affected by each.
As an example of a risk tradeoff rooted in omitted voice, Graham
and Wiener refer to a case study on the risks of dechlorination of
drinking water.z That case study draws attention to the risks of not
chlorinating the drinking water supply (microbial disease) versus the
risks of chlorinating (certain cancers). Although the authors of the
study raise the possibility that dechlorination of the water supply will
have a disproportionately significant effect on poor people who
"would be less able to expend the necessary funds to switch to an alternative disinfection system or to purchase bottled water,"' they do
not say which kinds of groups would advocate for redistributing risks
away from themselves and onto others. Indeed, the authors of that
study observe that "the federal EPA has begun negotiating rulemaking, involving industry as well as community leaders,"' aimed at striking an appropriate balance between the twin risks. Thus, far from
showing how a single, self-interested group hijacks the regulatory
process, the case study in fact shows how the regulatory process allows
disparate groups to give voice to their interests.
2. Interest groups and ancillary benefits.
Graham and Wiener further argue that whereas powerful dynamics bring about ancillary risks, "there are no systematic forces at work
to encourage such unexpected pluses [that is, ancillary benefits]. 1' 0
Thus, they predict that ancillary benefits will be less prevalent than
ancillary harms. Even if Graham and Wiener were correct about the
general utility of the "omitted voice" rationale in explaining risk
tradeoffs, their argument that incentives are not similarly structured to
bring about ancillary benefits is unpersuasive.
Graham and Wiener suppose that interest groups will seek out
regulatory intervention when they want to redistribute risk away from
themselves and onto others. But they provide no reason to believe
206 Compare the Clean Air page on the NRDC website, available online at <http://
www.nrde.org/air/default.asp> (visited Apr 19,2002) ("No element of the natural world is more
essential to life than air, and no environmental task more critical than keeping it clean."), with
the Global Warming page, available online at <http://www.nrde.org/globalWarming/
default.asp> (visited Apr 19, 2002) ("Global warming may be the most devastating environmental problem human beings have created.").
207 See Susan W. Putnam and Jonathan Baert NWiener, Seeking Safe DrinkingWater, in Graham and Wiener, eds, Risk versus Risk 124, 124 (cited in note 2) (explaining how people have
come to fear that adding chlorine to water may cause cancer, but chlorination of water is an important means of combating serious waterborne microbial diseases).
208 Id at 144.
209 Id at 145.
210 Id at 232.
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that these interest groups would want to actively redistribute their
risk, to reduce their own exposure only. The risk-minimizing proposals
that the interest groups bring to the table are no more likely to bring
about risk tradeoffs than ancillary benefits. If anything, there might be
a selection bias under which interest groups advocate for target risk
reductions with ancillary benefits rather than harms, on the theory
that there would be less political or administrative resistance to such
policies. 2 ' The interest group lobbying for the target risk reduction
would call attention to the ancillary benefits of the proposed regulation and enlist the beneficiaries of these coincident risk reductions in
its attempt to win support for the regulation. This additional support
could help defray the target group's advocacy costs and secure greater
political capital for the decisionmaker.
3. Incentives of decisionmakers.
In addition to the claim that there are no underlying pressures to
bring about ancillary benefits, Graham and Wiener reason that "[i]f
decisionmakers foresaw opportunities to achieve coincident risk reductions, they would be likely to seek support from the beneficiary
constituencies, or to try to pare their interventions to avoid providing
uncompensated bonus reductions. '212 Thus, they argue that regulators
would seek to eliminate ancillary benefits so as not to distribute freely
rewards that are politically unearned.
Graham and Wiener assume that when an interest group proposes a regulation that entails risk tradeoffs, the decisionmaker will be
unconcerned about these harms as long as the negatively affected
group is ignorant or politically impotent. In contrast, according to
Graham and Wiener, when an interest group proposes a regulation
that has the ancillary effect of bringing benefits to others, the decisionmaker will choose to invest additional time and effort either to
reduce or to remove the ancillary benefits or else to extract a price
from the recipients of these benefits. There are two problems with this
account. First, it will not always be technically feasible to remove the
ancillary benefits.21'3 For example, a decisionmaker who agreed to set
new stringent standards for sulfur dioxide ("SO 2") emissions would
211

Occasionally, that resistance may be supplied by another agency, concerned with the po-

tential negative implications of proposed regulations. Thus, the Department of Energy recently
appears to have lobbied the EPA to relax pollution standards potentially burdensome to utilities.
See, for example, Katharine Q. Seelye, EPA and Energy Department War over Clean Air Rules,
NY Times A15 (Feb 19, 2002) (noting a fierce debate between the agencies pivoting on the im-

pact of clean air regulations on the energy sector).
'Wiener and Graham, Resolving Risk Tradeoffs at 232-33 (cited in note 34).
Recall that Graham and Wiener's argument applies only to ancillary effects that affect a
population different from the population facing the target risk. If the ancillary benefits were to
accrue to the same group, decisionmakers would have no incentive to pare them down.
212
213
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thereby bring about ancillary benefits in terms of greenhouse gas reductions." But it would be difficult to see how those benefits could be
removed while preserving the original target risk reduction. Indeed, a
significant body of literature on the phenomenon of free-riding begins
with the assumption that it will not always be possible to restrict benefits to those who deserve them or have effectively paid for them.'
Even if a decisionmaker were able, as a technical matter, to pare
down the ancillary benefits, what incentive would she have to do so?
In the context of risk tradeoffs, Graham and Wiener argue plausibly
that a decisionmaker will not expend time and effort to reduce ancillary harms to a "forgotten group" from which the decisionmaker can
216
extract no political or financial capital. But to say that a decisionmaker has no incentive to confer "unearned" benefits is not to suggest-as Graham and Wiener seem to believe-that a decisionmaker
has incentives to take time and expend energy to ensure that no one
accidentally benefits from regulatory interventions. Depending on the
magnitude of the ancillary benefits, the decisionmaker might indeed
seek support from the benefited constituencies, as Graham and Wiener predict, but in doing so, she will first carefully weigh the costsincluding her opportunity costs-in expending time and resources in
that way.
We have thus cast serious doubt on the only sustained account of
why ancillary benefits will be less prevalent than risk tradeoffs. It is
therefore unjustified to focus only on the latter, to the exclusion of the
former.
C. A Typology of Ancillary Benefits
In Part I, we presented a typology of risk tradeoffs and supplied
examples for each category. Consistent with our claim that ancillary
benefits are properly thought of as the mirror image of risk tradeoffs,
we now employ that typology to organize various kinds of ancillary
benefits. Here, too, we provide examples of each type. We also point
out substantial analytic limitations of health-health analysis, as well as
of lulling effects. Our objective is to call attention to the prevalence of
ancillary benefits, which have figured neither in academic debates
about regulatory policy nor in regulatory practice, and to suggest a
coherent approach to thinking about various types of ancillary beneSee text accompanying notes 345-60.
See, for example, Mancur Olson, The Logic of CollectiveAction: Public Goods and the
Theory of Groups21 (Harvard 1971) (assuming that the benefits cannot be restricted).
216 Wiener and Graham, Resolving Risk Tradeoffs at 230 (cited in note 34) ("[W]here the
consequences are broadly distributed across the general public, the incentives for ordinary citizens to organize and speak will be small.").
214
215

217

See id at 232-33.
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fits. At the same time, we cast doubt on the analytic soundness of two
methodologies used to justify attention to risk tradeoffs in the regulatory process.
1. Direct ancillary benefits.
As we have seen, advocates of risk tradeoff analysis draw on
analogies to iatrogenic injury and disease to explain the phenomenon
of (direct) risk tradeoffs.2 8 Just as medical interventions designed to
promote health frequently entail negative side effects, they argue, so
too regulatory schemes intended to bring about greater overall health
or safety may, in practice, accomplish the opposite. In so reasoning,
these champions of risk tradeoff analysis systematically ignore the
manner in which medical interventions-paradigmatically, drug therapies-carry with them not only negative, but also positive side effects.2 1 9 These positive side effects supply powerful examples of what
might be thought of as direct ancillary benefits.
The medical literature is replete with studies showing that drugs
originally approved or conventionally prescribed for certain purposes
are in fact beneficial in treating unrelated conditions.2, ° Aspirin, to take
a well-known example, was first introduced as an analgesic and antipyretic, but is now widely used also to reduce the risk of heart attack
in susceptible individuals.2' It is even beneficial in reducing mortality
after the onset of symptoms of a heart attack. = Recent evidencem suggests that aspirin also reduces the incidence of colorectal cancer.2
Other examples abound. Estrogen therapy, originally introduced
to combat the symptoms of menopause, significantly reduces osteoporosis and bone loss. 4 Angiotensin Converting Enzyme ("ACE") in218
219

See Part I.A.
See, for example, Wiener, 9 Risk at 47-48 (cited in note 35) (discussing the frequency

and severity of adverse drug events but ignoring ancillary benefits).
220 Because the FDA regulates substances, rather than the practice of medicine, drugs, once
approved for certain purposes, may be prescribed by the medical community for "off-label" uses.
See generally Laurence Landow, Off-Label Use ofApproved Drugs,116 Chest 589 (1999).
221 See Prevention:Aspirin Underused to Prevent Heart Attacks, Strokes, Heart Disease
Weekly 8,9 (Feb 3,2002) ("[A]spirin is a life-saving treatment that will provide major benefits to

many thousands of people at high risk of heart attack or stroke."); Jane E. Brody, Personal
Health, NY Times C12 (Feb 23,1994) (touting the benefits of aspirin for the prevention of heart
disease).
m See Maryann Napoli, Aspirin Is Effective for HeartAttack, Health Facts 4, 4 (Dec 31,
1997) ("Taking an aspirin at the first sign of a heart attack has been judged to be a safe and effective means of reducing death and complications.").
W See Jinne and Mayer, 342 New Eng J Med at 1961 (cited in note 23) (noting that "it is

likely that aspirin ..act[s] as [a] chemopreventive agent[] at early stages of carcinogenesis").
224 See Bente Riis, Karsten Thomsen, and Claus Christiansen, Does Calcium Supplementation Prevent PostmenopausalBone Loss?: A Double-Blind,Controlled Clinical Study, 316 New
Eng J Med 173,176-77 (1987) (finding estrogen therapy more effective than calcium for retarding bone loss).
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hibitors-developed as antihypertensive medicines-have been shown
to prevent heart attacks, strokes, and the onset of diabetes in certain
patients.22 ' Minoxidil, originally approved by the FDA as an antihypertensive, is now more commonly prescribed to prevent or reverse baldness.22 Botulinum toxin A (marketed as Botox) was recently approved
for cosmetic use in smoothing wrinkles after it had been initially approved as a treatment for "eye spasms and other neurological disorders."2'
In the face of these and other examples of the direct ancillary
benefits of medications, advocates of risk tradeoff analysis draw attention solely to their negative side effects. This one-sidedness is partially
explained, perhaps, by distortions in the availability and timing of information related to positive side effects. The drug approval process
places a premium on the discovery and disclosure of all significant adverse effects of a medication, but is not comparably concerned with
the production of information concerning a drug's ancillary benefits.m
In addition, negative side effects might be more readily discernible
than ancillary benefits. The tortuous career of the drug thalidomide is
instructive in this regard. First produced in Germany in the 1950s, thalidomide was widely prescribed to pregnant women as an antiemetic.2' Reports of neuropathy associated with long-term use of the
drug first surfaced in late 1960. Soon a connection was made between
the drug and the appearance of certain formerly rare birth defects. In
1961, thalidomide was withdrawn from world markets.
But in July 1998, thalidomide was approved by the FDA for
treatment of erythema nodusom leprosum ("ENL"), an inflammatory
complication of Hansen's disease.m It has subsequently proved extremely effective against a broad range of dermatological disorders, as
well as numerous HIV-related infections." Thus, a drug that forty
years ago became (deservedly) notorious because of its negative side

225 See Mary Duenwald, FamiliarBlood Pressure DrugFinds an Array of Novel Uses, NY
Times F1 (June 25,2002).
226 See Price, 341 New Eng J Med at 966 (cited in note 24).
227 Reed Abelson, ED.A. Approves Allergan Drugfor FightingWrinkles, NY Tunes C4 (Apr

16,2002) (reporting the FDA's approval of Botox for cosmetic use).
228 See, for example, Laurence Landow, Roberta C. Kahn, and Curtis Wright, FDA's Role in
Anesthetic DrugDevelopment, 90 Anesthesiology 882,883 (March 1999) (noting the requirement
that the FDA be apprised within seven days of serious adverse drug events during clinical trials).

Indeed, under the MedWatch reporting system, the FDA must be informed of adverse effects associated with drug administration even after approval. See id at 885.
229 Carrie L. Radomsky and Norman Levine, Thalidomide, 19 Dermatologic Clinics 87,87

(Jan 2001).
M L. Calabrese and A.B. Fleischer, Thalidomide: Current and Potential Clinical Applications, 108 Am J Med 487,487 (2000) (reviewing recent insights and new therapeutic uses of Thalidomide).
231 Id.
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effects has proved to have significant direct ancillary benefits. Notwithstanding the potential disparities in the availability (or timing) of
information about the negative and positive side effects of medication,
there is no reason to believe that direct ancillary benefits are less
prevalent than direct risk tradeoffs.
Nor are direct ancillary benefits confined to the medical context.
They have been observed-or can be expected to be observed-across
a broad cut of environmental and health-and-safety regulation as well.
We offer some illustrative examples.
In the past few decades, constructed wetlands have emerged as an
alternative to conventional wastewater treatment facilities as a means
of complying with the Clean Water Act's effluent limits for wastewater
discharge from point sources, including municipalities, industrial facilities, and animal feeding operations.' Water treatment is a natural
function of wetlands.2n Constructed wetlands can be used to manage
wastewater, operating along the same principles as natural wetlands,
creating a shallow basin filled with soil and vegetation through which
water flows.2- As the water passes through, suspended particles settle;
pollutants are broken down by plants, microorganisms, and sediment;
nutrients are absorbed; and pathogens die off.ns
Worldwide, more than one thousand constructed wetland projects
receive wastewater from municipal, industrial, and agricultural
sources." Case studies of these projects, some of which have been operating for twenty years or more, demonstrate that constructed wetlands can function as low-cost, effective wastewater treatment systems.2" Constructed wetlands have also been observed to have generated noteworthy direct ancillary benefits.
232 See EPA, Office of Water, Constructed Wetlands for Wastewater Treatment and Wildlife
Habitat,EPA832-R-93-005, Background (Sept 1993), available online at <http:llwww.epa.govl
owow/wetlands/construc/backgrnd.html> (visited Oct 2,2002).
233 EPA Office of Wetlands, Oceans, and Watersheds, Guiding Principlesfor Construction
Treatment Wetlands: Providingfor Water Quality and Wildlife Habitat,Part I: Introduction, (Oct

2000), available online at <http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/constructed/guide.html> (visited
Sept 3, 2002).
234 See EPA, Office of Wetlands, Oceans, and Watersheds, Design Manual: ConstructedWetlands and Aquatic Plant Systems for MunicipalWaste Treatment15 (Sept 1998), available online
at <http:llwww.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/pdf/design.pdf> (visited Sept 3, 2002) (providing an
overview of the two types of constructed wetland treatment systems: free water surface system
and subsurface flow system).
235 See EPA, Office of Wetlands, Oceans, and Watersheds, A Handbook of ConstructedWetlands 17 (Jan 1995), available online at <http://vww.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/pdf/hand.pdf> (visited Sept 3,2002).
236 Robert L. Knight, Wildlife Habitat and Public Use Benefits of Treatment Wetlands, 35

Water Sci & Tech 35 (Iss 5 1997).
237 See EPA, Office of Wetlands, Oceans, and Watersheds, ConstructedWetlands for Wastewater Treatment and Wildlife Habitat,Free Water Surface ConstructedWetland Systems, available
online at <http:llwww.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/construc/freewatr.html> (visited Sept 3,2002).
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Designed to replicate their natural counterparts, constructed wetlands produce many of the same benefits, including habitat creation
and preservation, carbon sequestration, erosion control, and recreational and research opportunities.2 The creation of habitat for fauna
and flora is perhaps the most significant ancillary benefit of the construction of wetlands for wastewater treatment. Wetlands are among
the most biologically productive ecosystems, essential to the survival
of more than one-third of the threatened and endangered species in
the United States.z9
Constructed wetlands recreate this biodiversity: Over six hundred
species of plants and the full range of animal types are found in treatment wetlands in the United States.2 Constructed wetland systems
also have the direct ancillary benefit of reducing carbon dioxide emissions by sequestering carbon through photosynthesis.24 ' Wetlands absorb carbon through vegetative growth and store it as preserved plant
biomass. 2 Furthermore, constructed wetlands absorb flood and surface water, reducing flooding and erosion damage to both natural and
human environments. 23
Finally, constructed wetlands provide public use benefits, supplying opportunities for hiking, biking, birdwatching, and scientific study.
Building trails, boardwalks, and observation towers can open the wetland to the public and increase recreational and educational opportunities. "' Each year, for example, ten thousand people visit the constructed wetlands at Orlando Easterly Wetlands Park, including area
schools and community volunteers.4'

238 See Steven Piper and Jonathan Platt, Benefits from Including Wetland Component in Water Supply Projects,J Water Resources Planning and Mgmt 230 (July/Aug 1998). The magnitude
of these ancillary benefits is difficult to quantify, and can be expected to vary as a function of
species composition within the wetland and proximity to other wetlands. See J.H. Sather, Constructed Wetlands for Wastewater Treatment: Municipal, Industrialand Agricultural353 (Lewis
1989). See also Portney and Stavins, 8 J Risk and Uncertainty at 117 (cited in note 186) (noting
that regulations protecting forested wetlands "also protect wildlife habitat").
239 EPA, Office of Wetlands, Oceans, and Watersheds, Wetlands Fact Sheets (Mar 2002),
available online at <http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/facts/contents.html> (visited Oct 3,
2002).
240 Knight, 35 Water Sci & Tech at 36 (cited in note 236).
241 See M.H. Ogden, Atmospheric Carbon Reduction and Carbon Sequestration in Small
Community Wastewater Treatment Systems Using Constructed Wetlands, available online at
<http://asae.frymulti.com> (visited Oct 3,2002).
242 See EPA, Office of Wetlands, Oceans, and Watersheds, Functions and Values, available

online at <http:l/www.epa.govlowowlwetlands/vitallnature.html> (visited Sept 3,2002).
243 See William S. Sipple, Wetland Function and Values, Module 6: Flood Protection (Mar
2002), available online at <http://www.epa.govlwatertrainlwetlandslindex.htm> (visited Sept 3,
2002).
244 See Knight, 35 Water Sci &Tech at 39 (cited in note 236).
245 David Sloan, et al, Reuse Reclaim, and Recharge, 10 Water Envir & Tech 56,57 (1998).
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The availability of carbon sinks as a compliance mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol furnishes another example of a direct ancillary
benefit in the context of environmental policy.2" In addition to effecting the primary goal of greenhouse gas reduction, the Protocol's reliance on carbon sinks will have the ancillary benefit of preserving forests in developing countries, thereby maintaining vital habitats and
biodiversity, retarding erosion, and securing the welfare of local human populations.247
Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol establishes the Clean Development Mechanism ("CDM"), which allows developed countries (Annex I) to earn emissions reductions through sustainable development
projects in developing countries (non-Annex I). The emissions reductions for forest preservation are calculated against the baseline of expected emissions in the absence of the project, making projects most
valuable in areas of impending destruction.m
Article 12 recognizes the importance of terrestrial carbon sinks,
including forests, to retard the processes that lead to global warming.
Simply stated, as plants grow, carbon is absorbed from the atmosphere
and stored in the biomass.249 When that biomass decays or is burned,
carbon is released back in to the atmosphere.- The Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change estimates that deforestation is responsible
for 10 to 30 percent of the anthropogenic carbon dioxide emitted over
the past twenty years. About 20 percent of annual emissions come
from the destruction of tropical forests. Deforestation of tropical forests continues at a rate of 40 million acres per year.21

246 See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Commission on Climate Change
(Dee 1997), available online at <http:l/unfccc.intlresource/docs/convkplkpeng.html> (visited Sept

3,2002).
247 See generally Jocelyn Kaiser, Soaking Up Carbon in Forests and Fields, 290 Sci 922
(2000), available online at <http://www.sciencemag.org> (visited Sept 3, 2002); Ernst-Detlef
Schulze, Christian Wirth, and Martin Heimann, Managing Forests After Kyoto, 289 Sci 2058
(2000), available online at <http://www.sciencemag.org> (visited Sept 3,2002).
248 See Donald M. Goldberg, Carbon Conservation: Climate Change Forests; and the Clean
Development Mechanism (1998), available online at <http:llwww.ciel.orglPublicationsl
CleanDevelopmentMechanismText.pdf> (visited Sept 3,2002).
249 See, for example, Peter B. Reich, et al, PlantDiversity EnhancesEcosystem Responses to
Elevated C02 and Nitrogen Deposition,410 Nature 810 (2001).
250 See World Resources Institute, Global Topics: Climate Change and Energy: The Global
Carbon Cycle, available online at <http:llwww.wri.orglwrilclimatelcarboncy.html> (visited Sept 3,
2002). See also Robert A. Sedjo, Brent Sohngen, and Pamela Jagger, Carbon Sinks in the PostKyoto World, RFF Climate Issue Brief #12, Resources for the Future (Oct 1998) (discussing the
utility of forests as carbon sinks).
251 World Resources Institute News Release, WRI Study Reports Deforestation May Be
Higher Than FAO Estimates (Mar 12, 2001), available online at <http:l/www.wri.orglpressl
fao_fra5.html> (visited Sept 3,2002) (noting that its figure was higher than that of the UN FAO's
2001 assessment).
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The availability of carbon sinks as a compliance mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol creates incentives for forest preservation in
countries where such action is currently economically impractical. At
the national level, the payoffs from selling a forest to an international
logging concession usually outweigh the benefits of its being preserved. The rewards from logging accrue almost exclusively at the national level, while the damages are felt locally and globally. By allowing non-Annex I countries to sell carbon sinks to Annex I countries
trying to meeting their emission reductions, the CDM provides a
means for non-Annex I countries to earn income without externalizing costs at the local and global levels.2
It is appropriate, therefore, to think of the CDM as giving rise to
a range of direct ancillary benefits: biodiversity preservation and watershed protection, fuel and timber conservation, and maintenance of
nonwood forest products.2n Forests contain the greatest rates of biodiversity of any ecosystem type. Based on current deforestation rates,
projections of extinction rates for forest species range from 2 to 5 percent per decade.2 Particularly in tropical areas, where over half of the
world's species are contained in only 7 percent of the land area, increasing forest conservation can slow extinction rates.2
Deforestation harms not only the species living within the forest,
but also those in the surrounding watershed. Forests stabilize soils,
maintain water quality and control water flows. Erosion rates in deforested areas can be up to one hundred times the natural rate,
contributing to landslides, flooding, drinking water contamination and
poor soil quality.-" Local people bear the impact of these harms, and
also suffer the loss of the forest as a source of food, fuel, and livelihood.
Direct ancillary benefits have also been observed in the context
of health-and-safety regulation. According to a 1994 study, regulations
implemented to limit the amount of carbon monoxide ("CO") in motor vehicle exhaust gas in order to reduce the long-term risks associated with air pollution had the ancillary benefit of reducing short-term

252

See C. Kremen, et al, Economic Incentives for Rain Forest ConservationAcross Scales,

288 Sci 1828,1831 (2000).
See Robert Bonnie, et al, Counting the Costs of Deforestation,288Sci 1763,1763 (2000).
See Emily Matthews, et al, Pilot Analysis of Global Ecosystems: Forest Ecosystems 1
(World Resources Inst 2000).
255 Id at 51.
256 World Resources Institute, Global Issues: Tropical Forest Species Richness, available
253
254

online at <http://www.wri.orglbiodiv/bOl-koa.html> (visited Sept 3,2002).
257 Matthews, et al, PilotAnalysis at 61-65 (cited in note 254).
258 See John L. Innes and Gary Bull, ForestryManagementand Production,Encyclopedia of
Life Sciences 1-5 (Nature Publishing Group 2001).
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carbon monoxide fatalities from accidents and suicides.2' The study
found that because of regulatory initiatives and new technology, 1989
cars emitted less than one sixtieth the carbon monoxide when idling
than 1967 cars. During roughly the same period,m the number of accidental fatalities caused by CO was reduced by one half.21 At the same
time, CO-induced suicides increased absolutely only trivially, well below the predictions of expected deaths in light of population growth
and expansion in the absolute number of motor vehicles on the roads.
The study shows that by 1987, the CO regulations had the "unanticipated benefit" of saving an average of twenty-five thousand lives per
year. By contrast, the regulations are only expected to save 212 to 551
lives annually from reduced air pollution." Thus, in this case, the ancillary benefit is considerably greater than the direct benefit.
2. Ancillary benefits and substitution effects.
The most compelling evidence of ancillary benefits rooted in substitution effects (or process changes) comes from recent studies of the
ancillary benefits of greenhouse gas ("GHG") reductions for reduc6 In order to reduce carbon dioxide
tions in conventional pollutantsY
(CO2 ) emissions, electricity producers might burn less fuel or burn
cleaner fuel. These transformations, designed to reduce CO2 emissions,
would also reduce criteria air pollutants such as ozone, NO,
and SO 2. '
Burtraw and Toman present and analyze eight different approaches to modeling these ancillary benefits. These models generate
estimates for the average ancillary benefit per ton of carbon reduction
See Sheletf 146/147 Sci Total Envir at 93-94 (cited in note 18).
See id at 97 (referring to 1970-87 as "the 18 years when large decreases in vehicle emissions were legislated in the USA").
261 Id at 97, table 4. Because of population growth during that period, and expansion in the
number of motor vehicles, the number was expected to double. See id.
259
260

262

Id at 100.

See Dallas Burtraw, et al, Ancillary Benefits of Reduced Air Pollutionin the UnitedStates
from Moderate Greenhouse Gas MitigationPoliciesin the ElectricitySector, Discussion Paper No
263

01-61 at 32-35 (Resources for the Future 2001), available online at <http://ww.rff.org/
discpapers/PDFfiles/0161.pdf> (visited Apr 20, 2002) (considering how moderate actions to
slow atmospheric accumulation of greenhouse gases from fossil fuel use also could reduce con-

ventional air pollutants in the United States); Burtraw and Toman, Discussion Paper No 98-01REV at *ii (cited in note 169) ("Policies that reduce emissions of greenhouse gases can simultaneously alter emissions of conventional pollutants that have deleterious effects on human health
and the environment."). See also Luis Cifuentes, et al, Hidden Health Benefits of Greenhouse

Gas Mitigation, 293 Sci 1257, 1259 (2001) (stating that, depending on how they are devised,
"[p]olicies to mitigate GHG can yield substantive and immediate benefits to the 3 billion people

currently residing in urban areas throughout the world").
264 Criteria pollutants are those regulated by Section 109 of the Clean Air Act. Reductions
in criteria pollutants entail potentially significant health benefits. See Cifuentes, et al, 293 Sci at
1259 (cited in note 263).
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ranging from $2.88 to $78.85.m Burtraw and Toman note that the

analysis of ancillary benefits gives rise to serious methodological difficulties. Nonetheless, they conclude by observing that "in assessing the
cost of GHG control ... ancillary benefits clearly warrant attention."266
In the more recent study,2" Burtraw and his coauthors model the
effects on criteria air pollutant reductions of a moderate ($25 per metric ton) carbon tax. They find that such a tax would have ancillary
benefits in criteria pollutant reductions worth about $13 to $14 per ton
of carbon reduced. 2' About $8 of the ancillary benefits are attributable
to nitrogen oxide (NO,() reductions,269 while another $4 to $7 would
come from avoided abatement costs for NO. and SO 2 controlso They
show that for a modest carbon tax, "ancillary benefits from reductions
in NO, emissions contribute significantly to justifying the cost of carbon emission reductions."' '
3. Health-health effects.
It is in the nature of health-health tradeoffs that one cannot point
to specific instances of negative side effects and attribute them to particular regulatory interventions. Rather, health-health tradeoffs are
grounded in the general supposition that regulations, because they
take an economic toll, take a toll on life as well. Not surprisingly,
therefore, health-health ancillary benefits also cannot be specified
with precision. But, as some commentators have perceptively noted,
for health-health analysis to be true to its own assumptions, it has to
be allowed that regulatory interventions that generate jobs or economic activity entail ancillary benefits. As Portney and Stavins have
put it, "[I]f Superfund cleanups employ previously unemployed workers, or if air pollution regulations increase the incomes of those producing control equipment, their economic fortunes will improve andaccording to [health-health analysis] assumptions-so will their life
expectancies."' '
265

Burtraw and Toman, Discussion Paper No 98-01-REV at *18, table 5 (cited in note 169).

266

Id at *23. This perspective is shared by the authors of the studies Burtraw and Toman

review: "Studies ... indicate that significant reductions in NO. and CO are possible as a result of
policies aimed primarily at reducing CO2 emissions" Id at *4 (cited in note 169), citing Joel D.
Scheraga and Susan S. Herrod, Assessment of the Reductions in CriteriaAir PollutantEmissions
Associated with Potential C02 Mitigation Strategies,Draft Report (EPA Office of Policy, Plan-

ning, and Evaluation, Climate Change Division 1993).
267

Burtraw, et al, Discussion Paper No 01-61 (cited in note 263).

26S
269
270
271

Id at 33.
Id.
Id.
Id.

272

Portney and Stavins, 8 J Risk & Uncertainty at 117 (cited in note 186). See also Lisa

Heinzerling and Frank Ackerman, The Humbugs ofthe Anti-Regulatory Movement, 87 Cornell L
Rev 648,669 (2002) (noting that "environmental protection is big business" and that people who
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A full analysis of the role, if any, that health-health analysis
should play in regulatory policy is beyond the scope of this Article. It
is important, though, to stress at least briefly that there are strong reasons to question the analytic soundness of the methodology and to
suggest that health-and-safety and environmental regulations may
have positive indirect ancillary effects.
First, while there is evidence of an association between wealth
and health, the nature of the causal link is far from clear. Does less
wealth produce worse health, possibly because of less access to quality
medical care, as advocates of health-health tradeoffs maintain? Or
does worse health produce less wealth because sick individuals are
less likely to earn high incomes and more likely to have higher medi-

cal expenses? If the causal link were of the former type, then the use
of health-health tradeoffs would arguably be appropriate. But if the
link were of the latter kind, there would be absolutely no reason to assume that a regulation poses a countervailing risk simply because it
costs money to meet its requirements. The direction of the causal link
cannot be determined simply from the correlation between higher
wealth and better health. A recent, sophisticated study attempted to

determine this direction, but produced inconclusive results.4
Second, the ancillary effects of regulation are not necessarily limited to the health-health tradeoffs that arguably are produced by the
regulation's compliance costs. The research and development efforts
that lead to the production of pollution abatement technology may

create ancillary benefits in the form of technological innovation.
Strong proponents of this argument believe that these benefits can
outweigh the costs of complying with the regulation, a proposition
typically referred to as the "Porter hypothesis."2 ' This hypothesis is
276
controversial, but even if the ancillary benefits of the regulation do
work in all manner of jobs related to this business "are not poorer as a result of regulation," but
richer). In the context of advancing a risk tradeoff argument, Viscusi has observed that
"[r]egulatory requirements trigger a variety of economic activities, whether it be producing
scrubbers for the reduction of air pollution, removing asbestos from schools, or driving a car back
to the dealer after an automobile recall." 63 U Chi L Rev at 1451 (cited in note 9) (emphasis
added). We see no reason why this observation should not support a claim for ancillary healthhealth benefits.
273 For a discussion of this dichotomy, see James P. Smith, Healthy Bodies and Thick Wallets:
The Dual Relation between Healthand Economic Status, 13 J Econ Persp 145,147-48 (1999).
274

See id at 165.

See Michael Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations (Free Press 1990); Miechael E.
Porter and Claas van der Linde, Green and Competitive:Ending the Stalemate,73 Harv Bus Rev
120 (SeptlOct 1995); Daniel C. Esty and Michael E. Porter, Industrial Ecology and Competitiveness: Strategic Implicationsfor the Firm, 2 J Indus Ecol 35 (1998); Anestasios Xepapadeas and
Aart de Zeeuw, EnvironmentalPolicy and Competitiveness: The PorterHypothesis and the Composition of Capital,37 J Envir Econ & Mgmt 165,165 (1999).
276 See Adam B. Jaffe, et al, Environmental Regulation and the Competitiveness of US.
Manufacturing:What Does the Evidence Tell Us?, 33 J Econ Lit 132 (1995).
275
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not outweigh the cost of the regulation, these benefits are equally
worthy of consideration as the risk tradeoffs.
Third, the argument in favor of the consideration of health-health
tradeoffs is a second-best argument that is heavily dependent on
maintaining the existing pattern of income distribution in our society.
If Bill Gates has to pay $6 million to save a statistical life, the expenditure is unlikely to have a negative effect on his health.m On the other
hand, if this cost is borne by the very poorest members of our society,
a negative health consequence is far more likely. So, if the cost of
meeting an environmental regulation has a negative health consequence, there are two obvious courses of action. The first, advocated
by the proponents of health-health tradeoffs, is to make the regulation
less stringent in light of this negative consequence. But there is a second alternative: affecting the incidence of the costs. There is no analytically compelling reason for unquestioningly preferring the former
course of action over the latter.
4. Lulling effects.
Although we do not identify any specific examples, there is no
reason to believe that there is not a category of ancillary benefits
analogous to lulling effects. As a theoretical matter, we can imagine
two different types of such ancillary benefits. First, we posit the existence of what might be called "attentiveness effects," whereby the
promulgation of a health or safety regulation might, by reinforcing a
norm, make people more sensitive to the need for safety beyond the
circumstances expressly covered by the regulation.m To take a stylized
example, a regulation forbidding the use of handheld cell phones
while driving might have the ancillary benefit of raising awareness
about the need for road safety generally, and might therefore make
people less likely to consume food and drink when driving.
Alternatively, these ancillary benefits might take the form of what
might be called "relaxation effects," whereby individuals who are
lulled into a state of reduced sensitivity to safety are paradoxically
made safer. Thus, a regulation reducing the speed limit on a highway
might have the ancillary benefit of even greater accident reduction
than was targeted, because drivers who are made to feel calmer by the
lower limits might (under certain circumstances) get into fewer accidentsr'
277

See Heinzerling and Ackerman, 87 Cornell L Rev at 669 (cited in note 272).

278

For a general account of the expressive power of law in shaping norms, see Cass R. Sun-

stein, Symposium: Law, Economics & Norms: On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U Pa L
Rev 2021 (1996).
279 See, for example, Sophie Fouvez, European Conference of Ministers of TransportActions

on Speed Moderation *5-6 (Apr 1998), available online at <http://wwwl.oecd.orglcem/
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More generally, the literature on lulling effects does not convincingly establish the systematic presence of risk tradeoffs or absence of
ancillary benefits. The best-developed account of lulling effects, presented by Viscusi, relies on three distinct phenomena. First, Viscusi
notes that "regulations will lead to a reduction in safety-related efforts
for the affected product." This effect, however, is not necessarily an
instance of a welfare-reducing risk tradeoff. Assume, for example, that
before seat belts are widely available individuals drive at 60 miles per
hour (mph). After the use of seat belts is required, they begin driving
at 65 mph because they feel relatively safer. Compared to continuing
to drive at 60 mph with seat belts, is the higher speed socially undesirable? Presumably individuals derive net benefits from driving fasterfor example, in the form of reduced travel time-which outweigh the
higher risks. Thus, absent negative externalities imposed on third parties (other drivers or bystanders), the increased speed is socially desirable. With negative externalities, of course, the result is ambiguous because the driver's increased welfare may or may not outweigh the reduced welfare of the third parties.
Second, Viscusi refers to the "indivisibility of individuals' safetyrelated actions.' ' .. He observes that to the extent parents are less careful with prescription drugs that have safety caps, their diminished responsibility may extend to harmful substances without safety caps. For
example, instead of placing all their medicines in a safety-latched
drawer, they may begin leaving all of them-both the protected and
unprotected ones-on the kitchen counter. In this manner, "safety
caps will increase poisoning rates for [ ] unprotected products."M But
the indivisibilities to which Viscusi refers may also have the opposite
effect. They could raise the awareness of consumers to the poisoning
risks posed by medicines, leading them to exhibit more care with respect to the unprotected products. There are no analytically compelling reasons for believing that such indivisibilities will produce risk
tradeoffs rather than ancillary benefits, or that the former would be
greater than the latter.
The third, and perhaps central, claim is that "regulation may induce consumer misperceptions regarding the importance of precauonline/speeches/sfserock98.pdb> (visited Oct 2, 2002) (noting that accident reduction "is no
longer solely a question of imposing a speed limit" but of "combining speed limits with measures
relating to the vehicle, its environment, and driver, with a view to attaining ... calmer driving").
280 W. Kip Viscusi, The Lulling Effect: The Impact of Child-ResistantPackaging on Aspirin
andAnalgesic Ingestions,74 Am Econ Rev Papers & Proceedings 324 (1984).
281 See W. Kip Viscusi, Consumer Behavior and the Safety Effects of ProductSafety Regulation, 28 J L & Econ 527,539 (1985). See also Viscusi, 74 Am Econ Rev Papers & Proceedings at

324 (cited in note 280).
M

Viscusi, 28 J L & Econ at 539 (cited in note 281). See also Viscusi, 74 Am Econ Rev Pa-

pers & Proceedings at 324 (cited in note 280).
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' This effect arises "[t]o the extent that consumers
tions.' Zn
tend to ignore very-low-probability events."""' It is possible, of course, that in
some cases consumers behave in this manner. But the literature on
risk regulation also features prominently the opposite phenomenon:
the overestimation of small risks. In fact, the prevalent complaint by
advocates of regulatory reform is that regulatory policy pays excessive
attention to small risks relative to more serious ones.! More generally,
a socially undesirable lulling effect is present only if consumers accurately assessed the preregulation risk but underestimated the residual
risk that remains with regulation, or if they underestimated the residual risk more than the preregulation risk.
Viscusi's empirical study found that child resistant caps did not
reduce risk, apparently as a result of "increased parent responsibility,
such as leaving off the caps of bottles." But the fact that the net
ancillary effects were negative in that instance does not imply that
they would also be negative across different types of risks.

IV. RISK TRADEOFFS IN THE REGULATORY PROCESS:
INSTITUTIONAL BIAS

We have seen how risk tradeoff analysis invites legislators, regulators, judges, and academics to consider only the ancillary harms of
regulatory interventions and not their ancillary benefits. The methodology thus provides a biased metric for the assessment of regulatory
impacts. This problem could be rectified by coupling risk tradeoff
analysis with ancillary benefit analysis, as we advocate in this Article!"
But there is also a different, though related, problem that stems
not from the methodology itself but from the manner in which the
processes of executive and judicial review of regulation privilege
antiregulatory forces invoking the ancillary harms of regulation over
proregulation forces invoking its ancillary benefits. The precursor to
both institutional biases is the agencies' failure to consider ancillary
effects of its regulation, whether positive or negative. In Part IV.A, we
discuss this phenomenon, which, we argue, results from tunnel vision.2
Agency decisionmakers focus exclusively on one or some aspects of a
complex problem, as members of a highly balkanized bureaucratic

M

See Viscusi, 28 J L & Econ at 539 (cited in note 281).

284 Id.
M
See Cass R. Sunstein, The Laws of Fear,115 Harv L Rev 1119,1119-20 (2002); Breyer,
Breaking the Vicious Circle at 11-19 (cited in note 5).
286 Viscusi, 28 J L & Econ at 553 (cited in note 281).
2V See text accompanying notes 339-46.
M8Q See Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle at 11 (cited in note 5) (showing how this narrow
focus can ultimately bring about more harm than good).
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structure.2" As a result, they do not consider the full implications of
their decisions.
In Part IVB, we turn to the systemic imbalance in OMB's review
of regulation. This bias arises because OMB primarily sees its mandate
as reining in the regulatory impulses of administrative agencies. Thus,
when OMB examines the costs and benefits of regulation, it focuses
on risk tradeoffs and not on ancillary benefits.
In Part IV.C, we show how the doctrines of judicial review privilege the interests of challengers seeking less stringent regulation over
those of challengers with the opposite interests. Because the former
benefit from delaying regulations whereas the latter do not, risk
tradeoff arguments are more likely to be raised in the courts than ancillary benefit arguments.
A.

Administrative Agencies

Ideally, an omniscient regulator working at an administrative
agency with limitless resources would carefully consider and weigh all
ramifications of a potential rule and decide accordingly whether and
how to regulate. In practice, agencies either ignore altogether, or fail
to consider adequately, the ancillary positive and negative effects of
regulation. There are three closely related explanations for the disjunction between the ideal and the actual scenarios. First, there is an
ontological claim about the nature of the problems being addressed.
Health-and-safety risks of the kind targeted by regulatory intervention are parts of complex wholes. Aspects of a problem might fall under the legal or technical competence of a particular agency or subagency division, but the problem as a whole is likely to cut across bureaucratic boundaries.
Second, there is a cognitive psychological argument about the
agency decisionmakers. "[L]ike individual citizens and the public as a
whole," as Sunstein has put it, they "suffer from both limited informa'
tion and (even more importantly) selective attention."
Graham and
Wiener similarly portray the "fixation on a specific symptom" as a feature of the decisionmaking process.2 9 '
A third line of analysis, informed by neoinstitutionalist political
science, concentrates on the manner in which the bureaucratic structures in place both across and within agencies influence regulatory decisions. 2 ' Agencies or branches of agencies given jurisdiction over one
289 See Wiener and Graham, Resolving Risk Tradeoffs at 235 (cited in note 34) (discussing
the phenomenon of "bounded oversight roles in the administrative state").

290

Sunstein, 63 U Chi L Rev at 1536 (cited in note 3).

291 Wiener and Graham, Resolving Risk Tradeoffs at 235 (cited in note 34).
292 See, for example, J. Clarence Davies and Jan Mazurek, Pollution Control in the United
States: Evaluating the System 16-22 (Resources for the Future 1998) (discussing the influence of
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particular issue or set of issues are likely to ignore -or at least downplay 3 -the effect of their own regulations on matters beyond their
technical and legal competence.294
The problems of fragmentation are particularly acute in the context of environmental regulation. Professor Richard Stewart has recently written: "For all its past successes, the U.S. environmental regulatory system has a fundamental flaw. It consists of a patchwork of detailed and rigid laws that are largely unrelated to each other and are
lacking in any unified vision of environmental problems or EPA's mission."- Two other scholars have dubbed fragmentation "[t]he most
obvious and important characteristic of pollution control."' Of the
nine major environmental statutes,2 three are organized by medium
(air, water,2 drinking water3), another is organized by type of product (pesticides), '1 one targets toxic substances in general,3 another,
cleanups of hazardous substancesm and two deal with the provision of
information. ' The EPA, in turn, replicates in its bureaucratic organi5
zation the complexity characterizing the statutes it administers.3

the EPA's fragmented bureaucratic structure on pollution legislation). For a general discussion of
integrating the EPA to combat pollution, see Symposium: Integrated Pollution Control,22 Envir
L 1 (1992).
293 For our purposes, it does not matter whether the agencies are self-conscious in their inability to tackle certain complex problems, or are unaware of the implications their administrative decisions have for decisionmakers working in different offices or different agencies altogether. Our point about the fragmentation of the decisionmaking process applies either way.
Some commentators have focused on fragmentation as the source of an adversarial relationship
between offices within an agency. See Marc K. Landy, Marc J. Roberts, and Stephen R. Thomas,
The EnvironmentalProtectionAgency:Asking the Wrong Questions from Nixon to Clinton 31617 (Oxford 1994).
294 See Whipple, 9 Reg at 37 (cited in note 44) (describing various ways regulation may
merely transfer risk instead of reducing it).
295 Stewart, 29 Cap U L Rev at 153 (cited in note 25).
296 Davies and Mazurek, Pollution Control at 16 (cited in note 292).
297 Id at 11. For an example of a call for greater statutory coherence at EPA, see Robert M.
Sussman, Should Environmental Laws Be Integrated?,15 Pace Envir L Rev 57, 62-66 (1997)
(calling for an "integrating statute" to serve as an overlay on the existing environmental statutes).
298 Clean Air Act, 42 USC § 7401 et seq (2000).
299 Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 USC § 1251 et seq (2000).
M Public Health Service Act, 42 USC § 201 et seq (2000).
301Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 USC § 136 et seq (2000).
302 Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 USC § 2601 et seq (2000).
303 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA), 42 USC § 9601 et seq (2000).
304 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 USC § 4321 et seq (2000); Emergency
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986,42 USC § 11001 et seq (2000). See Davies
and Mazurek, Pollution Controlat 11-12 (cited in note 292). See also Walker and Wiener, Recycling Lead at 150 (cited in note 198) ("The fragmentation in EPA programs and regulations
largely reflects the narrow focus of the original statutes passed by Congress to protect the air,
surface waters, drinking water, and food supply,and to manage hazardous and solid wastes:').
305 For a general discussion, see Thomas 0. McGarity, The InternalStructure of EPA Rule-
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In addition, its various policymaking, economically-oriented, and
legal staffs bring to the organization different professional and ideological commitments that themselves stand in the way of internal coherence.-' As a practical matter, the statutory background of environmental law and the bureaucratic layout of the EPA stand in the way of
an integrated approach to risk regulation.
Graham and Wiener argue persuasively that the "fragmentation
of decisionmaking into specialized roles with bounded oversight responsibilities"' ' is an important source of risk tradeoffs. Regulatory
decisionmakers fail to consider risk tradeoffs precisely because those
harms often fall under a bureaucratic responsibility different from
their own.3w Their argument, however, applies with equal force to the
consideration of ancillary benefits. Agency decisionmakers fail to consider the ancillary effects of proposed regulation precisely because
those effects fall outside the ambit of their specific legal authority or
technical competence.1

The EPA's approach to the risk tradeoffs of the new ozone
NAAQS provides a useful example of how fragmentation promotes
inattention to ancillary effects in risk regulation.31 ' During notice and
comment rulemaking, the EPA was presented with-and ultimately
rejected-numerous arguments about how tropospheric ozone might
have beneficial effects in protecting against ultraviolet radiation. '
making, 54 L & Contemp Probs 57 (Autumn 1991) (describing EPA's decisionmaking processes
and bureaucratic structures).
306 See Landy, Roberts, and Thomas, EnvironmentalProtectionAgency at i1(cited in note
293) ("Because the [EPA] is responsible for many different aspects of policymaking ... it em-

[Their] difploys a wide rage of professionals including lawyers, economists, and engineers ....
ferences often breed misunderstanding and conflict."). See also Davies and Mazurek, Pollution
Control at 17 (cited in note 292) ("Many of the pollution control technologiesnow used to meet
regulatory requirements do not really control the pollution-they simply shift it around, change
its form, or delay its release into the environment.").
307 Thus, for instance, regulators who care about clean air might be less concerned with
sludge produced by coal scrubbers. See Bruce A. Ackerman and William T. Hassler, Clean Coal/
Dirty Air: Or How the Clean AirAct Became a Multibillion-DollarBail-Outfor High-Sulfitr Coal
Producersand What Should Be Done about It 31-54 (Yale 1981).
308 Wiener and Graham, Resolving Risk Tradeoffs at 235 (cited in note 34). As they put it:
"The jurisdictions of administrative agencies tend to be defined by categorical boundaries that
countervailing risks do not respect." Id at 237.
309 "The mission orientation of such agencies ... leads to a form of 'bureaucratic externality' in which the agency tends to ignore or discount the adverse effects of its choices on values or
goals that are not central to its mission." Stephen G. Breyer, et al, Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy:Problems,Text, and Cases 352 (Aspen 4th ed 1998).
310 See Davies and Mazurek, Pollution Controlat 18 (cited in note 292) ("Major problems
in the future are likely to be cross-media problems, and they will go unrecognized for a long time
if we try to detect them through programs that focus on only one medium of the environment.").
311 See text accompanying notes 50-66.
312 See Marchant, 11 Tulane Envir L J at 274-75 (cited in note 54) (explaining how the EPA
refused to consider the health benefits of ground-level ozone in its decision to revise the ozone
standard).
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Later, when industry groups challenged the regulation in court on the
grounds that the EPA had failed to consider the risk tradeoff of
tighter ozone standards, the EPA took the position that it was legally

barred from considering ancillary effects and that those effects were
properly considered under a different part of the Clean Air Act.313 As
discussed above, the D.C. Circuit rejected this argument.1
To some extent, the EPA has attempted to address the problems

of fragmentation. In particular, the emergence of "clusters," policymaking teams that bring together members of various programs, is an
important step toward a more integrated approach to regulation. 315'
But the efforts have been limited. In summary, fragmentation, coupled
with selective attention, limited time, and finite resources, creates

strong incentives for agency decisionmakers to focus almost exclusively on the primary effects of regulation and largely overlook the
ancillary effects.
This inattention to ancillary effects is not, on its face, biased;

agency officials tend to ignore all ancillary effects, not only ancillary
benefits. But, as we show in Parts V.B and V.C, it is the root cause of

biases that emerge as a result of the executive and judicial review of
administrative actions.316

B.

OMB

With the issuance of Executive Order 12291 in the first month of
the Reagan Administration, the White House, acting through OIRA,
asserted unprecedented oversight authority over the regulatory
state."' There is broad consensus that OMB has consistently viewed its
313 "EPA interprets the NAAQS-setting provisions to focus only on the characteristics of
ground-level ozone that made it a 'pollutant'-i.e. its adverse health effects-and not its potential use as an ameliorating agent to reduce different health risks caused by a different problem."
EPA Brief on Ozone NAAQS, American Trucking Assoc v EPA, 97-1440, *58 (DC Cir 1999).
The EPA also argued that the purported health benefits of tropospheric ozone could not be adequately quantified. See id at 64.
314 See American Trucking, 175 F3d at 1051-53 (rejecting the idea that the EPA is barred
from considering the ancillary effects of a pollutant). See also text accompanying notes 50-63.
Although neither party petitioned for certiorari on this matter, Justice Breyer did cite approvingly to Judge Williams's risk tradeoff analysis in his concurring opinion. See 531 US at 457
(Breyer concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). See also text accompanying notes
157-59.
315 See Wiener and Graham, Resolving Risk Tradeoffs at 253 (cited in note 34).
316 In addition, in the wake of new case law like the D.C. Circuit's opinion in American
Trucking, it may now be the case that agencies are attentive to risk tradeoffs but not ancillary
benefits.
317 See Elliott, 57 L & Contemp Probs at 167-68 (cited in note 27) (describing the OMB's
broad powers); Olson, 4 Va J Natural Resources L at 10-12,40 (cited in note 26) (explaining the
significance of Executive Order 12291, which gave OMB the authority to ensure that all informal
executive agency rules conform to certain broad-based economic rules). Executive Order 12291
has been the subject of extensive academic and policy debate. See, for example, Christopher C.
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task under the Executive Order as being "to drive regulation in a direction (towards deregulation) different from that which the delegees
[that is, the agencies themselves] would have chosen.,31 If OMB were
truly interested in promoting rationality in the regulatory process, it
would be as concerned with regulations that undervalue benefits or
overvalue costs as with regulations that overvalue benefits or undervalue costs. But throughout its history, OMB has concerned itself with
3 9
the latter and not the former..
Not until very recently has OMB ever

used its oversight authority to call attention to the possible unexplored benefits of regulation.- "OIRA's basic mission has been to
stop unjustified rules, mainly through the use of 'return letters,' requiring agencies to reconsider their proposals."31
Given OMB's outlook, it is not surprising that it would concern
itself with risk tradeoffs that the agency might have overlooked, and
not with ancillary benefits.9 Drawing attention to risk tradeoffs might

delay the implementation of a regulation while the agency considers
the matter, or it might prevent the regulation from ever being prom-

DeMuth and Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review ofAgency Rulemaking, 99 Harv L Rev
1075,1076 (1986) (noting that President Reagan's initiatives provoked intense controversy).
318 Elena Kagan, PresidentialAdministration,
114 Harv L Rev 2245,2280 (2001). See also
Mark Seidenfeld, The Psychology of Accountability and Political Review of Agency Rules, 51
Duke L J 1059, 1069 (2001) (noting that OIRA personnel focus on the costs of regulation,
"which makes it likely that they will object to a rule if there is uncertainty" whether benefits
outweigh costs); Alan B. Morrison, OMB Interference with Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong Way
to Write a Regulation, 99 Harv L Rev 1059, 1065 (1986) ("The Administration has principally
used the system of OMB review created by the Executive Orders to implement a myopic vision
of the regulatory process which places the elimination of cost to industry above all other
considerations.").
319 See Olson, 4 Va J Natural Resources L at 54-55 (cited in note 26) (observing that OMB
does not undertake cost-benefit analyses of proposed rules that would relax standards).
320 In September 2001, John Graham, the new OIRA Administrator, sent two "prompt letters" to agencies suggesting potentially beneficial regulation. Two features of these letters are
unique in the practice of regulatory oversight. First, the letters are prospective: They propose
new regulation, rather than reviewing regulation that has already been proposed. Second, the letters show a recognition on the part of OMB that additional regulation can be beneficial. See Office of Management and Budget, Press Release, OMB EncouragesLifesavingActions by Regulators (Sept 18, 2001), available online at <http:lvlwv.whitehouse.gov/omb/pubpress/200135.html> (visited Apr 20, 2002); Robert W. Hahn and Cass R. Sunstein, Regulatory Oversight
Takes Exciting New Tack *1, Policy Matters No 01-25 (AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Affairs 2001), available online at <www.aei.brookingsorg> (visited Sept 3,2002).
321 Hahn and Sunstein, Policy Matters No 01-25 at *1 (cited in note 320). Professor Kagan
has suggested that the role of presidential oversight during the Clinton administration "disprove[ed] the assumption some scholars have made ... that presidential supervision of administration inherently cuts in a deregulatory fashion." Kagan, 114 Harv L Rev at 2248-49 (cited in
note 318). But by "presidential oversight," Kagan means something much broader than OMB review.
322 See text accompanying notes 137-49.
323 See Olson, 4 Va J Natural Resources L at 48-49 (cited in note 26) (noting that for the
proposed EPA rules with which OMB disagrees, delay in regulatory action is the norm).
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ulgated, by showing that it was excessively costly.-MEither way, when
an agency, because of tunnel vision, does not c ncern itself with either
risk tradeoffs or ancillary benefits, OMB, because of its institutional
bias against regulation, is more likely to require the agency to relax its
regulation because of risk tradeoffs than to require the agency to
tighten the regulation because of ancillary benefits.
C. The Courts
The antiregulatory bias produced by judicial review of administrative action is conceptually quite different than that resulting from
OMB's oversight. The courts, unlike OIRA, do not have a structural
aversion to regulation.' Rather, the antiregulatory bias in the courts
potentially emerges as the result of doctrines governing the judicial
review of administrative action and the incentives to bring litigation,
which combine to privilege risk tradeoffs over ancillary benefits.
As we explained above, because of fragmentation, agencies can
be expected to fail to consider the ancillary effects of new regulations. 6 If those regulations are then challenged in court on the
grounds that risk tradeoffs were not considered, the agency may not
respond, as a matter of black-letter administrative law, by pointing to
potentially offsetting ancillary benefits. Thus, legal doctrine provides
an advantage to the would-be challenger of regulation over the agency
that must defend the regulation in court.
In addition, organizations that challenge regulations as excessively stringent (paradigmatically, industry groups) have well-aligned
incentives to bring such litigation, while organizations that challenge
regulations as insufficiently stringent (typically advocacy groups) have
conflicting incentives to do so. This disparity in incentives to bring suit
also contributes to an insidious antiregulatory bias in the courts.
1. Bias by waiver: Chenery and related doctrines.
The rule announced in SEC v Chenery Corp2 requires that a
court reviewing administrative action confine its review "to a judgment upon the validity of the grounds upon which the [agency] itself
324 See id at 43 ("In practice ...

OMB has acquired a de facto veto power over certain

[EPA] regulations.").
325 Individual judges might harbor such sentiments. See Richard L. Revesz, Environmental
Regulation,Ideology,and the D.C, Circuit,83 Va L Rev 1717,1743-46,1760-64 (1997) (testing the
significance of intraparty and interparty differences in the voting records of individual judges);
Richard L. Revesz, Ideology, Collegiality,and the D.C Circuit:A Reply to ChiefJudge Harry T
Edwards, 85 Va L Rev 805, 840-43 (1999) (explaining ideological differences over procedural

challenges).
326 See Part N.A.

327 318 US 80 (1943).
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based its action. ' ' gThe Chenery Court stated: "If an order is valid only
as a determination of policy or judgment which the agency alone is authorized to make and which it has not made, a judicial judgment cannot be made to do service for an administrative judgment."29 Thus, the
reviewing court is not free to find new grounds on which to justify an
agency's decision. This doctrine implies that when a challenger complains that the agency failed to consider risk tradeoffs, the reviewing
court will not be able to substitute its view that a regulation ought to
be found legal because the ancillary benefits that the agency overlooked are at least as large as the ancillary harms.
Moreover, the agency would probably not even be able to bring
to the court's attention any ancillary benefits not considered in the
administrative process. Conceptually related to the Chenery doctrine
is the rule that when a regulation is being challenged, "the courts may
not accept appellate counsel's post hoc rationalizations for agency action.' 3"OWhereas groups challenging regulation are free to introduce
evidence of risk tradeoffs not considered by the agency, the agency
lawyers may not counteract the argument by pointing to evidence of
ancillary benefits for the first time during the course of litigation. By
ignoring ancillary effects during rulemaking, the agency effectively
waives its right to invoke them in litigation. The result is an antiregulatory bias that draws more judicial attention to tradeoffs than ancillary
benefits.
The effect of this rule in creating a bias favoring risk tradeoffs
over ancillary benefits is reinforced by another doctrinal strut of judicial review. A central task of the reviewing court is to determine
whether the agency adequately considered all the relevant factors during the course of the administrative proceeding.' As a result, if an
agency's counsel or a challenger seeking more stringent regulation
points to the existence of ancillary benefits as a means of counteracting risk tradeoffs, the outcome might be perverse. Instead of making
the regulation appear more desirable, such a strategy would provide

328 Id at 88. See also BellAtlanticTelephone Co v FCC,206 F3d 1, 9 (DC Cir 2000) (remanding case under Chenery for lack of an adequate explanation of the challenged FCC

rulings).
Chenery, 318 US at 88.
Motor Vehicle ManufacturersAssoc of the US., Inc v State FarmMutualAuto Ins Co,463
US 29,51 (1983). See also Citizens to Preserve Overton Park,Inc v Volpe, 401 US 402,419 (1971)
(declining to consider as part of the record on appeal materials deemed post hoc rationalizations).
331 See, for example, Corrosion Proof Fittings v EPA, 947 F2d 1201, 1215 (5th Cir 1991)
(holding that the EPA failed, under the TSCA, to supply sufficient evidence to justify its proposed ban on asbestos); Ethyl Corp v EPA, 541 F2d 1, 66-67 (DC Cir 1976) (en banc) (Bazelon
concurring) (expressing the preference that administrative decisionmakers present information
to reviewing courts in clear and nontechnical fashion).
329
330
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an independent reason for a remand: that the agency did not take ancillary benefits into account.
2. The incentives to challenge regulation.
Challenges to the legality of regulation are a perennial feature of
the administrative state, and tend to come from all sides. Industry
groups argue against the restrictiveness of regulation, while advocacy
groups of different kinds argue that such regulations are not expansive enough. But even though in one sense the industry and advocacy
groups are the mirror images of one another, their incentives to bring
litigation challenging a regulation are importantly different.
The incentives of antiregulatory challengers to invoke risk tradeoffs are well aligned. Such challengers aim to bring about less stringent regulation. Where a court agrees that an agency has failed to justify the stringency of its new rule, the court is likely to vacate the regulation pending a remand to the agency to reconsider the matter more
exhaustively. While the regulation is being reconsidered by the agency
on remand, the preexisting (and, by hypothesis, less stringent)n regulatory scheme remains in effect. Under those circumstances, the challenger stands to win not only in the long run, insofar as the agency ultimately might not be able to defend the new regulation, but also in
the short run, because the less stringent old rule will typically remain
in effect while the new rule is being reconsidered.
In contrast, challengers seeking more stringent regulation face
conflicting incentives. The prospect of more stringent regulation is, of
course, desirable to such challengers-that is the reason they bring
suit in the first place. However, the possibility that the regulations
might be vacated during a remand-a likely result if the challenger
prevails in court-is unattractive. This is because vacatur means that
the pre-existing, less stringent rule will remain in effect while the
agency reconsiders the present rule73 Thus, the proregulation challenger's incentive to bring suit to effect a long-term increase in the
new regulation's stringency is undercut by the worry that a legal "vic332 We acknowledge that the force of this argument depends upon the assumption that the
new regulation imposes more, not less, stringent requirements.
333 As we discuss below, in the 1990s, the D.C. Circuit began to remand cases to administrative agencies without vacating. See, for example, Allied-Signal, Inc v U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, 988 F2d 146, 154 (DC Cir 1993) (remanding without vacating). See also Cass R.
Sunstein, Is the Clean AirAct Unconstitutional?,98 Mich L Rev 303,372-73 & n 299 (1999):
The rules should be held unlawful, and remanded to the agency; but they should not be va-

cated, at least when the agency can show (a) that it might be able to generate a justification
that will satisfy judicial review, and (b) that invalidation of the rule may generate significant
risks.
Nevertheless, the ordinary practice of that court is to vacate a rule upon remand. See, for example, Illinois Public TelecommunicationsAssociation v FCC,123 F3d 693,693 (DC Cir 1997).
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tory" might create an even less stringent standard than the one embodied by the new (disputed) regulation. Nor should the fact that a
remand is (nominally) only a temporary source of comfort to proregulation challengers. As the leading empirical study in this area has
shown, in only about 20 to 25 percent of remands does the agency end
up reaffirming its original decision.f
As a result of this asymmetry in the respective payoffs of bringing
suit, other things being equal, a reviewing court is more likely to be
presented with antiregulatory challenges to regulation than proregulatory challenges, and that it is therefore more likely to be presented
with arguments grounded in risk tradeoffs than ancillary benefits.
The force of this argument is potentially weakened by the emerging trend on the D.C. Circuit to remand regulations to agencies without vacating them.335 Were remand without vacatur to become the
general rule rather than the exception (albeit an increasingly robust
one), or were the D.C. Circuit deliberately to apply this remedy only
(or chiefly) when suit is brought challenging an agency action as insufficiently stringent, our incentive-based claim might be significantly
undermined. Neither appears to be the case.
First, although some commentators have referred to this remedy
as "standard operating procedure" on the D.C. Circuit,36 the court has
itself maintained that the general rule remains to vacate administrative actions upon remand.3 7 Second, the D.C. Circuit has never indicated a preference for remanding without vacating where suit is
brought challenging a new rule as insufficiently stringent. Instead, it
has repeatedly relied on the two-factor test set out in Allied-Signal,
Inc v US. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to determine when remand without vacatur is appropriate. Thus, there is no reason to believe that the trend toward increasing reliance on remand without vacatur will mitigate the institutional bias in the courts in favor of risk
tradeoffs (and against ancillary benefits) generated by significant differences in the incentives to bring suit challenging regulations.

334 Peter H. Schuck and E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station:An EmpiricalStudy of
FederalAdministrative Law, 1990 Duke L J 984, 1047 ("[Our findings show that] agencies reaffirmed their original decisions in only 20-25 percent of the remanded cases.").
335 See Brian S. Prestes, Remanding without Vacating Agency Action, 32 Seton Hall L Rev
108, 109 (2001) ("[Clourts have increasingly ... remand[ed] ... without vacating the regulation.").
336 See Frank H. Wu and Denisha S. Williams, Remand without Reversa An Unfortunate
Habit,30 Envir L Rep 10193,10194 (Mar 2000).
337 See, for example, Illinois PublicTelecommunicationsAssociation, 123 F3d at 693.
338 988 F2d 146, 150-51 (DC Cir 1993) (stating that the decision to vacate depends on the
seriousness of the deficiencies and the disruptive consequences of an interim change).

2002]

The Biases of Risk TradeoffAnalysis

1823

V. ANCILLARY BENEFITS ANALYSIS IN THE AGENCIES: A CASE
STUDY AND ITS LESSONS

In this Part, we offer a solution to counteract the methodological
and institutional biases of risk tradeoff analysis. Our core proposal is
simple: Decisionmakers in administrative agencies should consider the
positive side effects brought about by regulatory interventions, and
not merely the negative side effects. In so doing, they will be able to
assess thoroughly and accurately the risk portfolio of a regulatory intervention.
Ideally, other decisionmakers throughout the administrative
state-particularly judges, OMB officials, and legislators-would take
responsibility for implementing ancillary benefit analysis. We are
skeptical, however, for reasons discussed in Part IV, that there is any
effective substitute for attention to ancillary benefit analysis on the
part of regulatory agencies. First, the doctrines of judicial review that
privilege risk tradeoffs over ancillary benefits are unlikely to be overturned. Second, for the foreseeable future, OMB's principal institutional commitment will probably continue to focus on reducing the
burden of regulation. 3" This antiregulatory perspective, which fits comfortably with risk tradeoff analysis, is not conducive to the consideration of ancillary benefit analysis.
Third, it is unlikely that in the near future Congress will address
the biases raised by risk tradeoff analysis. Comprehensive regulatory
reform legislation has been stalled in Congress for a long time in part
as a result of the phenomenon of divided government. Were Congress
to enact such legislation in the future, however, it is important that,
unlike the situation in prior bills.' any requirement for risk tradeoff
analysis be coupled with a requirement for ancillary benefit analysis.
Parity in this context is important. There is no justifiable reason for
requiring the former and remaining silent on the latter.
For these reasons, the primary burden for implementing ancillary
benefit analysis must fall squarely on the agencies themselves. We see
three reasons to be cautiously optimistic about the agencies' ability
and willingness to investigate ancillary benefits, despite the problem
of tunnel vision discussed above.! First, our Article shows more
clearly than ever before the disadvantages of not considering ancillary
benefits.3 Second, agencies have been compelled by reviewing courts
339 See, for example, Michael Grunwald, Business Lobbyists Asked to Discuss Onerous
Rules: GOPAide Identifies 57 Regulations to Target, Wash Post A3 (Dec 4,2001) (relating that
Graham, the administrator of OIRA, asked a senior Republican congressional aide to convene
lobbyists and identify and rank onerous regulations).
340 See text accompanying notes 125-36.
341 See text accompanying notes 290-310.
342 See text accompanying notes 287-89.
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to undertake risk tradeoff analysis.3 Once they have been forced to
overcome the limitations of tunnel vision to consider risk tradeoffs,
agencies will find it relatively easier to consider ancillary benefits. Finally, as we have shown, agencies have independently begun to undertake measures to remedy fragmentation.' " These measures will prove
useful in helping agencies to consider ancillary benefits in the rulemaking process.
In Part V.A, we present a case study to illustrate how an agency
might carry out this task. Part V.B shows that the federal environmental statutes permit-perhaps should even be interpreted to require- ancillary benefit analysis. Part V.C advances a "mirror image"
principle: There should be parity in the treatment of risk tradeoffs and
ancillary benefits.
A. A Case Study of Ancillary Climate Change Benefits
Our case study shows how policies targeting conventional pollutants can be expected to lead to meaningful reductions in GHG emissions!" These reductions in criteria pollutants have beneficial health
and environmental consequences in the United States. We focus on
the regulatory regimes targeting two criteria pollutants: sulfur dioxide
and ozone, which are regulated under Section 109 of the Clean Air
Act. But our method might also be useful for the evaluation of the
GHG-related ancillary benefits of regulatory regimes directed at
other criteria air pollutants. Indeed, we hope that our case study will
prompt the EPA to adopt an off-the-rack model that would permit it
systematically to study beneficial climate change consequences of
regulations directed at reductions in criteria air pollutants.!
1.

Clean fuels and energy conservation.

Global warming is the process by which the presence in the atmosphere of GHGs-mainly carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide- trap energy given off by the earth, thereby leading to increases in
temperature.3 4 7 The negative consequences include sea level rises and
343 See text accompanying notes 62-63.
344 See text accompanying note 315.
345 Our case study presents the mirror image of the one described by Burtraw and Toman,

which investigated the ancillary benefits of CO2 reductions for criteria pollutants. See Burtraw
and Toman, Discussion Paper No 98-01-REV (cited in note 169).
346 See Risk Assessment and Cost/BenefitAnalysis for New Regulations,Joint Hearing on Title III, HR 9 before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Hazardous Materials and the
Subcommittee on Health and Environment of the House Committee on Commerce, 104th Cong,
1st Sess 145,146-49 (1995) (testimony of Lester B. Lave, Higgins Professor of Economics and Finance, Carnegie Mellon University) (remarking that because of limited expertise in agencies,
they need to be furnished with "template analyses" that can serve as models for future analyses).
347 For a general discussion, see EPA, Global Warming: Climate, available online at
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changes in precipitation patterns, environmental quality, and human
health.3 Carbon dioxide has the most significant effect, contributing
82.4 percent of total U.S. GHG emissions in 1999.' By far the most
significant source of carbon dioxide emissions is fossil fuel combustion, which was responsible for 98 percent of U.S. carbon dioxide
emissions in 1998.3; Carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel consumption were responsible for "80 percent of global warming potential (GWP) weighted emissions in the 1990's. '3 '
The process of burning fossil fuels causes the carbon in them to
be released as carbon dioxideY" Such fuels differ significantly in the
amount of carbon dioxide they release per unit of energy produced.ns
Coal gives off the most carbon dioxide, with petroleum giving off
about 25 percent less, and natural gas 45 percent less.3 Electric utilities, responsible for the vast majority of annual coal consumption,
produced more carbon dioxide emissions in 1999 than any other sector-transportation, industrial, commercial, or residential.3 5 Reducing
the amount of overall fuel consumed by the electricity sector and
shifting coal consumption to less carbon-intensive fossil fuels would
bring about significant reductions in carbon dioxide emissions: As
the recently released Climate Action Report 2002 observes, "Federal

programs promote greenhouse gas reductions through the development of cleaner, more efficient technologies for electricity generation
and transmission. ' Similarly, an environmental advocate recently testified before Congress: "Electric generation is responsible for 40 percent of total U.S. CO 2 emissions. Wehave the technology to make significant reductions in CO2 from this sector though [sic] a combination
<http:llwww.epa.govlglobalwarminglclimatelindex.html> (visited Apr 21, 2002) (discussing the
implications of global warming for the earth's climate).
348

See id (reviewing the effects of rising global temperatures on the environment).

349

EPA, National Emissions: Recent Trends in US. Greenhouse Gas Emissions fig ES-4,

available online at <http:lwww.epa.gov/globalwarminglemissioslnationalltrends.html> (visited
Apr 21,2002) (pointing out the contribution of the direct GHGs to total U.S. emissions).
350 EPA, National Emissions: Carbon Dioxide Emissions, available
online at
<http://www.epa.govlglobalwarminglemissions/nationallco2.html>
(visited Apr 21, 2002);

Burtraw and Toman, Discussion Paper No 98-01-REV at *3 (cited in note 169) (noting the significance of fossil fuel combustion for GHG emissions).
351 EPA, NationalEmissions: Recent Trends (cited in note 349). The concept of GWP allows
policymakers to compare the impact on global warming of various gases, using CO2 as a baseline.
352 EPA, NationalEmissions: CarbonDioxide Emissions (cited in note 350).
353 Id.
354

Id.

355 See id.
356 See, for example, United Nations, Climate Change Information Kit: Climate Change
Information Sheet 25: New Technologies and Policies 25, available online at <http://

unfecc.int/resource/iuckit/fact25.html> (visited Oct 3,2002) ("Switching from coal to natural gas
can reduce [carbon dioxide] emissions by up to 40-50 percent.").
357 EPA, Climate Action
Report 2002 51 (May 2002), available
<http://www.epa.gov/globalwarminglpublications/car> (visited Sept 3,2002).
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of efficiency measures on the supply and the demand side, and
through increased reliance on cleaner fuels."3Policies that expressly seek greenhouse gas reductions in the electricity sector can be expected to produce a shift away from coal consumption. But even policies that expressly target reductions in conventional pollutants and not GHGs can also lead to a decrease in carbon dioxide emissions from the electricity sector. That is because in
addition to being the most carbon-intensive fossil fuel, coal is also the
"dirtiest" in terms of releasing conventional pollutants into the atmosphere. At the same time, natural gas, in addition to being the least
carbon-intensive fossil fuel, is also significantly cleaner-burning than
coal.3 9 Thus, if electricity producers were to respond to a regulatory
regime requiring a reduction in criteria pollutants in part by switching
from coal to natural gas consumption, they would in so doing reduce
CO 2 emissions. Such a process change would have the ancillary benefit
of reducing GHG emissions to a significant extent.0
2. Regulation of criteria pollutants and incentives for
electricity production.
In this Part, we identify some regulatory regimes that target criteria pollutants and that can be expected to produce (or have already
produced) process changes away from dirtier and toward cleanerburning fuels. In so doing, these regulatory regimes have had, or can
be expected to have, ancillary benefits for GHG reductions.
a) SO2 caps. The 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act
added Title IV ("Acid Deposition Control"),3'' which for the first time
established a federal regulatory regime for reducing acid rain by targeting its chief precursors, SO, and NO.. Acid deposition occurs when
358 Climate Change Technology and Policy Options, Testimony of David Hawkins, Director,
Climate Center, Natural Resources Defense Council, before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation (July 10, 2001), available online at <http:l/

commerce.senate.gov/hearings/071001Hawkins.pdf> (visited Sept 3,2002).
359 See Dallas Burtraw and Karen Palmer, Project Summary: Achieving Pollution Reductions from Electric Generation by Promoting Fuel Switching from Coal to Natural Gas (Re-

sources for the Future), available online at <http:lwww.rff~orglproj..summaries/99filesl
burtraw_99fueswitching.htm> (visited Apr 21, 2002) (investigating "the desirability, cost effectiveness, feasibility, and practicability of switching fuels from coal to natural gas at major electric

generating plants"). By analogy to our discussion of direct risk tradeoffs in Part II.A, we might
say that CO2 reduction bears an internal relationship to the reduction in criteria pollutants.
36 Wiener cautions that although burning natural gas releases about one half the carbon
dioxide that burning coal releases, the accidental leakage of methane into the air can itself have
detrimental effects on the environment. Thus, there is a risk tradeoff in protecting the global environment through burning natural gas as opposed to fuel or petroleum. See Jonathan Baert
Wiener, Protecting the Global Environment, in Graham and Wiener, eds, Risk versus Risk 193,

210 (cited in note 2).
361 42 USC §§ 7651-51o (2000).
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these precursors "are oxidized in the atmosphere and the resultant
compounds fall to earth in the form of rain, snow, or hail, or as dry
particles and aerosols."'" Title IV set a cap on aggregate emissions of
SO2 by electric utilities and instituted an SO 2 emissions trading program" Since fossil fuel consumption in the electricity sector is responsible for two-thirds of SO2 emissions,3 Title IV has had the most
immediate and profound impact on that sector. Compliance with the

caps has been achieved, in part, through process changes away
from the consumption of coal and toward cleaner-burning fuels like
S02

natural gas.w
An ancillary benefit of that transition has been a reduction in
GHG emissions. On occasion, this ancillary benefit of GHG reduction
has been explicitly noted.3 " Generally, however, studies of the 1990
amendments have merely shown that the SO 2 caps have ushered in
process changes away from coal and toward natural gas consumption
without noting the implications for CO 2 reductions. Consider, for example, the EPA's assessment of the impact of the SO 2 caps predicted
in the Regulatory Impact Analyses ("RIAs") for the revised NAAQS
for particulate matter and ozone, which were the subject of the
m In order to assess the efficacy of the
American Trucking litigation.6
362 Bruce A. Forster, The Acid Raid Debate: Science and Special Interests in Policy Formation 12 (Iowa State 1993).
363 See Dallas Burtraw, et al, The Costs and Benefits of ReducingAcid Rain *1, Discussion
Paper No 97-31-REV (Resources for the Future 1997), available online at <http://www.rftorg/
CFDOCS/dise.papers/PDF-files/9731.pdf> (visited Apr 21, 2002) (presenting an analysis of the
prospective costs and benefits of Tite IV's Allowance Trading System for reducing SO 2 and Title
IV's mandated reductions in emissions of NO,).
364 EPA, National Pollutant Emission Estimates for 1999, available online at
<http:lwww.epa.gov/ttnlchiefltrends> (visited Oct 3, 2002). Ninety-three percent of those emissions were brought about by coal consumption. Id.
365 For a general discussion, see EPA, Office of Atmospheric Programs, Clean Air Markets
Division, EPA, Impacts of the Acid Rain Programon Coal Industry Employment, Report No 430at
<http://www.epa.govlairmarktlarticlesl
R-01-002
(2001),
available
online
coalemployment.pdf> (visited Apr 21, 2002); Peter T. Kilborn, East's Coal Towns Wither in the
Name of CleanerAir, NY Tunes Al (Feb 15,1996) (explaining the economic impact of clean air
requirements on coal-mining areas).
366 See text accompanying notes 369-71.
367 A recent study by the Energy Information Administration ("EIA") states that "strategies to control other air emissions to comply with the requirements of the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990" are a contributing factor in CO, reductions from year to year. Department of Energy and EPA, Carbon Dioxide Emissions from the Generation of Electric Power in
the United States (2000) (joint report), available online at <http://www.eia.doe.govl
cneaf/electricity/page/co2_report/co2report.html> (visited Apr 21, 2002). This acknowledgment
of ancillary benefits came not in a study of the effects of Acid Deposition Control as such, but in
a Department of Energy study that focused on CO2 emissions from the electricity sector.
368 See EPA, Innovative Strategies and Economics Group, Office of Air Quality Planning
and Standards, Regulatory Impact Analyses for the ParticulateMatter and Ozone NationalAmbient Air Quality Standardsand Proposed Regional Haze Rule 5-5-5-6 (July 17, 1997), available
online at <http:lwwwepa.gov/ttn/oarpglnaaqsfinlria.html> (visited Apr 21,2002) (discussing the
EPA's SO 2 control options).
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new NAAQS, the EPA began with a sophisticated estimate of the environmental baseline against which to study the distinctive effects of
the revised standards. The discussion of the baseline imputed a wide
range of transformations to "existing Title IV requirements and the
more stringent SO 2 cap. '' 69 In documenting the various SO 2 control options, the EPA referred to both "[r]epower[ing] existing coal-fired or
oil-fired units to natural gas combined-cycle"'' and "[r]etir[ing] existing coal-fired, or oil-fired units and replac[ing] them with combined
cycle natural gas units. ' Thus, in the context of establishing a meaningful baseline for the study of the impact of the NAAQS, the EPA
determined that the Title IV SO 2 regime would have significant implications for fuel switching in the electricity sector. ' Other studies have
similarly concluded that the SO 2 caps will lead to fuel switching."'
b) Ozone provisions. In the RIA for the revised ozone
NAAQS, the EPA undertook a careful study of the techniques
through which industry might comply with the new regulations. It concluded that, as in the case of the SO 2 caps, the new standards would
likely bring about various process changes in the electricity sector
away from coal consumption and toward cleaner-burning fuels. For instance, the RIA included an illustrative list of controls that might be
undertaken to comply with the new standards. The controls included
"fuel switching," "natural gas replacement," and "repowering." 74 The
document states:
A company or industry facing increasingly more stringent solvent
emission limits, for example, is unlikely to seek ever more expensive add-on control devices. Instead they will seek substitutes
such as non-volatile material inputs or process changes. Redesign
of both products and processes becomes a likely operative part of
this industry's or company's environmental solution.... Other

369 Id at 5-5.
370 Id at 5-5-5-6.
371 Id. The EPA

concluded that even under the cap, overall electricity production would
remain constant due to a "predicted increase in combined-cycle natural gas unit capacity that is
expected to offset a predicted decrease in coal steam and oil/gas steam generation capacity." Id
at 11-16.
372 An early study of techniques for meeting the Title IV SO, standards called attention to
the significance of "changing the method by which electricity is produced," including "the use of

oil and natural gas rather than coal." Forster, Acid Rain Debate at 100-01 (cited in note 362).
373 In their study of the ancillary benefits of CO, reductions for conventional pollutants,
Burtraw and his coauthors argue that the opportunity costs of GHG reductions have previously
been overstated because studies have failed to account for the implications of the SO, caps for
fuel switching. See Burtraw, et al, Discussion Paper No 01-61 at *22-23 (cited in note 263).
374 EPA, Regulatory Impact Analyses at 5-6 (cited in note 368). These control techniques
were considered to a lesser degree than "more conventional control approaches" such as "'addon' control devices installed downstream from an air pollution source." Id at 5-1.
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substitutions, such as cleaner fuels, are commonplace and can be
expected in the future as industries seek optimal solutions.-"'
The EPA, pursuant to Section 126 of the Clean Air Act,3 made
similar findings in connection with its RIA for its rule calling for the
reduction of NO., emissions to prevent excessive interstate spillovers.3
This RIA also details the control measures that electric utility generators are expected to undertake. The RIA concludes that "[i]ndustry
will increase its use of natural gas over coal to generate power as part
of its approach to compliance" with the new rule.m The RIA predicts
that as a result of the rule, the marginal costs of electricity generation
would increase disproportionately for coal-burning sources. 9 By contrast, "some owners of oil and gas-fired boilers would be better off because their control costs would be lower" than the industry average.The RIA also predicts that the rule might reduce overall demand for
electricity because of price increases. Transitioning away from coal
consumption to natural gas consumption and reducing overall consumption of fuel would both have ancillary benefits for GHG reductions. But as in the case of the ozone RIA, the EPA failed to take note
of the ancillary benefits of the regulation.
3. The ancillary benefits.
We have seen how different regulatory regimes targeting two criteria pollutants have ancillary benefits in terms of GHG reductions.
These benefits take the form of improved health and environmental
conditions. The direct health benefits of reductions in GHG emissions
are hard to pin down. But global warming may increase human mortality and morbidity in a number of ways: First, hotter temperatures
may aggravate cardiovascular problems and lead to heat exhaustion
375 Id at 9-16.

42 USC § 7426 (2000).
See EPA, Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards, Office of Atmospheric Programs, EPA, Regulatory Impact Analysis for the FinalSection 126 Petition Rule (Dec 1999), available online at <http:lwww.epa.gov/ttnlecaslregdatal126fnO.pdf> (visited Apr 21, 2002) (providing an analysis for the Section 126 rule, which addresses regional transport issues related to
ozone attainment).
378 Id at 6-2.
379 As a corollary, the Regulatory Impact Analysis for Section 126 predicted a drop-off in
labor in the coal industry, but an increase in labor in the natural gas sector. See id at 6-25.
3S0 Id at 6-21.
381 See id at 6-17 ("Overall, generators in the final Section 126 region are predicted to cut
output during the ozone season by a percent or more, largely from power plants that would use
control strategies with high marginal costs.").
382 Our discussion relies heavily on the EPA's website dedicated to presenting the health
implications of global warming. See EPA, Impacts: Health, available online at <http:ll
www.epa.gov/globalwarming/impacts/health/index.html> (visited Apr 21, 2002) (explaining the
relationship between human health and local climate).
376
377
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and other respiratory problems.9 Second, warmer weather may promote greater concentrations of ground-level ozone, which in turn may
aggravate certain respiratory conditions.- Third, global warming
might lead to increases in some infectious diseases, whether those
caused by warm-weather insects (like malaria) or associated with algae blooms (like cholera).* The EPA has stressed that these health
risks are not inevitable corollaries to global warming. -* Nevertheless, a
policy that retarded global warming by reducing CO2 emissions could
be said to carry with it potential health benefits.
The environmental implications of global warming are vast and
potentially profound.l The most immediate environmental implication of global warming is sea level rise, which, "[u]nilke most other
manifestations of climate change ... is already a problem."' Sea level

rise in turn leads to beach erosion, coastal flooding, and the wholesale
disappearance of coastal wetlands.3 This problem is especially acute
in polar regions (including parts of Alaska) where warmer temperatures are expected to have the most concentrated impact.O Already a
decline in sea ice in polar areas has been observed,3 1 making the coastline more vulnerable to erosion and altering the habitats of various
marine mammals, such as polar bears.3 But sea level rise is not limited
to the poles. Indeed, the EPA predicts that by 2050, and possibly as
early as 2025, the sea level along the Gulf and Atlantic coasts of the
United States will rise by at least one foot.9 Erosion of the coastline
will magnify the impact of storms, promote flooding, and increase the
salinity of bays and rivers.9
See id.
See id.
385 See id.
386 See id.
387 See EPA, Global Warming: Climate (cited in note 347).
388 Stephen P. Leatherman, Social and Economic Costs of Sea Level Rise, in Bruce C. Douglas, Michael S. Keamey, and Stephen P. Leatherman, eds, Sea Level Rise: History and Consequences 181,181 (Academic 2001).
389 See id at 183.
390 See EPA, Impacts: Climate Change and Polar Regions, available online at
<http:llwww.epa.govlglobalwarminglimpacts/polarregions/index.html> (visited Apr 21, 2002)
("Climate models indicate that global warming will be felt most acutely at high latitudes, especially in the Arctic where reduction in sea ice and snow cover are expected to lead to the greatest
relative temperature increases.").
391 Id.
392 Id.
393 See, for example, Lesley Ewing, Overview of Sea Level Rise and Some Implicationsfor
Coastal California,in Rising Tides4 Eroding Shores: The Legal and Policy Implications of Sea
Level Rise and Coastal Erosion *8(University of Maryland School of Law, Environmental Law
Program Apr 20,2001) (on file with authors).
394 EPA, Impacts: Coastal Zones, available online at <http:/lwww.epa.gov/globalwarmingl
impactslcoastal/index.html> (visited Apr 21,2002).
395 See id.
383
384
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Agricultural production will also be affected by global climate
change. Although some areas will become more fertile, the benefits
will probably be outweighed by the overall harms of heat and

drought:316 Inland and coastal fish can also be affected by global warming? More generally, changes in temperature and precipitation patterns might bring about irreversible transformations in various ecosystems, from deserts3 to mountainous regions3 to forests.4 Although

the nature and magnitude of the impact is unknown, there is reason to
believe that global warming will have negative consequences for these
and other regions.40'
B.

Ancillary Benefit Analysis and the Federal
Environmental Statutes

Showing that regulatory policies bring about ancillary benefits
would be of limited utility if the relevant statutes prohibited the agencies from considering those benefits as part of their rulemaking proceedings. NAAQS under the Clean Air Act, the ancillary benefits of
which we noted in our case study,4 furnish an illustration of why the
statutory language is broad enough to embrace ancillary benefit
analysis. Section 109(b)(1) requires that the primary NAAQS be set at
a level "requisite to protect the public health." Section 109(b)(2)

396 See, for example, Climate Change2001: Impact; Adaptation, and Vulnerability:A Report
of Working Group 11 of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change *9 (2001), available
online at <http:lwww.ipcc.chlpublwg2SPMfnal.pdf> (visited Apr 21, 2002) (discussing the effects of climate change on crop yield).
397 See EPA, Impacts: Fisheries, available online at <http://www.epa.gov/globalwarmingl
impactslfisherieslindex.htmI> (visited Apr 21,2002) (explaining the effects of global warming on
inland, coastal, and ocean fisheries).
398 See EPA, Impacts: Deserts, available online at <http://www.epa.gov/globalwarming/
impacts/deserts/index.htmil> (visited Apr 21, 2002) (discussing whether global warming will lead
to the expansion of deserts).
399 See EPA, Impacts: Climate Change and Mountain Regions, available online at
<http:/www.epa.gov/globalwarminglimpacts/mountains/index.html> (visited Apr 21,2002) (stating that scientists expect global climate change "to affect mountain and lowland ecosystems, the
frequency and intensity of forest fires, the distribution of water, and the diversity of wildlife").
400 See EPA, Impact: Forests, available online at <http:lwww.epa.gov/globalwarmingl
impacts/forestslindex.html> (visited Apr 21,2002) (warning that global warming may lead to a
less diverse mix of tree species).
401 For the argument that global warming will actually enhance American economic activity,
see generally Robert 0. Mendelsohn, Global Warming and the American Economy: A Regional
Assessment of Climate Change Impacts (Cheltenham 2001). See also John Tierney, The Big City:
Warming up to the Notion of Warming, NY Tunes Dl (Dec 7, 2001) (reviewing Mendelsohn's
findings). Mendelsohn's celebration of the positive impact of global warming on the American
economy-even if one assumes that he is correct about it-overlooks the economic and enviromental damage done to other countries.
402 See text accompanying notes 382-401.
403 42 USC § 7409(b)(1) (2000).

1832

The University of Chicago Law Review

[69:1763

provides that secondary NAAQS be set at a level "requisite to protect
the public welfare."' " "Welfare," in turn, is defined extremely broadly:
All language referring to effects on welfare includes, but is not
limited to, effects on soils, water, crops, vegetation, manmade materials, animals, wildlife, weather, visibility, and climate, damage to
and deterioration of property, and hazards to transportation, as
well as effects on economic values and on personal comfort and
well-being, whether caused by transformation, conversion, or
combination with other pollutants.405
As we have seen, the D.C. Circuit held in American Trucking that
tradeoffs.4
the statutory language was broad enough to include risk
But the language is also broad enough to contemplate ancillary benefits. Just as it would be "bizarre" for a "statute intended to improve
human health" to require that "only one half of a substance's health
effects" be examined,4 so it would be equally implausible for that
same statute to require the investigation of only one half of the ancillary effects of a regulation.
Sections 108 and 109 of the Clean Air Act are not unique in allowing ancillary benefit analysis. A representative survey of other
statutory provisions from the Clean Air Act reveals them to be
drafted in such a way as to accommodate our suggested methodology.
For example, the EPA must set emissions standards for new sources
"taking into account the cost of achieving such reduction and any
nonair quality health and environmental impact."4' Emissions standards under the hazardous air pollutant provisions of the Clean Air
Act are similarly defined to require attention to "non-air quality
health and environmental impacts." Section 169 of the Clean Air Act
defines the "best available control technology" emission limitation in
areas that have better air quality than the NAAQS by reference to a
case-by-case inquiry that takes into account "environmental, and economic impacts."1 0 And in requiring economic impact analyses under
Section 312 of the Clean Air Act, the statute requires the EPA Administrator to "consider all of the economic, public health, and environmental benefits of efforts to comply with such standard.,"41 Language
of this sort permits-arguably even requires-the EPA to consider
404 42 USC § 7409(b)(2) (2000).
405 42 USC § 7602(h) (2000).
406 See American Trucking, 175 F3d at 1052-53. See text accompanying notes 61-66.
407 American Trucking, 175 F3d at 1052 ("Legally, [the] EPA must consider positive identifiable effects of a pollutant's presence in the ambient air in formulating air quality criteria.").
40S 42 USC § 7411(a)(1) (2000) (emphasis added).
409 42 USC § 7412(d)(2) (2000) (emphasis added).
410 42 USC § 7479(3) (2000).
411 42 USC § 7612(b) (2000).
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ancillary benefits. And there is nothing in this language that restricts
such an inquiry to negative effects.
C. Ancillary Benefits and Causation: The Mirror Image Principle
Critics of ancillary benefit analysis might complain that we are
venturing too far afield, and that the ancillary benefits of a regulation
might be too remotely connected to the regulation's primary effects.
By "too remote," critics of our suggestion might mean one of two
things. Ancillary benefits might be thought to be analytically or bureaucratically too remote. By "analytic remoteness," we mean to convey the idea that the ancillary effects are mediated by too many intervening steps to link them credibly to the original regulation. By "bureaucratic remoteness," we mean to suggest that the benefits might be
too removed in the sense of implicating the expertise and legal jurisdiction of an agency or subagency too distant from the one tasked
with implementing the regulation in the first place.
In fact, we are sympathetic to the view that the link between the
two should not be excessively attenuated. What we argue for is parity
in the treatment of risk tradeoffs and ancillary benefits. Just as the link
might be too attenuated for certain ancillary benefits, so it might also
be excessively attenuated for certain risk tradeoffs. We invoke a mirror image principle, according to which ancillary benefits should be
put on the same theoretical and practical footing as risk tradeoffs.
If an agency were to ignore the ancillary effects of a regulation altogether, its understanding of the regulation and its impact on society
might thereby be impoverished, but it would not be biased in a systematic way. Such a state of affairs prevailed in the regulatory state
until the recent emergence of risk tradeoff analysis. It was as though
the agency had decided to draw a small circle-defined by reference
to a tight causal link-around the regulation's primary effects and to
consider only those effects that took place within the circle.
With the emergence of risk tradeoff analysis, the agencies' attention has been drawn to the risk tradeoffs of regulation. Thus, with respect to some of the ancillary effects of regulation, the radius of the
circle has been increased-reflecting a looser causal link-to include a
wider range of regulatory impacts. In order to maintain parity, it is incumbent upon the agency to consider ancillary benefits as well. There
is simply no causation-based argument for proceeding otherwise.
The mirror image principle, in addition to pointing out the need
to interpret the statute to require uniform attention to ancillary effects, suggests answers to two potential challenges to our account. In
response both to the claim that ancillary benefits are too remote, and
to the analytically distinct argument that the cost of considering ancillary benefits may outweigh the benefits it (the consideration itselfW
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that is) may confer, we say, in effect: If it is good enough for ancillary
risks, then it is good enough for ancillary benefits.
The same mirror image principle should apply to the cost-benefit
analysis of the study of ancillary benefits. It will not always be desirable to consider the ancillary effects of regulation. Sometimes the
costs of those studies will be great and the potential benefits too slight.
We recognize this problem but note that the same standards applied
to determine whether it is worth undertaking risk tradeoff analysis
should apply as well to ancillary benefit analysis.
CONCLUSION

The law contains many instances in which our attention to the
secondary effects of a rule or regulation is drawn only selectively. This
partial attention can sometimes be justified by the operative normative framework. For instance, courts have struck down statutes as
overbroad in part because they have a chilling effect on future expression quite apart from their primary effect of restricting present
speech."' The chilling effect can be thought of as an instance of an ancillary harm of the regulation. Focusing exclusively on the ancillary
harm (as opposed to entertaining the possibility of ancillary benefits)
of a speech regulation is justified by our strong normative commitment to free speech. In this area of law, we are generally content to
build into our analysis a tendency to "overstate" the harmful effects of
speech regulation in order to reinforce a basic legal norm.
Similarly, in certain normative contexts, selective attention to ancillary benefits is desirable. In his recent Madison Lecture,414 Justice
Breyer argued that constitutional law ought to take seriously the "liberty of the ancients" (to use Constant's formulation ) and not merely
412

See Sunstein, 63 U Chi L Rev at 1553 (cited in note 3) ("[I]t is impossible to know

whether to undertake health-health analysis without first doing a bit of health-health analysis, at
least by making some initial judgments about the ancillary risk-a risk that, by hypothesis, the

agency has not yet explored."). To this "paradox of recursive deliberation," a theoretically insoluble "optimal stopping problem," Wiener posits an institutional solution in which institutions
most able efficiently to consider risk tradeoffs do so, all the while avoiding the twin pitfalls of

"supersynopticism" and "blind incrementalism." 9 Risk at 75-76 (cited in note 35). See also Jay
D. Wexler, Risk in the Balance,30 Con L Rev 225,254 (1997) (reviewing Graham and Wiener,
eds, Risk versus Risk (cited in note 2), and arguing that, in applying risk tradeoff analysis, a court
should answer conservatively the question of "which risks" to focus on).
413 See, for example, Gooding v Wilson, 405 US 518, 527-28 (1972) (noting the potential
chilling effect of a broadly drafted statute regulating speech). See also Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,

Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 Yale L J 853, 856 (1991) ("develop[ing] a framework for
thinking about the shape that overbreadth doctrine ought to take and ... offer[ing] suggestions
about when statutes should be held overbroad and what remedial consequences such holdings
ought to have").
414 Stephen Breyer, MadisonLecture: OurDemocratic Constitution,77 NYU L Rev 245,246
(2002).
415 See Benjamin Constant, PoliticalWritings 309-28 (Cambridge 1988). Isaiah Berlin re-
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the "liberty of the modems." Judges, when engaged in constitutional
interpretation, ought to be sensitive to securing this "active liberty" in
addition to protecting the basic rights of modem, negative liberty
against majoritarian infringement. Although Justice Breyer did not
formulate the matter in precisely this way, it is possible to think of enhancing positive liberty as an ancillary benefit of various actual or hypothetical legal regimes. For example, in connection with the recent
Supreme Court jurisprudence on equal protection and voting rights,
Justice Breyer noted that the positive liberty-enhancing properties 416
of
race-based districts supply a powerful argument for their legality.
The reason why we do (or ought to) investigate this positive effect of
gerrymandering more than potential negative ancillary effects is because of our foundational commitment to democratic decisionmaking.
Thus, depending on context, we may have strong normative reasons to
investigate more thoroughly either ancillary harms or ancillary benefits of different legal regimes.
Turning to our project, we can now ask: What kind of normative
commitment would justify paying attention exclusively to the ancillary
harms of regulation, rather than ancillary benefits? We suggest that
only an ideological dedication to a minimal administrative state and a
concomitant skepticism about regulation could justify that state of affairs. That set of commitments, however, is not characteristic of the
post-New Deal administrative state. On the contrary, in the area of
health, safety, and environmental regulation, our commitment in this
age of cost-benefit analysis should be seen as favoring rationality.
Overly stringent and overly lax regulation are both undesirable, and
are undesirable for the same reason: They decrease social welfare.
Within the sphere of risk regulation, our normative commitment
tugs not in the direction of accentuating ancillary harms or benefits,
but in the direction of parity between them. In this vein, we offer ancillary benefit analysis as a means of achieving parity in regulatory
policy.
In this year's State of the Union Address, President Bush expressed the view that government policies implemented in the wake
of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 will have important ancillary benefits. He said: "Homeland security will make America not
only stronger, but, in many ways, better. Knowledge gained from
bioterrorism research will improve public health. Stronger police and
fire departments will mean safer neighborhoods. Stricter border enforcement will help combat illegal drugs.'417 We encourage policymakferred to these as positive and negative liberty respectively. See Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on

Liberty 121-22 (Oxford 1969).
416 See Breyer, 77 NYU L Rev at 264-65. (cited in note 414).
417

President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address, (Jan 29,2002) available online at
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ers to follow the President's example and consider the ancillary benefits of health, safety, and environmental regulation.

<http:lwww.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html> (visited Apr 22,2002).

